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1. Literature Review 
'Christopher Longuet-Higgins has devised a beautiful demonstration of the functional essence 
of representations. A simple robot moves around on top of a table. Whenever it is about to 
fall o f f , it rings an alarm bell to summon its human keeper. The robot has neither an 
electronic camera nor any kind of pressure sensors, so how can it possibly perceive the edge 
of the table? The answer turns - literally - on a representation. The robot has two main 
wheels, one on the middle of each side, which drives two smaller wheels that hold a piece of 
sandpaper up beneath its baseplate. The paper is the same shape as the table. As the small 
wheel turns, they move the paper around beneath the baseplate so that any moment their 
position on the paper corresponds to the position of the robot on the table. When the small 
wheels reach the edge of the paper a circuit is closed to ring the alarm bell. The main wheels 
are thu, both a means of transport and perceptual organs registering the robot's movement 
around the table. The position, A, of the robot corresponds to the position A', of the smaller 
wheels on the paper, and this position governs the robot's action of sounding the alarm. In 
short, the robot has a rudimentary representation of its position on the table-top.' 
Johnson-Laird, 1993, p. xii 
1.1 Introduction 
As the title of this thesis is the 'cognitive mapping of virtual space' a number of preliminary 
definitions are required to elucidate the area of research addressed. 
Cognitive mapping is operationally defined as the process or processes by which a cognitive 
representation of an environment is acquired. The process of cognitive mapping necessarily 
gives rise to a cognitive map, definitions of which may be found below in section 1.1.2. 
Virtual space is again operationally defined as a computer generated - hence virtual -
enviroimient which may be viewed and / or explored and which as a consequence may have 
spatial properties. 
Therefore the domain of this enquiry is the nature of the cognitive representation of the spatial 
properties of virtual environments. The methodology adopted is one of inter-feature distance 
and angle estimation and the subject matter is a series of simple regular virtual environments. 
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1.1.1 Overview 
This chapter reviews the research into cognitive maps and other relevant aspects of spatial 
cognition and has the following structure: 
Introduction 
- Is this section and describes the field of research and provides some preliminary 
definitions. 
Spatial cognition I: an account of spatial cognition 
- This, the largest section, gives a broad overview of the study of spatial cognition from a 
variety of different disciplines ranging from ecological to cognitive psychology. 
Spatial cognition II: distance and angle estimation 
- This section is of particular relevance as it reviews models of distance and angle estimation 
which wil l be employed throughout the experiments reported in this volume. 
Spatial cognition III: primary & secondary spatial knowledge 
- Spatial knowledge can also be acquired from representations of space such as maps and 
diagrams as well as textual descriptions. This section reviews such evidence. 
Spatial cognition IV: computational approaches 
- A number of different approaches to modelling spatial cognition are considered. The first 
has adopted a route often associated with artificial intelligence (i.e. the use of production 
rules and explicit data structures), the second employs a connectionist paradigm. 
Spatial cognition V: an introduction to virtual reality 
- Finally, the emerging psychology of immersive and non-immersive virtual reality is 
reviewed. 
Summary 
- Is just that. 
Structure of thesis 
- This final section outlines the chapters of this thesis. 
Page 5 
1.1.2 Cognitive maps: some definitions 
Although Tolman (1948) is widely credited as being the first to propose the existence of 
cognitive maps, both Gulliver (1908) who spoke of such a concept in passing and Trowbridge 
(1913) who wrote of imaginary maps, do predate him (noted in Kaplan and Kaplan, 1978, p. 
75). The appeal of the term cognitive map is that it is immediately, although superficially, 
clear what is meant. An initial and naive view of a cognitive map might be ... ^  cognitive map 
is a map-like cognitive representation of an environment, which is the kind of definition which 
may be found in standard textbooks on psychology. However, despite decades of research, a 
more sophisticated and agreed definition of what constitutes a cognitive map still does not 
exist. One reason for this may be that research into cognitive maps and spatial cognition more 
generally has been informed by a number of different sources and disciplines which have 
included geography (e.g. Gould and White, 1974; Magana, Evans and Romney, 1981), 
developmental psychology (e.g. Kosslyn, Pick and Fariello, 1974; Piaget and Inhelder, 1956; 
Pick and Rieser, 1982), environmental psychology (e.g. Evans, 1980), cognitive psychology 
(e.g. Baum and Jonides, 1979; Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982; Tversky, 1981), and Kaplan 
and Kaplan (1982) in their review add education, sociology and planning to this list. 
The following selection of definitions of cognitive maps illustrate this diversity: 
Tohnan(i948) 
- Tolman (1948) reported that he saw a rat's initial set of stimulus - stimulus (S-S) 
expectancies concerning an environment as becoming integrated, with experience, into a 
map-like representation including distance and direction information, writing, 
'...information impinging on the brain, worked over and elaborated ... into a tentative 
cognitive-like map of the environment indicating routes and paths and environmental 
relationships.' 
Downs and Stea (1973) 
- Downs and Stea have offered this formal definition: 'cognitive mapping is a process 
composed of a series of psychological transformations by which an individual acquires, 
codes, stores and decodes information about the relative locations and attributes of 
phenomena in his everyday spatial environment.' ... and ... 'human spatial behaviour is 
dependent on the individual's cognitive map of the spatial environment.' 
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Neisser(1976) 
- Neisser has described cognitive maps as 'orienting schemata specialised to direct both 
perceptual and motor behaviour'. 
Kuipers(1978) 
- Kuipers, in reviewing the reported attributes of cognitive maps, identified the following 
three principle attributes: Cognitive maps are like maps in the head. People have reported 
being able to 'see' such maps, but cognitive maps have properties which both go beyond 
maps and which are less than maps. A cognitive map is like a network. It is made up of 
routes and nodes and some spatial errors may be accounted for by the distortions required to 
preserve the network structure. The cognitive map is like a catalogue of routes. This is a 
reference to cognitive maps being a store of procedural knowledge, that is, how to get from 
A t o B . 
O'Keefeand Nadel(1978) 
- From their work with the hippocampi, O'Keefe and Nadel have described cognitive maps as 
being networks of stimulus-response-stimulus connections. They suggest, for example, that 
these S-R-S connections are rather like instructions one might give to a rambler, i.e. at the 
church, turn right and then sfraight on imtil you see the river... 
Downs (1981) 
- 'Both the real world and the world in the head can be captured conveniently by the idea of 
a map. Although the precise interpretation of the cognitive map is unclear (that is, its 
metaphorical and / or analogical character), its centrality [to spatial cognition] is beyond 
question.' 
Menzel(1987) 
- From a comparative psychological view point Menzel has observed: 'Cognitive mapping is 
by no means a complete explanation of how animals are able to get around in the world. It 
is a largely metaphorical statement about what sorts of information they collect and how 
they organise it. That is, it is a psychological structural concept, rather than a 
developmental, functional or evolutionary concept; and as such it does not answer but 
rather poses further questions.' 
Page? 
Denis (1991) 
- Cognitive maps are "... internal representations of the environment, its metric properties, 
and topological relationships between landmarks' 
As can be seen from these definitions, there is little more than a broad consensus. Tolman 
describes cognitive maps as something more than S-S connections while O'Keefe and Nadel 
reduce them merely to S-R connections. Downs and Stea take cognitive maps to be synonyms 
for spatial cognition. Downs (having reviewed his earlier position) and Menzel see cognitive 
maps as a metaphor or analogy of varying usefulness while in contrast, Denis appears to take 
them literally. Finally, while Neisser emphasises their functional role, Kuipers recognises the 
difficulty in defining them, suggesting that their appearance and characteristics reflect how 
they are measured. 
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1.1.3 By way of illustration... 
While an agreed account of cognitive maps, or spatial cognition more generally, does not exist, 
what is not in question is our remarkable ability to wayfind. A specific example of a real world 
study of cognitive maps is presented here as something of a composite. It is drawn from the 
psychological and anthropological work which has investigated the extraordinary navigational 
abilities of the South Sea Islanders. Their, now well documented, abilities to set off in an 
outrigger without modem navigational aids and find a island which at the point of departure 
subtends an angle of less than 5° has been described by, for example, Oatley (1977) and 
Hutchins (1983). The seamen of the Caroline Islands (Hutchins, 1983) do not employ 
technological or mechanical devices to navigate distances of up to 450 miles, instead they 
employ a 'star compass' which is used to define the courses between islands. In addition to the 
star compass, they use a system of 'ETAKs' which is a way of expressing the distance from a 
reference island (which may be imaginary) from the navigator's home island; but perhaps most 
importantly they employ a conceptualisation (or cognitive map) in which the known geography 
is moving past the navigator, his outrigger, and the stars in the sky. These techniques are 
supplemented by observations of sea birds, and the pattern of the tides which act as 
confirmations of this dead-reckoning. Oatley describes these feats of navigation as a 'form of 
analogical reasoning in a spatial frame' (p.537) which he believes involves the following: 
- the emplojmient of a cognitive map or spatial mental model in which elements, 
relationships and processes of the task (i.e. wayfinding) are represented; 
- the establishing, or recognising, of correspondences between 'real world' cues, such as 
objects or places, and their sjonbolic equivalents in the map or model; 
- using the map or model to make inferences. 
While this is by no means of a complete account of spatial cognition it does identify its key 
features. Firstly there is the presumption of a cognitive representation (a map or model), 
secondly, the need to establish the relationship between the representation and that which it 
represents and finally, a set of operations on the representation to enable way-finding. 
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1.2 Spatial Cognition I : An account of spatial cognition 
1,2.1 Route knowledge and map knowledge 
The distinction between route knowledge and map knowledge is one which is common 
throughout the literature on spatial cognition. 
Route knowledge is generally regarded as consisting of sequentially organised procedural 
descriptions, that is a sequential record of the space between starting points, subsequent 
landmarks and destinations (e.g. Siegel and White, 1975; Moar and Charleton, 1982; 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982;) or as a network of stimulus-response-stimulus connections 
(e.g. O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978). 
In confrast map (or survey) knowledge is defined as consisting of knowledge of the metric and 
topological properties of an environment. These properties include the location of objects in 
the environment relative to a frame of reference such as a fixed co-ordinate system (e.g. 
compass bearing), the global shapes of large land features (e.g. streets, parks etc.), and the 
inter-object route and Euclidean distances. Overall there is considerable evidence for, and 
agreement on, this two component representation of spatial knowledge (e.g. Kozlowski and 
Bryant, 1977; Allen, Siegel and Rosinski, 1978; Lehtio and Poikonene, 1980; Thomdyke and 
Stasz, 1980; Byrne, 1982; Kaplan and Kaplan, 1982; Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982; Dillon, 
McKnight and Richardson, 1993). Table 1-1 holds a summary of the commonly agreed 
distinctions between route knowledge and cognitive maps after Bartram and Smith (1984) 
{quoted in Cohen, 1989): 
route knowledge map knowledge 
Local Global 
Micro Macro 
Episodic Semantic 
Ground based Bird's-eye 
Procedural Propositional 
Concrete / Detailed Schematic / Absfract 
~ Hierarchical Levels 
Sequential Flexible 
Table 1-1 
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1.2.2 Acquiring a cognitive map 
Again there is a broad consensus that route knowledge which is acquired first then becomes 
transformed into a representation which is more map-like in nature. This sequence appears to 
hold for both developmental and cognitive psychology. For example, Piaget (Piaget, Inhelder 
and Szeminska, 1960; Piaget and Inhelder, 1967) has found that young children initially learn 
particular paths (e.g. the way to school), but only later are able to achieve 'co-ordination' of 
these paths in a form of representation which includes directions, distances and common 
elements. What is also agreed is that the key to fransforming this initially acquired route 
knowledge into a cognitive map appears to be increasing exposure to the environment either 
directly or indirectly. 
The sequence of acquiring of spatial knowledge 
Figure 1-1 illustrates two different accounts of the process of acquiring a cognitive map of an 
environment: 
Knowledge of the appearance 
of landmarks 
Knowledge of the sequential 
order of the landmarks 
Knowledge of the landmarks 
and the overall route 
Integration of the route 
schema into a map-like 
representation 
Non-specific schema 
Instantiation of the scheina 
with landmark information 
Route knowledge based 
on landmarks 
Acquisition of map 
knowledge of the 
environment 
Figure 1-1 
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Describing these models in parallel: 
Siegel and White (1975) 
- route schemata 
1. When we first travel in or explore an 
unfamiliar area, we acquire knowledge 
of the appearances of landmarks, but 
we know little or nothing about the 
spatial relations among the landmarks. 
2. With increasing experience, we acquire 
knowledge of the sequential order of 
landmarks. 
3. As we gain more experience of the 
route, we achieve knowledge of the 
spatial relations between the landmarks 
and eventually a concept of the spatial 
layout of the complete route. 
4. Finally, when we have gained 
sufficient information, we integrate the 
different route schemata into a map-
like integration representation of the 
spatial layout of landmarks and routes 
in the area. 
Dillon, McKnight and Richardson (1993) 
- global schemata 
1. Dillon, McKnight and Richardson have 
modelled the process of acquiring a 
cognitive map beginning with Brewer's 
(1981) notion of a non-specific global 
schema is based on general knowledge. 
2. This global schema becomes 
instantiated by the process of 
assimilating landmark information. 
3. This is followed by learning a set of 
routes through the environment using 
these landmarks. This route 
knowledge is procedural, relatively 
inflexible and error prone. 
4. Finally, the fourth stage is the 
acquisition of map or survey 
knowledge of the environment. This 
allows one to give directions, plan 
journeys, and know the relative 
position of features. 
Contrasting these models, it is clear that the main differences lie with the starting premises, 
Siegel and White take a tabula rasa approach while Dillon et al, posit a pre-existing schema. 
Considering these models in turn: Moar and Charleton (1982) have noted that Siegel and 
White's theory implies that i f we learn two intersecting routes through an area, we still first 
acquire a separate route schema for each route. When we have learned each route sufficiently, 
we combine the two route schemata to create a more global cognitive map. They argue that 
schemata based in individual routes are the essential units of representation in the process of 
acquiring a cognitive maps of the environment. However when Moar and Charleton explicitiy 
tested this assertion they found evidence to the contrary. Indeed they found some evidence for 
the acquisition of a more map-like representation prior to route knowledge in their experiments. 
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Turning to Dillon et al's model. One immediate difficulty with this model lies with the concept 
of a generalised schema, a concept which is inherent circular in nature. Such schema are taken 
to have arisen from a process of generalisation of pre-existing (in this instance spatial) 
knowledge which in turn relies on the pre-existing generalised schema. This position is thus 
untenable. 
Finally, Cohen and Cohen (1985) in a review of how urban residents acquire a cognitive map of 
their neighbourhood offer a simpler account of the sequence of acquiring spatial knowledge 
which is as follows: (i) landmarks and simple routes are learned fairly quickly (in the first three 
weeks); then after approximately three months (ii) a slight increase in the number of landmarks 
and routes follows, together with configuration knowledge. This second stage also corresponds 
to the acquisition of a more global, map-like representation of the environment. However, 
while numerous studies have found that map-like knowledge arises and improves with 
increasing residence in an environment or community (e.g. Beck and Wood, 1976) none of 
these studies (nor the two described above) has neither confrolled the subject's access to maps 
or other indirect sources of knowledge' nor can account for the role of such information. 
Yet despite these differences and difficulties it is generally agreed that route knowledge is 
acquired prior to map knowledge of an environment although there remains quite a wide 
difference in the detail of how this occurs. 
The role of activity in acquiring spatial knowledge 
The evidence for the importance of activity in the acquisition of a spatial knowledge of an 
environment comes from a number of different sources and includes environmental, 
developmental and comparative psychology, examples of which are now briefly reviewed. 
Environmental psychology. Francescato and Mebane (1973) have found that adults in both 
Rome and Milan, aged 30 and under, tended to draw maps of the cities with a bias towards 
paths, while older subjects drew more landmarks. They have suggested that older subjects may 
have been less likely to have learned the layout of the city by car than younger individuals. 
This interpretation, however, as Cohen and Cohen (1985) note, rests on the assumption that 
landmarks are more salient to walkers and paths are more salient to drivers and passengers. 
Similarly Walsh, Krauss, and Regnier (1981) (quoted in Cohen and Cohen) have found that 
active elderly adults drew more accurate maps of their environment than an equivalent group of 
'The differences between spatial knowledge acquired from the environment and from representations of the 
enviroimient are examined in section 1.3.6. 
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inactive elderly individuals. 
Modes of fransportation have been examined by comparing of spatial knowledge for people 
who typically fravel in different ways (e.g. by car, bus or train, or as pedestrians). While 
pedestrians have the most direct sensori-motor experiences, walking does limit the amount of 
space covered. Bus and frain travellers are the most physically passive participants of the three 
groups and are least involved in navigation decisions. Such travellers have been shown to draw 
less accurate maps of the environment than the more active travellers (e.g. Appleyard, 1970; 
Beck and Wood, 1976), and to make more errors on a paired comparison distance estimation 
task (e.g. Golledge and Spector, 1978^). 
Experimental psychology. Goldin and Thomdyke (1982) have investigated the different types 
of knowledge acquired from direct navigation compared with simulated navigation. The direct 
navigation condition consisted of a bus tour of an area, while the simulated navigation 
condition consisted of watching a film of a trip through the same area. Further to this, subjects 
received either: a period of map study prior to their trip; a running commentary during the tour 
or no additional information (the control group). The map study consisted of studying at a map 
with landmarks and routes for 10 minutes prior to taking the tour. The running commentary of 
the tours named of the sfreets on the route, landmarks, the distance between intersections and 
the current compass direction. The subjects in both conditions were passive observers. 
After the tour the subjects were asked to carry out an array of six tasks. These consisted of: 
location recognition, location sequencing, landmark location, route and Euclidean distance 
estimations and a basic spatial ability test which tested visual memory, spatial visualisation and 
perceptual independence abilities. 
Goldin and Thomdyke found that the subjects in the film condition identified tour locations 
better than those who were on the actual tour. Within the film group the control group 
performed better than the two groups who had received additional information. This difference 
was not found for the subjects on the real tour. The subjects in the film groups proved to be 
more accurate at location-sequencing than the subjects on the real tour, and the narrative 
condition proved to have a negative effect on performance across both conditions. 
However, the film group performed more poorly than the other groups in the orientation test, 
the subjects on the real tour being approximately 10° more accurate than those in the film 
group. Furthermore the subjects in the film condition made significantiy more errors in excess 
of 90° than those subjects in the real tour condition. 
'^Cited in Cohen and Cohen (1985). 
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Both the film and the real tour groups who had studied the map prior to the trip, performed 
more poorly on the orientation task than those in the confrol and narrative groups. No 
differences between the groups were found for the route distance estimation tasks, Euclidean 
estimations and landmark placement tasks. 
In post-hoc tests differences were found for those in the film group who had received additional 
information. Those who had studied the map showed a higher performance than all of the other 
five groups, and those who had listened to the tour description had a lower performance than 
the other five groups. The results of the study clearly indicate that people can acquired spatial 
knowledge of environments from a range of media although it is equally clear that exposure to 
different media give rise to different patterns of spatial knowledge. For example, exposure to 
film gives rise to more accurate spatial memory for locations but much poorer memory for 
orientation than direct exposure to the enviroimient. 
Developmental psvchologv. Feldman and Acredolo (1979) measured the accuracy of memory 
for location of an object as a fimction of either self-directed or experimenter-directed 
exploration of the enviroimient. Four and 10-year-old children either walked or were led 
through a rectangular hallway in search of an object, which they later were asked to relocate. 
For the younger children, active exploration facilitated memory for spatial location. However 
the older children's memories were not influenced by either condition. 
Comparative psvchologv. Menzel (1978) has reported that young chimpanzees are capable of 
forming cognitive maps of an environment through passive exposure to it alone. Menzel had a 
chimpanzee carried aroimd a field by an assistant, while allowing the animal to observe another 
person hiding food in clumps of grass, under leaves and so forth, in a number of different 
places. When the chimpanzee was released, the animal was observed to go directly to where 
the food was hidden. The chimpanzee did not retrace the explorer's route but typically 
followed a shorter, more direct route, which Menzel interpreted as evidence of the animal 
having formed a cognitive map of the environment. 
An ecological perspective. It is widely held that perception and action are tightly interlocked 
processes (e.g. Neisser, 1976; Gibson, 1979; Reason, 1984) and that animals and people do not 
passively perceive the world but move about in it actively, picking up the information needed 
to guide their movement. There is thus a continuous cycle between the organism and the 
environment. The consequence of this viewpoint is that the role of perception is to furnish that 
information needed to organise action, which in turn implies that an imderstanding of 
perception requires an xmderstanding of the systems controlling action. Active locomotion 
within a large-scale environment is seen to lead to a more accurate and flexible spatial 
representation than physically passive experiences. Actively moving through the environment 
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brings the individual into contact with the multiple perspectives of space and facilitates the 
integration of views and the co-ordination of percepts with motor experience (e.g. Brewer and 
Dupree, 1983; Norman, 1981). 
1.2.3 The structure of cognitive maps 
There is a body of evidence for the premise that there is an internal hierarchical stmcture to 
cognitive maps (e.g. Lynch, 1960; Stevens and Coupe, 1978; Lehtio and Poikonene, 1980; 
Allen, 1981; Hirtle and Mascolo, 1986; McNamara, 1986; and Couclelis, Golledge, Gale and 
Tobler, 1987). Lynch was perhaps the first to argue that cognitive maps [of cities] work 
primarily as orientation aids and reflect the basic elements of the physical layout of a city. His 
research has suggested that five key environmental, hierarchically organised features make up 
urban settings, which are as follows: paths, path intersections (nodes), landmarks, districts, and 
boundaries (edges). Similarly Rosch (1976) and Tversky and Hemenway (1983) have 
identified a taxonomy or hierarchy of environmental features. Hirtle and Jonides (1985) have 
also found that similar tj^jes of buildings tended to be grouped together, for example, 
commercial buildings were found to be recalled with other commercial buildings, and 
university buildings with other university building, despite the fact that the two types of 
buildings were geographically interspersed. Similarly, Hirtle and Mascolo (1986) have 
demonstrated the effects of semantic clustering on the memory of spatial locations. They found 
that semantic labels biased memory for the location of landmarks of a typical city, for example, 
government buildings tended to be remembered as being more closely co-located than they 
actually were. Cognitive maps are then believed to reflect this stmcture. 
Lehtio and Poikonene (1980) have also presented evidence of the hierarchical arrangement of 
[urban] spatial locations, with respect to relative distance and orientation. In a series of studies 
they asked residents of a city to make a number of simple spatial judgements (e.g. they asked 
subjects whether or not two named sfreets crossed). They found that their subjects appeared to 
activate a low resolution mental map first but had access to a more detailed fine-grained 
representation i f required. 
However, Ferguson and Hegarty (1994) have suggested that the evidence for a hierarchical 
stmcture to cognitive maps may simply be a reflection of working memory limitations. For 
example, i f a given geographical region has only a small number of landmarks (say, < 5) then 
people wi l l probably represent that region as a single 'chunk' however i f a region is more 
complex, people may create subdivisions so that an hierarchical stmcture necessarily emerges 
(such chunking has also been observed by, for example, Egan and Schartz, 1979). 
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1.2.4 The non-veridical nature of cognitive maps 
Cognitive maps do appear to have a number of map-like features in that they preserve relative 
distance information and the relative location of objects. In this respect they would appear to 
be broadly consistent with a limited two-dimensional Euclidean model of the environment. Yet 
as Downs (1981) notes, any map is by definition a model and therefore less full than the 
original space. In addition to being less full, cognitive maps have also been found to be subject 
to distinct, systematic distortions. A number of researchers (e.g. Stevens and Coupe, 1978; 
Tversky, 1981; Thomdyke, 1981; and Moar and Bower, 1983) have observed systematic 
distortion in the recall of spatial configurations. Moar and Bower (1983) have found that 
judgement of angles between routes are subject to systematicity in that there is a tendency to 
recall angles closer to a multiple of 90° than the actual angle. A related example of this 
systematicity or normalisation, is the finding of Brewer and Treyens (1981) that the recall of 
objects in a room are distorted in that they tended to be incorrectly recalled in their canonical 
positions. Similarly Thomdyke (1981) found that subjects' estimates of distance increase as a 
linear function of the number of intervening points along the routes when making judgements 
from memorised maps. This so-called 'clutter effect' has been observed when subjects have 
been asked to estimate the length of a route (which is filled with objects, landmarks or turns) 
they have traversed (e.g. Bjme, 1979; Cohen, Baldwin and Sherman, 1978; Sadella and 
Staplin, 1980, Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982). Similar but reduced effects have also been 
noted when subjects were asked to make judgements from their knowledge of the United States 
and while viewing a map. Finally, Holyoak and Mah (1982) have found that distances are 
judged differentially depending upon their proximity to reference points (i.e. landmarks), 
specifically, distances near a referent are over-estimated. They asked one group of students to 
imagine themselves on the East Coast of the United States, and another group to imagine 
themselves on the West Coast. Both groups were then asked to estimate distances between 
pairs of cities lying along an east-west axis, for example, San Franciso and Salt Lake City, New 
York City and Pittsburgh. The students who had been asked to adopt a West Coast perspective 
overestimated the distance between the westerly pairs relative to the easterly pairs, and the 
students asked to adopt an East Coast perspective did the opposite. Thus, it would appear that 
the vantage point or the frame of reference (see below) systematically distorted the judgements. 
Finally, Sadalla, Burroughs and Staplin (1980) have found evidence that judged distances 
between spatial reference points and non-reference points are asymmetrical; non-reference 
points being judged nearer to reference points than were reference points to non-reference 
points. While these reported effects do appear to be robust, O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) have 
voiced the following objection: 
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it is hard to imagine how the non-commutativity of distances could be encoded in the 
same structure which provides for the easy use of alternate routes to the same goal and 
for the rapid reversal of paths. Non-commutativity almost demands that the map 
represents paths in terms of individual responses, or landmarks, involving in traversing 
them... 
O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978 p. 77 
This objection remains unanswered. Furthermore, and in contrast to the above there are 
numerous studies demonstrating the remarkable accuracy spatial knowledge from a well 
explored space. For example, both Baird, Merrill and Tannenbaum, 1979 and Baum and 
Jonides, 1979, who had students construct models of their campus, found that each landmark 
was placed extremely close to its counterpart in the true configuration. 
1.2.5 Landmarks, spatial reference points and frames of reference 
Lynch (1960) has suggested that navigation through cities is dependent on knowledge of 
landmarks; similarly Siegel and White (1975) have argued that landmark knowledge is a 
necessary condition for way finding to occur; landmarks are described as strategic foci to and 
from which individuals travel. Landmarks have also been found to play a role in the 
development and the maintenance of spatial orientation and Allen, Siegel and Rosinski (1978) 
have concluded that the acquisition of spatial knowledge in a novel environment begins with 
the identification of key environmental features (or landmarks), a finding which is consistent 
with the models of spatial knowledge discussed in section 1.2.1. The term landmark has 
additionally been used to denote central elements in an individual's cognitive representation of 
a region; the most easily recalled attributes of a region have been typically referred to as 
landmarks. From this, it is clear that the definition of a landmark has been rather circular. 
However the following components of what constitutes a landmark appear to be as follows: 
- a significant feature of a route, which affords navigational decision points; 
- a significant feature of a region, which allows an observer to maintain spatial orientation; 
- salient information identified in the recall of an environment. 
Sadalla, Burroughs and Staplin (1980) have fiirther refined the idea of landmarks in a series of 
experiments in which they identified what they describe as spatial reference points. Using 
cluster analysis they found that familiarity, dominates nearby places, near the centre of a 
region and cultural importance accounted for 91% of the variance of what makes an 
environmental feature a spatial reference point. Furthermore, Sadalla et al in a series of five 
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experiments confirmed that large scale spaces do indeed contain such reference points, and that 
these points serve as organising loci for other points in space. As akeady noted, they found 
evidence that the judged distances between reference points and non-reference points is 
asymmetrical. Results of additional reaction time experiments indicated that from a given 
point in space, the proximity of adjacent reference points may be more quickly verified than 
can the proximity of equivalently placed non-reference points. Further, the data indicate that 
the orientation of a particular point in space may be more quickly verified when the observer is 
cognitively located at a reference location than when the observer is cognitively located at a 
non-reference location. These data suggest that the cognitive location of many points in space 
are either stored or retrieved in relation to a smaller set of spatial reference points. Spatial 
reference points appear to provide an organisational structure that facilitates the location of 
adjacent point in space. Such spatial reference points should be distinguished from landmarks 
as it seems likely that there are (other) discriminable features of the environment which could 
be used to support navigation but that do not produce the above results - a landmark, Sadalla, 
Burroughs and Staplin conclude, is a less general term that spatial reference point. Finally 
Ferguson and Hegarty (1994) in studying spatial representations created from reading 
discourse, define an anchor as any landmark that is used in the text as a reference point for 
defining the location of other landmarks. 
Frames of reference 
Just as a minimum of two landmarks are required to align a physical map with the environment, 
the cognitive process of orientation is seen as the means by which cognitive maps are aligned 
with the spatial environment which gave rise to them. Orientation is made with respect to a 
frame of reference, the word 'orientation' itself means 'aligned with the East' (Lat. oriens). 
There are three generally accepted classification of these frames of reference (e.g. Downs and 
Stea, 1973), which are: 
- ego-centric, that is, based about the representing individual. This is envisaged as a three-
dimensional co-ordinate system wherein objects are located in terms of in front of, to the 
right or left, or above or below (e.g. Bryant and Tversky, 1992). 
- a frame of reference based on the environment represented. Lynch (1960) notes that terms 
such as 'sea-ward', or 'up stream' denote such a frame of reference. The above comments 
on landmarks or spatial reference points also supports this, e.g. Sadalla, Burroughs and 
Staplin's (1980) evidence of landmarks as acting as organisation foci. Downs and Stea 
also observe that when a landmark is used as a frame of reference it is often in terms of 
polar co-ordinates with the landmark acting as the centre. 
Page 19 
- An externally based fi-ame of reference such as one based on compass co-ordinates. 
As appealingly simple as this classification is, it does not address a number of questions: 
firstly, do frames of reference arise in this particular order and i f so how does one acquire each 
step and how do they interact and to what extent are they orthogonal? Secondly, what 
determines the use of one over another? Is there an element of 'cognitive economy'l Finally, 
how precisely do cognitive maps and frames of reference interact - which arises first or do they 
do so in parallel? 
1.2.6 Methodological issues: A diversity of approaches 
Since 1980 the study of spatial cognition and cognitive maps more specifically has become a 
major focus of both environmental psychology and social geography (including such things as 
the sub-discipline of demography) as distinct from experimental and cognitive psychology. 
The differences between an environmental approach and a cognitive or experimental approach 
largely lie with the scale and context of the studies. The former are largely naturalistic with 
tasks such as asking people to draw a sketch map of their neighbourhood or asking students to 
constmct a map of their campus (e.g. Baird, Merrill and Taimenbaum, 1979). 
In contrast, the experimental and cognitive approach is frequentiy laboratory based with tasks 
such as distance estimation between two points on a map which subjects had learned, or 
subjects being asked to push one of two buttons to indicate whether a point in a given stimulus 
configuration is on the left or right (e.g. Hintzman, O'Dell and Amdt, 1981) or having their 
memory tested as to the vertical arrangement of abstract shapes (e.g. Tversky, 1981). 
Consequently the practitioners and affiliates of the environmental approach are frequently 
critical of the latter for lacking in ecological validity (e.g. Evans, 1980), while the advocates of 
the experimental approach complain of the lack of controls in studies of the environmentalists 
(e.g. Levine, Jankovic and Palij, 1982; Taylor and Tversky, 1992a; 1992b). Overall, the 
approach adopted by ecological psychology is necessarily uncontrolled and while it may reflect 
and quantify real world spatial knowledge it does not appear to have a great deal to contribute 
directiy to the understanding of the underlying cognitive processes. Between these extremes, 
there are, of course, a wide range of approaches: Jonides and Baum, 1978 had subjects imagine 
walking from one campus building to another; Piaget and Inhelder (1967) had their subjects 
imagine scenes from different perspectives; Attenneave and Farrar (1977) elicited judgements 
about locations and orientations of objects behind their subjects' heads; Kozlowski and Bryant 
(1977) asked their subjects to estimate the lengths of streets and their angles of intersection and 
to point to unseen objects (Kozlowski and Bryant, 1979); Byrne (1979) obtained judgements of 
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the lengths of streets and the angles of their intersection; and Loftus (1978) measured the 
accuracy of visually presented compass directions, to cite but a few. 
Sketch maps 
Lynch (1960) was one of the first to analysis sketch maps made by residents of their own cities. 
From his subjective analysis of hand-drawn sketch maps he devised a taxonomy of the urban 
which he has argued reflects the contents of people's cognitive maps, however he offered no 
account of the confounding effect of individual differences in ability to sketch a map. 
His approach raised two primary difficulties with sketch maps have been addressed in a variety 
of ways. 
- The subjective analysis of sketch maps has been replaced by a more objective 
categorisation. For example, Rodwin et al (quoted in Jakle, Brunn and Roseman, 1976) 
have created a classification system, facilitating the grouping of sketch maps into two broad 
categories - sequential and spatial, and these categories are, in turn, subdivided into, for 
sequential maps - fragmented, chain, branch and loop, and netted; and for spatial maps -
scattered, mosaic, linked and patterned varieties. However it is far from clear what 
psychological relevance these categories have. 
- The difference in the subject's ability to sketch is particularly relevant when the systematic 
distortions are observed in sketch maps which may reflect either the sketcher's lack of skill 
or real distortions in cognitive map itself. Evans (1980) is his review paper cites the work of 
Howard et al (1973) who examined the psychometric properties of sketch maps. They 
asked subjects to perform one of the following tasks:(i) to draw a map of the environment; 
(ii) to place objects in a scale model; (iii) to make magnitude estimates judgements of inter-
object distances; and (iv) to make ratio estimates of inter-object distances by marking off a 
standardised line in proportion to the real distance. Howard et al found that all four 
methods proved to be reliable, with reliability coefficients (r) ranging from 0.987 to 0.995 
which does indeed appear to lend weight to the validity of sketch maps as a means of 
eliciting spatial knowledge. 
- However, more recently, Hirtle and Jonides (1985) have compared the accuracy of absolute 
distance estimates arrived at by variety of means: (i) magnitude estimates proved to be the 
most accurate, (actual / estimated distance, r = 0.80); (ii) constructed map, that is, subjects 
asked to draw a subset of the features in a memorised map, were almost as accurate (r = 
0.73) but, (iii) sketch maps (r = 0.63) proved to be the least accurate means. 
Nonetheless, sketch maps have proved to be a very popular means by which spatial knowledge 
and cognition has been studied and the work of Lynch has been built upon by a large number of 
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others (e.g. Appleyard, 1970; Francescato and Mebane, 1973; Beck and Wood; 1976; Walsh, 
Krauss, and Regnier, 1981; Cohen and Cohen, 1985). Sketch maps have been the subject of 
work by Taylor and Tversky (1992a; 1992b) who have examined their interpretations (1992a) 
and their creation from textual descriptions (1992b). This work is discussed in some detail in 
section 1.3.6. 
Distance and angles estimation 
The use of sketch maps, has in certain quarters been replaced by the use of other measures such 
as distance estimation (e.g. Baird, 1979 etc.), the estimation of angles and bearings (e.g. Loftus 
1978; Hintzman, O'Dell and Amdt, 1981), comparative distance judgements (e.g. Baum and 
Jonides; 1979; Hirtle and Jonides, 1985) or the estimation of both angle and distance 
estimation, i.e. vectors (e.g. Byme, 1979; Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982). Such methods 
have the very clear advantage that they are less likely to be biased by the artistic skill of the 
subject or the subjective rating of the experimenter. The findings of such approaches are 
reviewed in section 1.3. 
Other techniques 
More recently, two additional techniques have emerged for the study of cognitive mapping. 
These are the use of spatial priming (e.g. McNamara, 1986; McNamara, Hardy and Hirtle, 
1989) and the use of the ordered tree clustering algorithm (e.g. Hirtle and Jonides, 1985; 
McNamara, Hardy and Hirtle, 1989, but these wil l not be reviewed as their relevance to this 
enquiry is remote. 
What is being measured? 
While there is no doubt that all of the above techniques are addressing aspects of spatial 
cognition it remains very unclear exactly what it is they are measuring. As will be seen in the 
next two sections different methodological approaches appear to be more suited to the study of 
spatial knowledge acquired from large scale spaces (e.g. cities) and others to spatial knowledge 
acquired fi-om small scale spaces or representation of space, yet for all of these very clear 
differences there has been no attempt to establish the validity and reliability of one approach 
over another. 
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1.3 Spatial cognition II: Distance and angle estimation 
1.3.1 Distance estimation 
At the time of writing there is no agreed or verified model of distance estimation. The most 
comprehensive is that of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth which they sought to verify in 19823. 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth (1982) 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth began with the following premises: spatial knowledge acquired 
from maps is qualitatively different from spatial knowledge acquired from the free exploration 
of the environment. Spatial knowledge acquired from the free exploration of environment is 
initially procedural, that is knowledge of how to get from A to A^ but this procedural 
knowledge gradually becomes more detailed and might include 'impressions of the distance 
travelled along each leg (straight-line segment) of the route, the angle of the turns between 
legs, and terrain features along the route' - Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, p.562. This sequential 
account of a route, with extended exposure to the environment, undergoes a further 
development in that it becomes translucent. This translucence may refer to the cognitive 
manipulation of an aspect of a cognitive map which allows individuals to 'see' through 
obstacles. 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's account of spatial knowledge acquired from maps is as follows, 
' We assume that when learning maps intentionally, the individual acquires an image of the 
depicted space.' - p.563. They describe spatial knowledge acquired from maps as survey 
knowledge which is fiirther described as knowledge of the topographic properties of the 
environment relative to a fixed co-ordinate system such as compass bearings, the global shapes 
of environment features and the inter-feature Euclidean distances. 
Given these fundamental difference in the ways in which spatial knowledge is acquired from 
these two different media, Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth go on to model how Euclidean and route 
distance estimates are made: 
3 It should be noted that some of these points have been made earlier in this chapter in a number of different contexts 
and Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth also offer an account of the cognitive processes involved in estimating angles which 
is intimately linked to their distance estimation model. 
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Type of experience Euclidean Route 
Map Visualise map Visualise map 
Locate endpoints Locate endpoints 
Measure length Measure leg length 
Generate response Sum lengths 
Generate response 
Free exploration Mentally simulate route Mentally simulate route 
Estimate leg lengths Estimate leg lengths 
Estimate turning angles Sum lengths 
Perform informal algebra Generate response 
Generate response 
Clearly an important difference between distance estimation from spatial knowledge acquired 
from free exploration and spatial knowledge acquired from maps is the dependency between 
the Euclidean and route judgements. In the free exploration condition, Euclidean judgements 
are derived from route estimates. 
Their experiment 
Having outlined this model, Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth then explicitly tested it. In doing so 
they set out to 
investigate the 
differences in spatial 
knowledge acquired 
from maps and spatial 
knowledge acquired 
from the free exploration 
of a particular 
environment. 
Thomdyke and Hayes-
Roth selected as their 
environment the first 
floor of the Rand 
Corporation in Santa 
Figure 1-2 Monica, USA. The first 
floor consisted of two 
buildings separated by 
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an enclosed hall with a 50° ' jog' (or dogleg). The building contained a number of distinct and 
prominent public areas which, with the exception of the hall, were all set at right-angles to each 
other. Figure 1-2 is a very approximate copy of the map used by Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth. 
Their 48 subjects were divided into two groups, those who had previously acquired knowledge 
of the building by either actually working there (the route knowledge or navigation condition -
navigation hereafter) and those who were requested to acquire such knowledge by studying 
floor plans of the building (the map knowledge condition). Within each condition, a fiirther 
subdivision was made. 
For the map condition, (i) subjects were required to leam a map of the building so that they 
could reproduce it without error; (ii) as group (i) but with a fiirther 30 minutes of over-learning; 
and (iii) as (i) but with a fiirther 60 minutes of over-learning. 
For the navigation condition, (i) subjects were identified who had worked at the Rand for 1 to 2 
months; (ii) for 6 to 12 months; and (iii) for 12 to 24 months. 
Both groups were asked to estimate: 
- Euclidean (i.e. 'sfraight line') distances from the centre of one room to another; 
- route distances again from the centre of one room to another; 
- orientation, that is, subjects were asked to point to a given location from their current 
location, and; 
- location, that is, to locate a designated location from a partial map. 
Map-learning 
As noted above Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth have argued that subjects who have acquired 
spatial knowledge from a map effectively acquire an image of that map. Subjects are then able 
to estimate distances by scanning the image of the map from point to point in a manner which 
is analogous to visually scatming an actual map. 
When estimating a Euclidean distance, subjects scan the image and estimate the distance by 
comparing it to the provided scale distance. However as Euclidean distance estimates do not 
depend on the route information, the error in subjects' estimates of Euclidean distance will be 
independent of the number of the legs on the connecting route. 
However when subjects estimate route distances, they must estimate and sum the lengths of the 
component legs on the route. This additional processing is a potential source of error into the 
estimation process. The greater the number of component legs to be estimated and combined, 
the greater the opportunity for error. As a consequence, the error in map-learning subjects' 
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estimate of route distances should exceed the error in their estimates of Euclidean distance. 
Given these predictions Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth found that the performance of the map 
learning subjects with regard to distance estimates was characterised as follows: 
- the correlation between the Euclidean and route distance estimates was high (r = 0.82). 
This finding matches their prediction. 
- more and larger errors were made in estimating route distance than Euclidean distance and 
these error were not reduced with over-learning. This finding matches their prediction. 
- the relative accuracy of the estimates was equally divided between Euclidean and route 
distance estimates (i.e. for 50% of the sample the correlation between actual and route 
distance was higher than the correlation between the actual and Euclidean distances). 
While this finding does not match their prediction it is not a contradiction. 
As noted above these results were taken to be a qualified confirmation of their theory .regarding 
map-learning. 
Navigation-learning 
While the distances estimates made by the navigation subjects proved to be less uniform than 
the map learning subjects, they did offer further confirmation of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's 
model, specifically: 
- the judgements of route distances were more accurate than Euclidean distances, but as the 
amount of navigation experience increased, the differences in accuracy of judgement 
between route and Euclidean distances diminished. This finding matches their prediction. 
- Euclidean judgements were found to become more accurate with extended navigational 
experience though the accuracy of route distances judgements was unchanged. This 
finding matches their prediction. 
In summary 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth have produced a model of large scale"* distance estimation which 
makes a number of yery specific predictions that have some measure of empirical support. 
Firstly, route distance estimates made from spatial knowledge acquired from free exploration 
tend to be more accurate than Euclidean judgements. The reverse is tme for spatial knowledge 
acquired from maps. Secondly, although initially route estimates are more accurate than 
^Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth describe their field of study 'large scale space', p. 562. 
Page 26 
Euclidean estimates this difference diminishes with increased exploration. No such 
improvement is observed in the map leaming. 
However, the model does rest on an unproved premise, namely that when an individual uses a 
map he or she commits it to memory and the representation of the memory is an image 
{'...when learning maps intentionally, the individual acquires an image of the depicted space.' -
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, p.563). It can be further argued that their emphasis is on learning 
the map and hot the spatial knowledge acquired from it. The point to be recognised is that 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth are addressing a sijecial case and one which has dubious validity. 
Their position is likely to have been based on the work of Thomdyke and Stasz (1980) who 
investigated individual differences in ability to acquire knowledge from the environment by 
studying maps. The tasks were based upon acquiring specific knowledge from maps this 
knowledge consisted of the relative and absolute distances between objects, their locations and 
being able to reproduce the map afterwards. Two maps were used; a town map and a country 
map. The subjects consisted of a small number of catographers (experts) and a group of 
individuals who were unfamiliar with map reading. The surprising feature of the results was 
that the experts did not necessarily perform better, the differences in performance could largely 
be attributed to the quality of subject's visual memory. However Gilhooly, Wood, Kinnear and 
Green (1988) demonstrated that the failure of the experts to show superior memory for the 
maps was due to the fact that planimetric (that is, tourist map like) maps rather than contour 
maps had been used by Thomdyke and Stasz. When the latter were used then the experts 
showed superior recall over the non-experts once again demonstrating the domain specificity of 
experts' knowledge (e.g. de Groot, 1965; Egan and Shwartz, 1979; Adelson, 1981; Anderson, 
1983). 
So, continuing with the above discussion, Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth do not present 
convincing evidence that people effectively memorise maps and further, the word 'map' could 
equally be replaced with 'figure', 'diagram' or 'schematic' and in doing so it is difficult to 
maintain that what is being acquired is still spatial knowledge. Furthermore given that maps are 
not, in general, committed to memory (except by secret agents, perhaps), Lieblich and Arbib 
(1982) have argued, 'Maps are meaningless ... unless we have a process for using them' (p. 
628). They go on to say that in using a map to, say, get from one town to another, we must 
recognise the representations (and orientations) of the towns, identify paths between them and 
on that basis formulate a plan of action. In short, a map's function is to represent paths and 
other spatial relations which can be tum into 'programs' for directing actions. 
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1.3 .2 The cognitive representation of distance information 
There are a number of possible means by which distance information may be represented in 
memory. Here is a selection: 
Euclidean 
Baum and Jonides (1979) and Kerst and Howard (1978) are among those who have explicitly 
argued that format of spatial information stored in memory is essentially Euclidean. 
Specifically, Baum and Jonides (1979) have compared judgements of distance made from 
memory (i.e. distance between two different landmarks on a University campus) and 
judgements made from perception (i.e. figures displayed on a VDU), measuring size of error, 
and response latency. While judgements in the perceptual condition were significantly quicker 
and more accurate than judgements made from memory, Baum and Jonides also found a clear 
linear relationship between distance estimates and the amount of time subject took to arrive at 
these estimates for both the perceptual and memory conditions. From these data, they 
concluded that the cognitive mechanisms underlying the judgements were not ftmdamentally 
different and that an image scanning paradigm (such as Kosslyn's) could account for the results 
from the memory condition. 
This position is fiirther substantiated by the body of evidence that, have demonstrated 
correspondences between perceptual and memorial performance data on other tasks that utilise 
spatial stimuli (e.g. Cooper, 1976, Finke and Schmidt, 1978; Kosslyn, 1973, 1975; Kosslyn and 
Pomerantz, 1977; Moyer, 1973; Podgomy and Shepard, 1978; Shepard, 1978; Shepard and 
Podgomy, 1978). These results support the position that the memory representation used to 
perform these spatial tasks has much in common with the perceptual experiences of the objects 
themselves. In particular, it has been argued that memory representations, like percepts, can 
have continuously varying analogue properties that accurately reflect the objects they represent 
(e.g. Holyoak, 1977; Kosslyn, 1973, 1975, 1978; Kosslyn and Pomerantz, 1977; Shepard, 1978; 
Shepard and Podgomy, 1978). Typically, such representations have been described as visual 
images that can be generated and manipulated in memory (Kosslyn and Pomerantz, 1977; 
Kosslyn and Schwartz, 1977). 
However, as Baird^, 1970 writes 'A Euclidean model of size and distance has permeated the 
perception literature almost from the outset. It would indeed be convenient if an observer's 
judgements of environmental extents reflect the operation of a ready-made Euclidean metric, 
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invariant over changes in target position...But the problem is more complicated than was 
recognised at first, and it is now certain that metric constancy is only a special case that occurs 
with a particular combination of stimuli, methods and instructions.' 
Power function 
In contrast to the findings of Baum and Jonides (1979) there are studies which have indicated 
that estimates of distance and line length based on memory are related to true distance by 
psycho-phvsical power fimctions similar to those obtained in perceptual experiments (e.g. Kerst 
and Howard, 1978; Moyer et al, 1978). Kerst and Howard (1978) have also found evidence of 
a power fiinction^ relationship between the estimated area (estimated from memory) of a body 
of land (a country or a state of the US) and the actual area. This evidence is taken to be 
consistent with the findings of Bjdrkman et al, 1960 and Lundberg and Ekman, 1971 both of 
whom they quote. 
Ordinal 
Finally, Nelson and Chailkin (1980) haye argued that the available evidence is not sufficient to 
support either the Euclidean or power fiinction positions. Instead they offer a Weighted-
Distortion Theory as a basis for a new theory of spatial memory, the main points of which are 
as follows: (i) the accuracy of a spatial memory is a monotonically decreasing fimction of the 
physical distance between the to-be-remembered spatial location and a landmark; (ii) the 
direction of distortion for a spatial location from memory is towards the landmark; and, (iii) the 
magnitude of the direction-of-distortion effect is a monotonically decreasing function of the 
physical distance between the to-be-remembered spatial location. While this model is 
supported by a (pessimistic) view of the evidence it has not found wide support. 
In conclusion 
From the evidence presented above, it is clear that there is neither a simple nor single answer to 
the question of the nature of the cognitive representation of distance information in memory. 
In part it would appear to depend upon the scale of the study (i.e. real life knowledge of the 
environment compared with spatial knowledge acquired from an artificial setting); and how the 
^Gited in Nelson and Chaiklin, 1980 p. 530. 
^They describe the power function as follows: 4^  = k<D", where y is the psychological magnitude, <D the physical 
magnitude, k is a scaling factor depending on the units of measure taken and n, a parameter depending on the 
judgement continuum. 
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spatial knowledge has been acquired (i.e. is primary or secondary); and ultimately how the 
experiment measured the nature of the representation. 
1.3.3 The characteristics of judgements of angles and orientation 
Again like distance estimation there is no agreed and verified model of angle or orientation 
estimation. However some of the characteristics of judgements of angles such as directional 
bias and systematicity have been investigated. This section wil l begin by considering the 
characteristics of judgements of angles and orientation, it wil l also review the biases in 
judgement of angles and orientation ending with some notes on people's sense of direction. 
Angle estimation 
One of the most thorough investigations of the judgement of angles was conducted by 
Hintzman, O'Dell and Amdt (1981) in a series of 14 experiments. Throughout their basic 
measurement was the time taken to judge the angle of a target fromi a given starting orientation. 
In all fourteen experiments the task was one in which the subject was told to imagine being at a 
particular place facing a particular direction (the orientation) and to indicate with respect to his 
or her own body (i.e. employing an ego-centric frame of reference) the co-ordinates of a 
particular object, (the target). 
These experiments were then subdivided into: 
- visual maps. Visual maps were the subject of two of the experiments and consisted of 
presenting subjects with an arrow (the orientation) and a point (the target). The experiments 
were conducted to establish a baseline for future comparisons. The results indicated a 
general increase in reaction time with rotation of the arrow from the upright, excepting 
straight down. Hintzman et al interpreted these data as evidence for mental rotation 
although they suspect that judgements front and back may involve a different mechanism. 
In these direct presentation conditions, targets were most quickly located when they were 
adjacent to or opposite the imagined orientation echoing Loftus' findings (Loftus, 1978) 
below. 
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cognitive maps: in all, eleven experiments investigated cognitive maps specifically. These 
experiments which involved making judgements from memory ranged from making 
judgements from named American cities; pointing to particular targets in the subject's local 
environment; to judging 
angles from pictures of 
pairs of objects previously 
memorised in the room. 
The range of stimuli 
allowed Hintzman et al to 
compare cognitive maps 
stored in both long-term 
and what they described as 
. o 
Z 
200 ^ 
180 X 
160 J . 
40 X 
120 X 
100 X 
immediate memory. 
Although the reaction 
times across these 
conditions and subjects 
were irregular they all produced a characteristic and regular M-sh'aped profile, as illustrated 
below. Again Hintzman et al interpreted these data as evidence for mental rotation 
tactile maps, created by two successive taps on the head, were the subject of two 
experiments. Again the M-shaped reaction time profile was found, suggesting that the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying the judgements made from cognitive maps are at work 
here. 
1.3.4 East - West / Right - Left 
Loftus (1978) after informally observing that airline pilots, as a matter of routine, were given a 
single number as their direction information (i.e. a number between 0° - 359°) found that they 
franslated this into a heading by firstly computing the nearest cardinal position and mentally 
facing that way. Then the difference between the cardinal direction and the desired direction 
was calculated followed by a mental rotation until the desired direction was faced. Testing this 
in the laboratory, he confirmed these findings but found that the way in which the direction 
information was presented had a profound effect on the reaction time to draw the direction. I f 
the directions were presented as a simple number, then a monotonic increase in reaction time 
was observed as the value increased; however, i f the directions were presented visually, angles 
close to North and South (±10°) were significantly more quickly responded to / processed than 
angles close to East and West. 
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Right-left or East-West have been shown to be more difficult to discriminate than up-down or 
front-back. This right-left effect has been demonstrated by a number of researchers (e.g. Farell, 
1979; Just and Carpenter, 1975; Maki, Maki and Marsh, 1977; Maki and Braine, 1985). A 
study by Maki et al (1977) has been the most extensive, showing the right-left effects on 
reaction time for both memorised familiar (e.g. maps of the US states), abstract locational (e.g. 
left of, above, and so forth) and orientational (vertically- versus horizontally-oriented) stimuli. 
Maki (1979) has noted that in previous studies discrimination of cardinal compass points may 
have been confounded with discriminations of the ego-centric up-down and right-left 
directions. She therefore designed an experiment to discriminate whether East-West takes 
longer to discriminate than North-South in a natural three-dimensional space. Stimuli were 
directions on a campus where, objectively. East-West does not necessarily correspond to right-
left and North-South and certainly not to up-down (but possibly front-back). However East-
West discriminations were still found to be slower than North-South discriminations, but there 
does remain the suspicion that subjects, in using compass directions as labels, still employed a 
ego-centric spatial reference system with North up (or front). South down (or behind). East 
right, and West left. The conventional correspondence in maps between these compass 
directions and the egocentric directions may pre-experimentally have made this way of 
labelling compass directions natural. As a consequence, whatever causes right-left to be 
difficult to discriminate also causes East-West to be difficult. Maki concludes that the locus of 
the difficulty o f discriminating right-left may be related to the right-left symmetry of the body. 
Franklin and Tversky (1990) have also found that reaction times for reporting the location of 
objects which were described in a body of text which subjects had read depended upon the 
orientation of the subjects' bodies. When subjects were standing, reaction times were fastest 
for reporting objects which were located beyond the subject's head / feet, yet when the subjects 
were reclining front / back were fastest. Franklin and Tversky regard these data as supporting a 
spatial framework model according to which space is conceptualised in terms of three axes, the 
accessibility of which depends on the relation of the body to the world. 
1.3.5 North - South / Top - Bottom 
Shepard and Hurwitz (1983) have noted the extended use of the upward direction and the term 
up more generally, and have identified what they describe as a hierarchy of the uses of the 
concept which are applied to horizontal directions. Firstiy, they argue that the concept was 
originally based on the unique, upright direction (defined by gravity) which holds over the 
entire surface of the earth. They continue that as even a very slight upward inclination of the 
local terrain is perceptually more accessible to us than the points of the compass and because 
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we are constrained by gravity to move on the surface of the earth which is orthogonal to the 
pull of gravity, the concept up has been extended to refer to any uphill direction. Next, the 
notion of up has been metaphorically extended to refer to the direction towards a significant 
reference point without reference to the actual lay of the land (as illustrated in the expression 
'going up to London')- This use of up has been further extended to mean North and to refer to 
the direction one is facing (based on the ego-centric frame of reference) again illustrated by the 
use of expression of ' I walked up to her'. A l l of these uses of up with the exception of the 
metaphorical use of the term, are designed to help us navigate or communicate information 
relating to the environment'^. 
Shepard and Hurwitz (1983) have found support for these observations in a highly simplified 
map reading task. Subjects were required to interpret a single turn in a path and have their 
reaction times recorded. The most consistent of their findings was that the identification of a 
map-like representation of a right or left turn took increasing longer as the angle of the turn 
departed from the upright. These findings have also been echoed in the naturalistic studies of 
Levine .(1982). It would also seem that a relatively high cognitive cost is incurred i f one 
departs from this preferred orientation. Levine found that when people consulted you-are-here 
maps in such places as shopping malls and hospitals, they were usually successful in fmding 
their way providing the map was in the preferred direction; but when the map was inverted 
people went o f f in directions that were incorrect by in excess of 90° more than 25% of the time. 
Finally, the work of Presson and Hazelrigg (1984) and Levine, Jankovic, and Palij (1982) on 
the orientation of the cognitive representation of spatial knowledge, which is highly relevant to 
these issues, is discussed more fully in section 1.4. 
Other systematic errors 
Tversky (1981) has reported that remembering one spatial location with respect to another can 
lead to distortions of direction. When subjects were asked to remember two nearly-aligned 
maps they tend to be remembered as being more closely aligned than they actually were. In her 
experiment she gave subjects two maps of the Americas, one of which was correct, the other 
having South America moved westward with respect to North America thus more closely 
aligning the two land masses. A significant number of the subjects where found to incorrectly 
identify the altered map as the correct one. In a further experiment, another group of subjects 
incorrectly selected a world map in which the Americas had been moved north relative to 
Europe and Africa. Alignment errors were also found in 
^ The caveat that these observations probably only apply to the northern hemisphere should be noted. 
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- students' judgements of directions between cities; 
- in memory for their local environment (spatial knowledge of which was most likely 
obtained from free exploration); 
- in memory for artificial countries and maps, and 
- in memory for blobs which could not be interpreted as maps. 
Tversky has attributed these errors to two heuristics found in models of perceptual 
organisation. The first is alignment whereby figures are lined up relative to one another due to 
their mutual proximity. The second is rotation where the natural axes induced by a figure 
converge with frame axes (North-South, East-West, or horizontal-vertical), a phenomenon 
which Tversky believes is related to the Gestalt 'law' of perceptual organisation by common 
fate. 
Sense of direction 
Kozlowski and Bryant (1977) have found that self-reports o f how good or bad people thought 
their sense of direction were positively correlated with their actual spatial orientation ability. 
According to these self-report data, individuals with a good sense of direction were better than 
those with a poor sense of direction in giving or following directions (either oral or written) and 
in remembering routes while passengers in cars, and remembering written directions to a place. 
Furthermore and unlike those with a poor sense of direction, people with a good sense of 
direction liked to read maps, enjoyed giving directions, tried to remember details of the 
landscape when travelling to a new area, and, when driving felt it important to find new routes 
to places. 
People with a good sense of direction were found to be better than those with a poor sense of 
direction at pointing at unseen goals (e.g. local buildings) in a familiar environment. Yet in a 
novel environment (a maze) Kozlowski and Bryant found that both people with good and poor 
sense of direction did not initially differ in the accuracy of their judgements. However with 
additional exposure to the maze, and with an explicit instruction to attend to intra-feature 
orientation, the good sense-of-direction group showed improved performance over the poor 
sense-of-direction group. From this Kozlowski and Bryant concluded that this improvement is 
neither automatic nor simple, but required repeated exposure to an environment and a 
conscious effort to orient oneself. Finally, they also noted that Tryon's (1939) experiments on 
maze 'bright' and maze 'dulV rats led him to conclude that neither sensory abilities nor 
learning abilities in these good and poor sense of direction rats differed, but rather, he argued, 
good maze learners were better at developing directional sets. In other words, an intentional, 
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relatively high-level cognitive process may be the source of the relevant individual differences 
between good and poor sense of direction people. 
1.3.6 Quantifying the accuracy of angle estimation 
Unfortunately there are very few published accounts of real world experiments - only three 
have been found which can be used for such a comparison. Kozlowski and Bryant (1977) 
found a mean pointing error of 10.79° for people with a good sense of direction (by self-
report), rising to 25.71° for those with a poor sense of direction (again by self-report) when 
they asked subject to imagine themselves in a particular place on campus and to point to 
various buildings out of the line of sight. Further evidence comes from Thomdyke and Hayes-
Roth's (1982) experiment (described in section 1.3.1). Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth had 
subjects estimate the angle from the centre of one room to the centre of another in a specific 
building in two different ways which they described as orientation and simulated orientation. 
In the orientation condition the subjects, who were either drawn from people who had worked 
in the building for varying amounts of time (the navigation subjects) or who had studied a map 
of the building, were taken to different rooms and asked to estimate the angle from the centre 
of that room to the centre of a target room elsewhere in the building. 
In the simulated orientation condition the same group of subjects were asked to imagine him or 
herself at the centre of a particular room and to estimate the angle to the centre of a target 
room elsewhere in the building. 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth found that the navigation subjects were very reliably more accurate 
than the map-learning subjects on both tasks. Furthermore performance of all subjects was 
more accurate on the orientation task than the simulated orientation task. Concluding their 
experiment Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth presented the subjects with a number of pages upon 
which were two labelled dots designating the location of two areas within the building. 
Subjects were then required to indicate the location of a fiirther room by making a mark on the 
page. Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth found that the map-learning subjects were very reliably more 
accurate than the navigation subjects on both tasks, although the latter improved with 
experience. 
The final piece of evidence for the magnitude of the errors made in judging angles comes from 
Moar and Bower (1983). While their interest was in the presence of systematicity^ in the 
judgement of the angles made by intersecting pairs of roads, they nonetheless tabulated the 
actual angles and mean judgements (table 1, p. 109) from which it is possible to calculate the 
^ i.e. the tendency to bias judgements to a multiple of 90° 
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mean errors. From these data, it is clear that the mean errors ranged from 37.5° to -11.4° with 
all but one of the mean errors being negative (i.e. biased in an anti-clockwise direction). 
In conclusion it would appear there is very little clear evidence as to the precise nature of the 
accuracy of judgements of angles. 
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1.4 Spatial cognition III: Primary & secondary spatial knowledge 
1,4.1 Primary and secondary spatial knowledge 
Presson and Hazelrigg (1984), in the light of their own research and in reviewing the related 
work of others, have drawn a distinction between primary and secondary spatial knowledge. 
They describe primary spatial knowledge as being acquired directly from exploring the 
environment by direct observation or interaction with it. In contrast, secondary spatial 
knowledge is acquired from secondary sources such as maps or other representation of the 
environment. 
Presson and Hazelrigg define primary or direct spatial activity as involving direct interaction 
with the immediate surrounds. Primary spatial activity, they argue, creates a sense of 
immediacy with respect to which one can act directly. In contrast secondary or indirect spatial 
activity is defined as dealing with information on which we cannot act directly. Presson and 
Hazelrigg offer examples of secondary spatial learning as including such things as reading, 
drawing maps, mental rotation, and perspective tasks. These secondary, more abstract uses of 
space usually entail the use of spatial symbols (e.g. maps or figures) and the information 
represented therein must be franslated before acting directly on it. Furthermore, secondary 
knowledge appears to have picture-like properties whereas primary knowledge does not (e.g. 
Evans and Pezdek, 1980; Presson and Hazelrigg, 1984). For example, there is strong evidence 
indicating that maps are encoded in the same orientation that they are experienced. Alignment 
effects (e.g. Levine, 1982; Levine, Jankovic, and Palij, 1982; Presson and Hazelrigg, 1984) and 
mental rotation effects (Evans and Pezdek, 1980) have also been reported when the spatial 
relations depicted in the map were learned in one orientation and tested in a different 
orientation. Evans and Pezdek (1980) found that when they presented subjects with either slides 
of states (i.e. US states) or of buildings on a college campus, that the reaction times for 
recognition increased as a linear function of the degree of rotation of the figure of the state but 
not of the buildings. These results may be explained by the assumption that the subjects had 
perceived the college building from multiple perspectives, whereas they had only ever seen the 
states from maps (or aerial photographs). Furthermore, when physical maps are aligned with 
the surrounding space, they are much easier to use than i f they are not aligned, both for children 
(e.g. Biuestein and Acredolo, 1979; Presson, 1982) and for adults (e.g. Levine, 1982). Rossano 
and Warren (1989) have suggested that in order to make proper directional judgements when 
using mis-aligned maps, a person must engage in a cognitive strategy which results in rotation 
of the map into alignment with the environment. In their experiments they observed that 
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although subjects were given no instmctions on how to solve trials with mis-aligned maps, 
many spontaneously reported using a mental rotation strategy. Furthermore, the general 
increase in response times corresponding to the increase in degree of misalignment suggests a 
mental rotation operation. Finally, whether or not maps have been experienced from multiple 
vantage points - which is a primary characteristic of free exploration, the spatial knowledge 
acquired from a map, is still recalled in a specific orientation for later judgements (Presson, 
McAdamsandDeLange, 1987^). 
This stands in confrast with primary or direct leaming which does not produce a mental 
representation that has a specific orientation. This conclusion follows from findings of the 
absence of alignment effects (e.g. Presson and Hazebigg, 1984) and no mental rotation effects 
(e.g. Evans and Pezdek, 1980) when primary knowledge was tested. However, there is some 
evidence that direct leaming does produce a representation with a preferred orientation but that 
orientation is very flexible, so that 'forward' in the environment is 'forward' in the cognitive 
maps (e.g. Scholl and Egeth, 1980 cited in Scholl, 1987 p. 616). Primary and secondary 
experiences also typically differ on several other factors, such as scale and context. 
Scholl (1987) has also investigated stimulus materials at different scales: 
- using a map of the subjects' university campus; 
- a map of the cities in the north east of the USA (a source of secondary spatial leaming); 
- subjects' direct experience of the university campus; 
- subjects' direct experience of the cities of the USA. 
In general her results support the findings of the primary - secondary spatial knowledge divide, 
although it should be noted that she was testing a related though different hypothesis'O. Scholl 
has argued that despite the differences in scale, it is unlikely to account for the reported 
alignment effects, in that, for example, the judgements of angular headings are unaffected by 
the variation in scale. Moreover similar alignment effects occur when symbolic information is 
used with no reduction in scale (e.g. Pufall and Shaw, 1973). 
Presson, DeLange and Hazelrigg (1989) revisited Presson and Hazelrigg's 1984 research in a 
series of experiments which attempted to fiirther clarify the primary - secondary spatial 
cognition divide. Firstly, they tested for the role of the instmctional set, i.e. whether the use of 
9 Cited in Presson et al, 1989, p. 896 
"'SchoU was testing Neisser's (1976) account of cognitive maps which he describes as orienting schemata. The 
parallel with the primary / secondary spatial knowledge divide is that 'forward' in (or to) an orienting schemata is 
the preferred or privileged direction. 
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terms (by the experimenters) of 'path' and 'map of a path' was significant, and found no effect. 
Next they varied the size and scale of the maps and paths presented to the subjects and found 
reliable evidence for the role of size in determining whether the figure was encoded in an 
orientation free or orientation specific manner. In contrast to the speculations of Scholl 
(above), Presson et al found that smaller arrays were found to be encoded in an orientation 
specific manner, characteristic of secondary learning, whereas large figures were not. Presson 
et al went on to speculate that larger displays are more like an environment in their own right 
and as such they 'afford' a wider range of experience and exploration. 
1.4.2 Equi-availability and orientation-specificity 
Predating and paralleling the work of Presson and Hazelrigg, Levine, Jankovic and Palij (1982) 
tested the specific hypothesis that the spatial knowledge contained in cognitive maps is 
essentially picture-like. They were motivated by the apparently conflicting evidence about 
cognitive maps, namely that they relatively accurately represent the environment of which they 
are a map and yet that they are subject to systematic distortions. However, rather than focusing 
on the distortions they proposed a model of veridical spatial representation. So, their opening 
hypothesis was that, like a picture, all information contained in a cognitive map is equally 
accessible, and like a picture, a cognitive map has a specific orientation. They refer to the 
former as the equi-availability principle and the latter as the specific-orientation hypothesis. 
According to the equi-availability principle, a person is able to represent information about the 
relative location of spatial landmarks acquired sequentially in a 'simultaneous system'. This 
system functions like an aerial picture or map of the environment, making all relations among 
known landmarks equally available to the person. In a series of five experiments, with a very 
sfrong emphasis on controlling the amount and type of information made available to their 
subjects'', they tested these hypotheses. The experiments achieved this by using artificial, and 
hence, unfamiliar environments (for example 'a table top terrain' and an especially prepared 
room), and high levels of control from the experimenters, for example, moving subjects' hand 
over maps, and walking blindfolded subjects around a room. Overall the results of these 
experiments supported both the equi-availability principle and the specific-orientation 
hypothesis. 
• 'This is in sharp contrast to the naturalistic acquisition of spatial knowledge. 
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In summary 
In all there is clear evidence for two distinct forms of spatial leaming and representation. 
Spatial knowledge acquired from the representations of the environment is orientation-specific 
in that the distribution of errors for aligned and counter-aligned judgements of angle show 
qualitative difference for small but not for large arrays. In terms of representation it is visual 
and picture-like. The specific figural qualities of the scene, relative to a ego-centric frame of 
reference are preserved. 
Spatial knowledge acquired from the environment is said to be orientation free but has with a 
preferred-orientation. In terms of representation it is more like an integrated model of the 
world preserving the invariant, integrated aspect of spatial relations in an externally based 
frame of reference, and when people recall information in this case, they can visualise a scene 
within which they are positioned. 
1.4.3 Spatial mental models 
It is accepted that the comprehension of texts describing spatial configurations is facilitated by 
way of a spatial mental model which analogically encodes the spatial relationships among the 
components of the configuration. In short, people create spatial mental models of those scenes 
described in the text (e.g. Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird, 1982; Foos, 1980; Mani and Johnson-
Laird, 1982; Perrig and Kintsch, 1985; Franklin and Tversky, 1990; Payne, 1993; Ferguson and 
Hergaty, 1994). These spatial mental models are a 'non-linguistic representation of a situation 
derived from a prepositional representation by means of inferences based on general 
knowledge' - Johnson-Laird, 1983. Spatial mental models contain information about the 
characters and objects within the scene, their orientation and locations. The spatial information 
preserved in them includes categorical spatial relations, such as those expressed in the words 
above, in front of, north of, across from and so forth, and sometimes includes more analogue 
information about distances. These spatial mental models appear to be rapidly updated and 
transformed as narratives supply new information about objects, locations and orientations. 
This area of study is both huge and very complex and only a little of it is relevant to this 
enquiry. So instead of attempting to survey the entire field, attention wil l be given to two of 
the most relevant sets of experiments in this area which are those of Taylor and Tversky (1992a 
& 1992b). These experiments are reviewed in the next two sections. 
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Comprehending route and survey descriptions 
Taylor and Tversky (1992a) have noted that (tourist) guidebook descriptions of cities and the 
like take on one of two perspectives, a route and a survey perspective. 
A route perspective takes readers on a mental tour of the environment, describing landmarks in 
an ego-centric frame of reference, i.e. in terms of the reader's front, back, right and left. For 
example, ''As you sail up the Seine from the Place de la Concorde, you first come to the Musee 
D 'Orsay on your right', p.261. 
In confrast, a survey perspective gives reader's a bird's-eye view, and describes landmarks 
relative to other another in an absolute frame of reference, i.e. in terms of north, south, east and 
west. For example, 'The Washington Mall is bounded by the Capitol at the East and the 
Lincoln Memorial at the west', p.261. These two perspectives clearly mirror the distinctions 
made between route and survey spatial knowledge. 
Taylor and Tversky investigated the consequences of these different perspectives in a series of 
four experiments. In the first of the series, they had subjects read either a route or survey 
perspective of each of four different environments. Two of the environments were large scale 
(e.g. a small town), and the remaining two were small scale (e.g. confined to a single building 
or enclosure, namely a zoo and a convention centre). Each environment contained a number 
of clearly defined landmarks. Taylor and Tversky prepared four pairs of descriptions of these 
environments. Each pair described one of the four environments from one of two perspectives: 
bird's eye (survey) or mental tour (route). The survey descriptions reflected the hierarchical 
structure of each environment and adopted an external frame of reference using such canonical 
terms as North, South or in the centre, while the route descriptions had a linear organisation 
and adopted an ego-centric frame of, reference using terms such as in front of you or to your 
right. The texts were judged to be equally informative, coherent and roughly equal in length. 
After studying the description, subjects responded true or false to a series of statement: (i) 
verbatim statements taken from both the perspectives read; (ii) statements taken from the other 
perspective to that which had been read; and, (iii) inference statements from both perspectives. 
The inference statements contained information that was not explicifly stated in either text, but 
could be inferred from information in either text. Taylor and Tversky reasoned that i f 
perspective was encoded in the mental representations, then inference statements from the read 
perspective should be verified more quickly than inference statements from the other 
perspective. After responding to the statements, subjects were asked to draw sketch maps of 
the environments. 
The speed and accuracy to answer the true or false questions suggested that the readers had 
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formed at least two mental representations of the text, one of the language of the text, and the 
another of the situation described by the text, that is the spatial relations among the landmarks. 
Responses to verbatim statements were faster and more accurate than responses to inference 
statements, although the overall accuracy did not reliably differ between types of statement. 
This results did suggest that perspective was encoded in the mental representations. These 
results were replicated across all four experiments. From studying the descriptions, subjects 
were able to produce maps that were virtually error free, indicating that language alone was 
sufficient to accurately convey coarse spatial relations. 
Producing spatial descriptions 
In confrast to the descriptions of the above experiments, this is very much the other side of the 
coin. Taylor and Tversky (1992b), in another series of experiments, gave subjects maps to 
study, and then asked them to write descriptions of the environments from memory. A 
compass rose appeared in each of the maps, allowing orientation with respect to the canonical 
axes. In a further experiment, Taylor and Tversky asked subjects to write descriptions of 
familiar environments they had leamed from experience. 
It emerged that the descriptions produced by the subjects used either route or survey 
perspectives, or a combination of both. No other style of description emerged. In the mixed 
perspective descriptions, either one perspective was used for parts of the environment and the 
other perspective for other parts, or both perspectives were used simultaneously for at least part 
of the description. Across a wide variety of environments, survey, route and mixed 
descriptions were obtained, their relative frequency depending in part on features of the 
environment. This finding is in confrast to the widespread claim that most spatial descriptions 
take a consistent perspective, specifically, a route perspective. The descriptions that subjects 
the subjects produced from memory were quite accurate and allowed a fiirther, naive group of 
subjects to place nearly all the landmarks featured on the maps correctly. 
Taylor and Tversky foimd that the key to a route description lay in describing the locations of 
landmarks relative to a single referent with a known perspective, in this case, the moving 
position of the reader. Furthermore in route descriptions, although the referent was constant, 
the orientation and location of the referent kept changing. Readers had to keep frack of that 
orientation and location relative to the canonical frame of reference (namely, the compass 
rose). In confrast, a survey description is distinguished by describing the location of a 
landmark relative to the location of aiiother landmark from a fixed perspective. Unlike route 
descriptions, in survey descriptions, the referent keeps changing, but the orientation is constant. 
Survey descriptions establish referential continuity by using a single orientation, but they are 
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complicated by changing the referent element. When either type of information is consistent 
and complete the individual pieces of information can be integrated into a coherent 
representation of the spatial among landmarks independent of any specific perspective. 
In summary 
Again Taylor and Tversky have presented evidence for a two component account of spatial 
cognition comprising route and map knowledge, together with two distinct frames of reference. 
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1.5 Spatial cognition IV: Computational approaches to spatial 
cognition 
This section reviews a number of contrasting computational models of spatial cognition, two of 
which are considered in detail. 
Introduction 
Computational models have been developed in recent years as an alternative to traditional 
experimental techniques. The primary means of distinguishing among these models lies with 
the choice of the form and content of the representation adopted by a particular model which 
appears to be strongly influenced by the range of tasks to be addressed. For example, 
CITYTOUR (Andre, Bosch and Rist, 1987) is designed to answer natural language questions 
about the spatial relations among objects in a city. CITYTOUR is able to answer questions such 
as, 'Is the post office behind the church?' because the system 'knows' where each object is in 
the city and has defined their intrinsic fronts and backs. Other models like TOUR (e.g. 
Kuipers, 1978) and NAVIGATOR (Gopal, Klatsky and Smith, 1989) focus on different aspects. 
TOUR does not fully ground itself in the psychological evidence pertaining to spatial cognition, 
but instead has adopted a social geographical cum developmental approach. Nonetheless the 
resulting model is an engine for solving a wide range of spatial problems including how new 
spatial knowledge is acquired. NAVIGATOR adopts a similar approach. 
In contrast to these computational model which owe much to artificial intelligence paradigms, a 
second group of models are concerned with biologically plausible models of place recognition 
and goal location in a connectionist framework. Zipser (1986), Munro and Hirtle (1989) and 
Wender (1989) are among a number of researchers who have developed connectionist models 
of cognitive maps and other aspects of spatial cognition. Zipser (1986) in particular has 
investigated the neurological basis of spatial cognition based on the work of O'Keefe (1979) 
and O'Keefe and Nadel (1979) who have studied the functional properties of the hippocampi in 
rats. O'Keefe and Nadel have presented evidence that the hippocampus is the neurological basis 
for the cognitive map. 
1.5.1 The TOUR Model 
Kuipers (1978), the creator of the TOUR model, begins with the concept of the cognitive map 
which he states is built up from observations gathered as the individual travels through the 
environment. The nature of the observations available are described as sequences of places and 
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paths encountered en route, the magnitude of tums and distances fravelled, and the observed 
positions of distal landmarks. Kuipers supplements this mainsfream position with evidence 
drawn from other sources, for example, Lynch's (1960) work on the categorisation of the 
landscape of cities; Appleyard's (1970) analysis of sketch maps of such landscapes; and a 
number of other social geographers' research is also used to supplement Kuipers' account (and 
starting position) of cognitive maps. The psychological evidence adopted by Kuipers appears 
to be essentially developmental in origin. While he cites the work of Piaget and Inhelder 
(1967) with children's conceptions o f space, he uses Siegel and White's (1975) review of spatial 
cognition (which he states demonsfrated parallels between a child's spatial abilities and an 
adult's) to justify this. Hence Kuipers' vocabulary of spatial concepts is derived primarily from 
Lynch and Piaget and Inhelder. 
The TOUR model adopts Lynch's segmentation of spatial knowledge and has data stmctures 
for each of the five categories (i.e. paths, path intersections, landmarks, districts, and 
boundaries), a mechanisms for carrying out inferential operations upon the data structures and a 
'You are Here' pointer. To illusfrate how this pointer has been instantiated, and to confrast 
Kuipers' approach with the connectionist model below, here is a pseudo-code fragment 
(Kuipers, 1978, p. 143) from the TOUR model which defines the 'You are Here' pointer: 
YOU ARE HERE: 
PLACE: <place description> 
PATH: <path description> 
DIRECTION <l-D[//Me/wio/i] orientation: +1 or-1) 
ORIENT: <co-ordinate-fi^me description> 
HEADING: <2-D orientation: 0 to 360> 
Cenfral to the TOUR model is the concept of a 'view'. Kuipers defines a view as, 'the sensory 
image received by the observer at a particular point'. Views are used to recognise places and 
these places can, in tum, be used as a node at which additional information can be stored. 
Consequently the key operation on views is that of comparison, for example, by comparing the 
current view with views stored in long term memory, it is possible to retrieve all the 
information associated with it. This information consists of the details of paths between it and 
other places, which in tum are stored as sequences of actions and views. In conclusion, 
Kuipers describes this model as having demonstrated how different kinds of knowledge can be 
stored, how new information is assimilated, change from one representation to another, and 
used to solve problems. He concludes by outiining the deficiencies of the model, both 
theoretical and empirical. TOUR does not address the role of imagery; or peoples' exposure to 
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and use of maps; or the interface with the sensory systems which pick up the raw data used by 
a view. Furthermore TOUR fails to model a variety of aspects of human spatial behaviour, 
including developmental aspects and the kinds of errors people make, for example, 
systematicity, the effects of clutter, the non-commutativity of distances, and so forth (e.g. 
Stevens and Coupe, 1978; O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Tversky, 1981; Thomdyke, 1981; and 
Moar and Bower, 1983). Nor is there any attempt to deal with the distinction between primary 
and secondary spatial knowledge (Presson and Hazelrigg, 1984). 
1.5.2 Zipser's connectionist models 
Zipser (1986) introduces his connectionist models by contrasting them with models of spatial 
cognition which have been instantiated in an unrestricted computer context, that is, without 
reference to biological plausibility, which for that reason he rejects. Zipser then considers the 
neurological evidence: he notes the powerful correlations between single cell neuron activity 
and events in the world which is foimd in cells of the hippocampus (Becker et al, 1980; 
O'Keefe, 1976 are cited as examples). In studies with the rats, for example, it has been found 
that they have single cells that fire at their maximum rate only when the animal is in a 
particular location relative to a set of distal landmarks. These locations are called 'place 
fields'. Removing too many landmarks or radically altering their spatial locations abolishes the 
place-field response of these units (O'Keefe, 1979; O'Keefe and Nadel, 1979 are cited as 
examples). Measurements of the location, size and shape of the place fields, and how their 
responses change when the environmental landmark cues are manipulated (for example Muller 
et al, 1983) were made. Quantitative experiments of this kind have shown that the response of 
place-field units is determined in a systematic, rule-governed manner by the configuration of 
the surrounding scene. Muller, Kubie and Ranck have also shown that when every feature of 
^ ^ — - ^ the environment is scaled to a different size, the relative 
/ \ \ location of place-fields, and their areas scale with the 
I \ / environment. Given these experimental findings Zipser 
\ ^ / developed a computational model which attempted to relate 
/ ! ] the configuration of landmarks (their location, size, distance 
etc.) and place fields. The fiindamental question is, 'How do 
the place-field neurons know that the observer is at the 
figure 1-3 location where they are supposed to fire?' Such a matching 
task is potentially very complex, however experiments revealed that only a few landmarks are 
actually required. This can be seen in figure 1-3. The location of point P can be uniquely 
determined by its distance from the three landmarks a, b, and c. The circles are perimeters 
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along which the distance of an observer from the landmark remains the constant (Zipser, 1986 
pp. 437.) 
In all Zipser constmcted three different models (instantiated as computer, connectionist 
programs). The first was based on the above reviewed data and analysis of landmark 
recognition, and figure 1-4 illusfrates its stracture. The Sensory System processes input from an 
environment and produces two outputs. These are X which is a description of the landmark; 
and dx which is the value of a location parameter such as distance. The units in layer 1 are 
tuned to individual landmarks and have distance information stored which is used to compare 
with the value of d^. I f the value of X = A then the unit Ap wil l generate on output based on 
d^-d^. The role of the layer 2 unit is to integrate the outputs from the layer 1 units until the 
scene changes (i.e. the observer moves). However, while this model is biologically plausible, 
evidence presented by Kubie, Muller and Ranck, 1983 (cited by Zipser, p. 441) suggests that 
rats, at least, do not use distance information as a location parameter, furthermore the model 
does not distinguish between left and right, and viewer orientation more generally. 
Zipser's second model is more 
speculative than the first, in that 
it added a 'goal vector' to the 
place fields which is a 
hypothesised output of the place 
field neurons. The goal vector 
Layer 1 was included in an attempt to 
address the essential aim of 
navigation - goal location (e.g. 
'How do I get home from 
here?'). This second model is 
called the distributed view-field 
model and is illusfrated in figure 
figure 1-4 1-5 (after Zipser, pp. 450). The 
object units have a similar 
function as the layer 1 units in the first model. The major difference is the inclusion of 
orientation specific units (i.e. left, cenfre and right), and these units only recognise landmarks 
in their own visual fields. The view-field units are, again, analogous to the layer 2 units in the 
first model. Together the object and view-field units recognise an oriented place-field (P). 
However, unlike the first model, the output of the view-field also depends on the orientation. 
In the network shown in figure 1-5, information about the goal location is also encoded in an 
Sensory System 
Bp 
Layer 2 
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additional unit the output of which is passed to the motor system which is interpreted as the 
direction of the goal. With this kind of network, to head to a goal from a given location, the 
observer would first examine the landmarks before it, which would activate an associated view 
unit. This in turn would activate a goal unit, the output of which could direct the observer to 
the goal. 
Visual System 
Object Units 
View-Field Units 
Goal Units 
Motor System 
figure 1-5 
There are, however, problems with this network. It is not realistic to have a unique field-view 
unit for every possible permutation of place and orientation in the environment. Secondly, it is 
unlikely that an observer would be at the exact centre of a place-field. Thirdly, it is not clear 
how information about the environment is assimilated in the first place. The final model (the P 
-coefficient model) was not based on the place field data, and while it was based on the 
biologically plausible behaviour of simulated neurons, is much more speculative. The rationale 
for its creation was to overcome the drawbacks of the previous models. The P-coefficient 
model needs to record information about a set of landmarks and a goal only once, and this 
recorded information can be later used to locate the goal from any position from which the 
landmarks are visible. 
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In sununary 
As capable as these models are, two criticisms can be made. Firstly, neither of the models can 
account for a truly significant part of human spatial cognition much less all of it. They use 
highly impoverished models and datasets as their basis; and secondly, as mentioned in the 
introduction to this section, the choice of representation and operations on that representation 
have been carefully and narrowly selected by their authors. Even connectionist approaches 
such as Zipser's biologically plausible models fall well short of offering an account of spatial 
cognition. 
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1.6 Of cognitive maps and spatial cognition 
This section attempts to identify the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive maps. 
Cognitive maps are appealing 
Downs (1981) has argued that we automatically and unquestioningly accept ideas of maps and 
mappings as logical ways of expressing the idea of space and of representing the world in 
which we live. 'Cartography,' he writes, 'has played and continues to play a central role in 
the attempt to understand spatial cognition and its development. There is an inescapable 
connection between cartography and cognition: cartography as a way of thinking is both 
pervasive and persuasive. In a sense, cartography is a 'natural' way of thinking and the use of 
spatial expressions appears to be fundamental to the structure of natural language and 
thinking with an apparently perfect match between experience language and thought.' 
However,... 'the relationship between spatial cognition and cartography is incredibly complex; 
there are similarities, parallels, interdependencies, and interactions that border on paradoxes' 
Downs, 1981, p.324. 
Cognitive maps as an incomplete account of spatial cognition 
While a considerable body of evidence has been presented for a two component model of 
spatial knowledge, there is also a case for considering whether it may not be better considered 
as a continuum. For example, both Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth (1982) and Moar and Charleton 
(1982) have variously argued and presented evidence that a person's 'route' knowledge 
contains more detailed information about the travelled route. This information might include 
impressions of the distance travelled along each leg (straight line segment) of the route, the 
angle of the turns between legs, and terrain features along the route. Thomdyke and Hayes-
Roth (1982) have also argued that cognitive maps contain information which is not available 
from direct experience in the environment, but which is more normally portrayed in maps. An 
individual's perspective of the environment usually corresponds to the canonical horizontal 
view he or she has during navigation or free exploration and not a global or bird's eye view. 
This observation also lends weight to the argument that route knowledge is transformed into a 
more map-like representation with experience rather than the simple accumulation of more 
spatial knowledge of the same type. However they believe that this knowledge is not identical 
with survey knowledge derived from maps. Instead they see this change as the development of 
(that is, the reported experience of) translucence in the ground-based procedural representation. 
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This translucence may refer to the cognitive manipulation of a view (or image) of an aspect of a 
cognitive map which allows navigators to 'see' through obstacles, revealing obscured 
relationships which can be examined. Cognitive maps have been also been treated as though 
they are two-dimensional in that there is a conspicuous absence of research into the 
characteristics of height and depth information in spatial knowledge as noted by Shepard and 
Hurwitz (1983). 
Furthermore Tversky (1993) has argued that the traditional use of the cognitive map metaphor 
does not reflect the complexity and richness of environmental knowledge. She goes on to say 
that environmental knowledge takes in a wide variety of forms, fragmentary memories of maps 
we have seen, routes we have taken, areas we have heard about, facts about distances and 
directions. Even knowledge of time zones, flying or driving times, climate, historical 
conquests and linguistic families can be used to make inferences about spatial proximity. This 
information may also contain errors, systematic or random, and when we need to remember or 
to make a judgement, we call on \yhatever information seems relevant. Because the fragments 
of information may be incomparable, we may have no way of integrating them. For those 
situations, she suggests had a cognitive collage is a more fitting metaphor for environmental 
knowledge. Tversky defines a cognitive collage as 'thematic overlays of multi-media from 
different points of view. They lack the coherence of maps, but do contain figures, partial 
information, and differing perspectives.'' 
So a cognitive map cannot be a map as such, particularly as Rumelhart et al have noted [read 
cognitive map instead of schemata]: 
Schemata are not explicit entities, but rather are implicit in our knowledge and are 
created by the very environment that they are trying to interpret... nothing stored 
corresponds very closely to a schema. What is stored is a set of connection strengths 
which, when activated, have implicitly in them the ability to generate states that 
correspond to instantiated schemata. 
Rumelhart et al, 1986, pp. 20-1 
Instead, the term cognitive map should be treated as a metaphor or as shorthand for the 
cognitive representation of spatial information. A cognitive map may have analogous 
functionality to a cartographic map but cannot have similar physical properties (Downs and 
Stea, 1973). Spatial information can, in principle, be represented in a great variety of different 
ways many of which are not analogues of the environment they represent. 
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1.7 Spatial cognition V: A review of virtual reality 
Introduction 
This section briefly reviews: 
- a number of instantiations of virtual reality. 
- immersive compared with non-immersive virtual reality (VR). 
The history of virtual reality is varied and its origin subject to apocryphal stories. However it 
does seem likely that various instantiations of VR were developed more or less simultaneously 
at a number of locations mainly in the USA. As consequence, virtual reality is not a unitary 
phenomenon and there are no agreed definitions. Virtual reality also has a number of 
synonyms indicating variously its astiology and the lack of a canonical definition (in its earliest 
incarnations it was also described as artificial reality). This new 'reality' can be found 
instantiated in such things as graphical user interfaces, computer aided design applications, 
flight simulators, and arcade games. However despite this diversity it can be divided into two 
basic forms, immersive and non-immersive (or desktop) virtual reality. Immersive virtual 
reality requires the users to wear a light-excluding helmet which houses the display, and a 
tactile data glove which facilitates the manipulation of virtual objects within virtual reality (e.g. 
Sturman and Zeltzer, 1993). Non-immersive virtual reality, in contrast, is displayed on a 
cathode ray tube most typically found in a personal computer's monitor. While immersive 
virtual reality has captured the public imagination, desktop virtual reality is more commonly 
found. 
1.7.1 A variety of manifestations 
A taxonomy of virtual reality may not be possible as virtual reality and its attendant fields of 
research are both immature and rapidly evolving so that any definition would neither be 
exhaustive nor in the strict spirit of Linnaeus. What follows is not based on the fundamental 
defining characteristics of virtual reality but instead on its pragmatic, and fimctional 
characteristics. Very broadly, virtual reality is currently used in three fairly distinct ways: 
- for the visualisation or representation of complex, perhaps multidimensional information 
(e.g. the image of a new building development, or the flow of traffic on a 
telecommunications network). An example of this has been British Telecom's (BT) use of 
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virtual reality for network visualisation*^. Using BT's system, the operator can view the 
network from a distance, then close in and navigate around it, viewing the 
telecommunication linkages from different view points. The application supports a virtual 
reality system which displays telecommunication links and boxes linked in three 
dimensions. Specific examples of the visualisation of complex, multidimensional 
information include the work of McConathy and Doyle (1993) working with medical art 
have created stereoscopic images of'three-dimensional' exploded organs; Eyles (1993) has 
produced a computer graphics system for visualising spacecraft in orbit; Fitzmaurice, Zhai, 
and Chignell (1993) describe the creation and use of a 3D spreadsheet; and Koike (1993) 
has used virtual reality visualisation techniques to aid software development; 
- as a means of tele-presence, that is, affording a user a view of a hazardous or otherwise 
unreachable situation or environment (e.g. the inside of a nuclear reactor, the surface of 
Mars, within a flight simulator - or an arcade game). Tele-presence has been realised in the 
research by, for example, Roscoe (1991) who has reported on the difficulties faced in the 
use of imaging systems for military aircraft. However, while these and other fields of 
research are interesting in their own right, their focus has very much been on the algorithms 
required to drive the graphics; and finally, 
- as a new user interface to computer systems themselves, Robertson, Card and Mackinlay 
(1993) are among a number of researchers who are experimenting with virtual reality as a 
means of exploring new user-interface paradigms. 
1.7.2 Immersive virtual reality 
Cognitive, sensori-motor and other psychologically related research into immersive virtual 
reality has included such things as: grasping and reaching for and the manipulation of virtual 
objects (e.g. MacKenzie, 1994), the role of gesture (e.g. Wexelblat, 1995; Prime, 1996); 
moving through virtual reality environments (e.g. Slater, Usoh and Steed, 1995); perception 
(e.g. Greenhalgh and Benford; Prime, 1996); ego- and allo-centric frames of references (e.g. 
Prime, 1996); and spatial cognition (e.g. Osberg, 1994). 
Wayfinding in virtual reality 
This section now reviews two investigations into wayfinding in virtual environments which are 
judged to be representative of current research. 
'^ Reported in New Scientist, 18.xi.93. 
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Regian and Shebilske (1990) conducted a series of studies of the use of virtual reality as a 
training medium for visual-spatial tasks, with one of their experiments involving wayfinding. 
The environment used in the wayfinding study was a virtual maze. It consisted of three storeys, 
with four rooms in each storey. Every room was connected to at least one adjoining room by a 
hallway or passageway leading to a room above. The walls were all coloured grey, the floors 
red and the hallways yellow. Each room was the same size and each contained either, a star, 
cube sphere, or pyramid coloured red, green or blue. Subjects were given verbal directions on 
where to move through the virtual environment. Three different tours were taken after which 
the subjects were free to self-explore the environment for one hour. After this period of free 
exploration the subjects were asked to find the shortest route to a room having a target object. 
The number of rooms traversed were recorded. These numbers traversed were contrasted with 
data from a random walk algorithm and found to be significant smaller. Regian and Shebilske 
have taken this as evidence that subjects can leam to navigate in a virtual environment. 
However, there must remain a question as to whether comparing a random walk with purposive 
behaviour is meaningful. 
Darken and Sibert (1993) have reported on an informal study looking at toolsets for wayfinding 
in virtual environments. The tools available to the participants were flying (the ability to rise 
above the virtual envirormient), spatial audio markers, visual markers (breadcrumbs), co-
ordinate feedback, grid navigation and two map-views of the world. The map views available 
were track-up and North-up. Track-up maps change dynamically so that the user is always 
represented in the middle of the map, and the map revolves so that the user's forward view is 
always presented at the top of the map. A North-up map has a similar cenfral representation of 
the user, but the representation rotates not the map. North is always represented at the top of 
the map. Only one type of map could be chosen and seen at one time. While the mechanics of 
how to use the tools were explained, the benefits and what information could be retrieved from 
them were not. Only one type of tool was available to the subject during each scenario for each 
condition. The environment was a large landscape with grid markings on the floor. The 
landscape was sparsely populated with objects such as ships and rectangles. The focus of this 
study was to examine how subjects would use a specific tool under three different types of 
conditions. The first condition was just to explore the environment. The second condition was 
a naive search, where the subject knew what the object looked like but did not know its 
location. The final condition was an informed search, where the subject knew both the 
description and location of the object. The subjects were instructed to search for the target. 
When the subject was close to the target a bell would sound and they were told to return to tHe 
starting position as efficiently as possible. The subjects were encouraged to talk aloud as they 
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moved through the environment and as they used the navigation tool to help them. The co-
ordinate tools were mainly utilised in two ways. The first was at the start position, where the 
subject would move along one axis of the grid lined floor and note the feedback. During the 
return" portion of the task they commented that they had remembered their initial position. The 
breadcrumbs were used more as landmarks than as trail making objects, which they were 
originally intended for. The first breadcrumb was usually dropped at the starting position. It 
was also observed that groups of breadcrumbs were dropped in a shape to show directional 
information. Informal observations indicated that people used the different tools in a variety of 
ways. One of the most usefiil tools was a synthetic sun, which improved performance in both 
the search and return phases. In fact before the sun was added all subjects moved in the 
incorrect direction in the homing phase. From this Darken and Sibert concluded that subjects 
showed different behaviours when they used different tools in wayfmding and fiirther work was 
required. 
1.7.3 Non-immersive virtual reality 
Finally, it should be noted that no published research on the topic of the cognition of non-
immersive virtual space was found in the course of this enquiry. This is with the exception of 
related research by Barfield and Robless (1989) and Carswell, Frakenberger and Bemhard's 
(1991) investigations of the relative ease of comprehension of two- and three-dimensional 
graphs. Barfield, Salvendy and Foley (1989) have also considered the mental rotation of 3-D 
graphic figures presented on a VDU. Such work stands in contrast to the large body of 
evidence about the real-time perception of virtual environments. Such research has typically 
focused on use of flight simulators, electronic instrument displays and so forth (e.g. Roscoe, 
1993). However a study which may be of some relevance is reported by Eby and Braunstein 
(1995) who investigated the effect of a visible frame around a real three dimensional scene on 
perceived depth within the scene. In all they conducted three experiments: (i) subjects were 
asked to judge the slant of an object that had been rotated about a vertical axis and found that 
the judged slant was reduced when the frame was illuminated. Next, subjects judged the width 
to height ratio of objects with in the scene (ii) with and without an illuminated frame (iii) when 
a frame was added to the illuminated scene. In both cases the presence of the frame reduced 
the perceived depth within the scene. Eby and Braunstein (1995) concluded that the presence 
of the frame serves as a flatness cue. It should be noted that the frame of the computer monitor 
is just such a frame. 
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1.8 The rationale and structure of this thesis 
1.8.1 Rationale 
It is expected that the exploration of virtual environments will give rise to spatial knowledge, 
and it is the nature of this knowledge which is here being investigated. The spatial knowledge 
which is acquired from interacting with virtual space can, perhaps, be of three forms: 
- It can be essentially the same of the spatial knowledge which arises from exploring 
everyday, three-dimensional space, (i.e. primary spatial knowledge). If it is, it would then 
be expected to exhibit a range of characteristics which this literature review has 
established. 
- In contrast, such spatial knowledge might instead more resemble that which is acquired 
from studying maps and diagrams (i.e. secondary spatial knowledge). Again, if this is the 
case, it would exhibit such characteristics as orientation-specificity. 
- Or some admixture of these two. 
1.8.2 Methodology 
Distance and angle estimation 
Wayfinding may be characterised as needing to know how far and in which direction to travel. 
So, to obtain a clear picture of wayfinding in virtual environments, the accuracy and other 
characteristics of both the estimation of inter-feature angles and distance estimation are the 
subjects of this investigation. 
Judgements of angles. Experiments I to IV (inclusive) and part of experiment VII examine the 
consistency of knowledge acquired from virtual envirormients from the perspective of angle 
estimation. 
Judgements of distance. Similarly, experiments V to Vin (inclusive) and part of experiment 
Vn examine the accuracy of inter-feature judgements of distance. 
The subjects 
The subjects who participated in the eight experiments reported in this volume were drawn 
from the technical and administrative staff of MARI Computer Systems, an independent 
software house located in Gateshead, which is the author's place of work at the time of writing. 
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The experiments were conducted over a period of 15 months. The subjects were predominantly 
male and aged between 18 and 50. The women were typically aged between 18 and 35. All of 
the men and women were very experienced in the operation of PCs. 
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1.8.4 The chapters 
Chapter 1 
Is this chapter and has introduced the field of this enquiry with a review of the literature 
focusing on spatial cognition. 
Chapter 2 
Experiment I investigated the consistency of the cognitive representation of a virtual 
environment as evidenced by accuracy of the judgement of angles between features in that 
environment. It also considered the role of incidental and intentional learning in spatial 
cognition. Experiment I I investigated the accuracy of inter-object judgements of angles while 
actively exploring a virtual environment. Experiment III fiirther investigated the findings from 
the first experiment that the judgements of angles in a virtual environment are biased in an anti-
clockwise direction. The chapter concludes with a general discussion of the fmdings of the first 
three experiments. 
Chapter 3 
Experiment IV addressed the question of whether spatial knowledge acquired from exploring a 
virtual environment shows the same orientation-specificity as knowledge acquired from 
studying maps or figures. Experiment IV also considered the integration multiple view points 
in virtual space to form a perceptual / conceptual whole. 
Chapter 4 
Experiments V paralleled part of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's (1978) investigation into the 
differences in spatial knowledge acquired from maps and from the environment, substituting 
virtual space for real space. 
Chapter 5 
Experiment V I investigated the accuracy of inter-object judgements of distance while actively 
exploring a 'cluttered' virtual environment. Experiment VII investigated whether the well-
documented clutter phenomenon pertains in virtual space and contributes the distortions in 
distance judgements. Evidence for systematicity of angular judgements was also sought. 
Experiment Vm paralleled (experiment 2) of Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser (1978) image scanning 
studies. The chapter concludes with a general discussion of the fmdings of experiments V to 
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VIII inclusive. 
Chapter 6 
Is general discussion of the. findings from the experiments, and offers suggestions for further 
work. 
Chapter 7 
Contains a fiill listing of all references cited in this thesis. 
Appendix A 
Contains the raw data from experiments I - VIII. 
Appendix B 
Contains a description of ACK3D. 
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2. Experiments I , I I & I I I 
Experiments I , I I , and IE are investigations into the cognitive representation of the spatial 
properties of virtual environments. Their focus is judgements of inter-feature angles within 
virtual environments. The first experiment is something of a pilot, in that it employs a virtual 
reality game, while subsequent experiments use a simple virtual reality construction kit to 
create custom-made virtual environments. 
Experiment I explores the role of intentional and incidental learning in the acquisition of spatial 
knowledge of a virtual environment. Further, it investigates the internal consistency of the 
cognitive representation of this virtual enviroimient which has been explored, by comparing the 
accuracy of judgements of inter-location angles made from different locations within the virtual 
environment. 
Experiment I I investigates the evidence for directional bias in the judgements of angles in 
virtual environments. 
Experiment I I I examines the accuracy of judgements of angles while actively exploring a 
virtual environment, with the objective of establishing a baseline for the accuracy of 
judgements of angles. 
2.1 Introduction to experiment I 
Intentional - incidental learning 
Learning is central to cognition (e.g. Norman, 1986), and until recently almost all accounts of 
learning assumed that it is intentional. However, Hasher and Zacks (1984) are among a 
number of researchers who have offered evidence that intention is not always required and that 
some learning occurs in an implicit or incidental manner (Hasher and Zacks describe it as 
automatic encoding). Berry and Broadbent (1988) are not alone in noting that it is not always 
clear what is meant by the distinction between intentional and incidental learning. Berry and 
Broadbent distinguish (firstly) between knowledge acquired by an individual some of which 
may be reportable, and some of which is not, so in this sense it parallels the procedural -
declarative knowledge divide (e.g. Rumelhart and Norman, 1985). Secondly, the incidental -
intentional distinction may apply to the way in which the knowledge was acquired. They 
illustrate this distinction by suggesting that learning itself may be explicit when deliberate 
instructions are given to learn something - e.g. 'discover the underlying rule in some set of 
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materials', or it may be implicit - 'learn this material', during the course of which the 
underlying rule is learned. Research into the intentional (or explicit) - incidental (or implicit) 
distinction has variously focused on tasks which range from computer control tasks (for 
example, Berry and Broadbent, 1988; Hayes and Broadbent, 1988) to the learning of artificial 
grammars (e.g. Reber, 1976). 
Spatial knowledge acquired incidentally 
An unverified but common-sense observation is that in the course of fraversing, say, a city, one 
remembers more than the simple sequence of distances traversed and angles turned through. 
Although there has been relatively little research into the field of incidental spatial learning, 
examples are as follows: Brewer and Treyens (1981) arranged to have subjects called, one at a 
time, to wait in a room they had especially prepared. When they were invited into a second 
room the subjects were given the unexpected task of recalling the contents of the first room. 
The first room had been made up to look like a typical graduate student's office containing both 
a set of schema-relevant objects (e.g. table, typewriter and coffee pot) and a set of schema-
irrelevant objects (such as a skull, and a toy top), and all of these objects had been previously 
rated for saliency by an independent group of subjects. Subjects asked to recall the contents of 
the first room typically included items which were not actually present but which were schema-
relevant, and included such items as books and a telephone. In all. Brewer and Treyens 
concluded that an important aspect of incidental leaming was schema relevance, in that people 
tend to recall objects which have high schema-relevance better than schema-irrelevant objects. 
Furthermore it was also observed that the subjects displayed a tendency to recall the various 
objects in their canonical positions rather than their actual locations. In conclusion. Brewer and 
Treyens argued that this evidence offers an account of the recall of spatial knowledge. Another 
example is reported by Mandler, Seegmiller and Day (1977) who have observed that in 
studying the role of incidental leaming in acquiring spatial information, such leaming is not 
truly incidental as subjects often deliberately use locations to help organise objects for recall. 
They therefore devised a series of experiments in which there was a true incidental task in that 
neither objects nor locations were expected to be recalled. In the first of their experiments they 
distinguished between intentional leaming, i.e. 'remember the location of these toys', from a 
standard incidental condition, i.e. 'remember these toys', from a true incidental condition, i.e. 
'estimate the value of these toys'. They found that the intentional and standard incidental 
conditions did not differ from each other but both showed higher levels of recall (numbers of 
toys) over the a true incidental condition. However, the data from this experiment (and a 
replication of this using children as subjects) indicated that almost as much spatial information 
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is retained when it has not been intentionally attended (they calculated the loss of location 
information at less than 20% comparing the true and standard conditions). 
Finally, in an experiment by Kozlowski and Bryant (1977) which in many respects closely 
resembles the current experiment (experiment I), subjects were led through a windowless maze, 
measuring 3 metres high by 2 metres wide, illuminated by lights every 2 - 3 metres. The 
subjects had been misleadingly told that this was a time-estimating exercise, but on being led 
back to the beginning of the maze were asked to draw an arrow leading back to the end of the 
maze. The route was fravelled a fiirther four times and a fiirther three measures taken. In 
addition to these estimates, the subjects were asked to rate their sense of direction, yielding two 
groups, those with a self-report of a good and poor sense of direction. As to the fmdings of this 
experiment, Kozlowski and Bryant reported the two groups did not differ in their mean 
pointing error. However, over the repeated trials those with a self-report of a good sense of 
direction significantly improved the accuracy of their judgements (errors falling from 
approximately 55° to 25°) while the accuracy poor sense of direction group's judgements 
became poorer then plateau-ed (errors rising from approximately 45° to 60°). Kozlowski and 
Bryant attempted to accoimt for the improvement in the maze-bright group by speculating that 
they prided themselves on having a good sense of direction and in some way worked to 
improve on it. 
In summary 
The precise role of intention in acquiring spatial knowledge is equivocal. People appear to be 
able to acquire spatial knowledge of an environment whether or not they have been 
intentionally trying to acquire it. 
2.1.1 Experiment I 
This experiment employed a non-immersive virtual reality game - DOOM, which is described 
in detail in section 2.1.3. Subjects were assigned to either the incidental ('pick up various 
objects') or the intentional learning ('learn the layout of the rooms in the game') condition and 
then were given a fixed amount of time to carry out these instructions. They were then asked to 
explore the first level of the game which consisted of a series of corridor-linked rooms. When 
subjects entered or re-entered particular rooms, they were identified verbally by the 
experimenter as follows: this is the balcony; this is the computer room; this is the poisoned 
lake; this is the exit, as appropriate. This identification served two purposes: firstly, to clearly 
identify the individual rooms from which they were to make inter-room judgements and 
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secondly, to assist in the coding and retrieval of spatial information as demonsfrated by, for 
example, Pezdek and Evans (1979). After the period of exploration, the subjects were asked to 
make a number of inter-room judgements of angle. The judgements were of the form, from 
position A, assuming you are facing 0°, what is the angle to B, C and D' - where B, C and D 
were different rooms on the first level of the game. That is make a judgement from source 
room to target room. In all, two sets of judgements were elicited from the subjects employing 
two different source rooms and four different target rooms. The accuracy of these judgements 
was taken to be an explicit test of the consistency of the cognitive representation of the spatial 
knowledge the subjects had acquired from exploring this virtual environment. 
2.1.2 Hypothesis 
The explicit (i.e. intentional) instructions to leam the spatial organisation of the rooms making 
up the first level of DOOM, followed by a period of free exploration of these rooms, will yield 
more accurate judgements of inter-room angles than a similar period of exploration prefaced by 
instructions to execute an incidental task. Furthermore, it is expected that the judgements made 
from two different starting locations will not differ in accuracy. 
2.1.3 Method 
Materials 
DOOM is a PC-based non-immersive virtual reality game in which the player, armed with a 
range of weapons, aims to explore various buildings and in the process improve his or her 
armour, weapons, and health. Unsurprisingly the player is faced with 'monsters' which attempt 
to kill him or her and which he or she must attempt to kill. The game is played using the cursor 
keys to move, the Ctrl key to fire and the spacebar to open doors. A variety of objects may be 
collected en route, which are picked up by simply walking over them, and include helmets and 
other forms of armour, blue flasks and first aid packs, weapons, ammunition and miscellany 
(keys and so forth). The game has a variety of levels of difficulty, and the player may save and 
reload their current position. To remove the distraction of subjects having to fight monsters, 
DOOM was configured to disable all monsters, placing the game in an exploration mode only, 
using the 'doom -nomonsters' start-up command. The game itself has very detailed graphics 
giving a very sfrong impression of a 'three-dimensional' maze of rooms, connecting corridors 
and doors. DOOM (the shareware version) was run on 486SX PC (at 33MHz with 8Mb of 
memory and a SVGA graphics card; the card has 1Mb of video memory and a resolution of 
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800x600 with 256 colours) where it had been previously installed on the PC's hard disc, and 
using this configuration, the game ran very smoothly with no discernible jerkiness in scrolling 
or performance. 
Subjects 
Twenty subjects (6 women and 14 men), drawn from the technical staff at MARI Computer 
Systems Ltd. agreed to participate in this experiment. All of the subjects used computers on a 
daily basis, and as such are wholly familiar with their operation. However, it was ascertained 
that none of the subjects had played DOOAf before. None was paid. 
Design 
An independent groups design was employed with subjects being randomly assigned to either 
the incidental or intentional learning conditions. 
Procedure 
Subjects were invited to sit at the experimenter's desk upon which sat the PC used in the 
experiment. The experiment had three components: a practice session to familiarise the 
subjects with the game and its controls, the free exploration of the first level of the game, and a 
set of post-experimental measurements. 
Prior to the pre-experiment practice session, the following was read to each subject: 
'This is the game Doom. It has been configured so that there are no 'monsters' to kill (or to 
kill you). It is played by using the cursor keys to move, and the space-bar to open doors. In 
addition to forward, backward, left and right you are able to climb stairs by simply walking 
towards them. 
You have one minute in which to practice the game.' 
Whereupon the subjects played Doom for one minute - it should be noted that they practised on 
a level different to the one about which they would be asked to make judgements. 
Subjects were then randomly assigned to either the incidental or intentional condition, upon 
which one of the following instructions were read to the subjects after the practice session. 
Incidental learning condition 
'Would you please explore the rooms in this game with a view to collecting as many objects 
you find there as possible. The objects which you can pick up are helmets and blue flasks. 
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You pick them up by walking over them. As you enter and re-enter particular rooms they 
will be named for you. You have three minutes. Afterwards you will be asked some 
questions.' 
Intentional learning condition 
'Would you please explore the rooms in this game with a view to understanding their 
organisation and layout. As you enter and re-enter rooms they will be named for you. You 
have three minutes. Afterwards you will be asked some questions.' 
The figure of three minutes exploration time was arrived at by piloting the experiment with two 
subjects who did not subsequently participate in the experiment proper. 
A map of the first level of Doom 
Computer room 
Balcony 
Starting point 
Exit 
Poisoned lake 
Figure 2-1 
Figure 2-1 is a schematic representation of the organisation of the rooms which make up the 
first level of DOOM used in this experiment. Screen-dumps of DOOM are unfortunately not 
available as the authors of DOOM have disabled the mechanism by which screens are captured. 
The subjects started in. a room with a sealed door behind them, through which they had 
notionally entered. The organisation of the rooms was pre-defihed by the authors of the game, 
and is approximately as depicted in the above figxire. When subjects entered or re-entered 
particular rooms, they were identified verbally by the experimenter as follows: is the balcony; 
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this is the computer room; this is the poisoned lake; this is the exit, as appropriate. (The rooms 
were named on the basis of their principal characteristics, and to ensure consistency when they 
were referred to during the angle judgement component of the experiment.) Finally the 
subjects were given a stapled set of 5 pages of A4 on which were the following sets of 
questions (below). The order in which these instructions were presented was randomised. 
The first set consisted of the following: 
'Assume that your starting position was due North, that is 0°, please estimate the angle from 
the starting point to the centre of the following rooms. Both draw.and estimate the angle.' 
DOOM was then restarted so that the subjects are clearly able to view the starting position. 
This was followed by four named positions from which to judge the angle, namely, the 
balcony, the computer room, the poisoned lake and the exit. 
The second set: 
'From this second saved position assume that you are facing due North, that is 0°, please 
estimate the angle from here to the centre of the following rooms. Both draw and estimate 
the angle.' 
Doom was then restarted from the second saved position so that the subjects are clearly able to 
view the exit. This, again, was followed by four named positions from which to judge the 
angle, namely, the starting room, the computer room, the poisoned lake and the exit. Drawing 
in both instances was facilitated by providing compass axes for each judgement, as below. 
North The iiistruction to both 'say aloud' and 'draw the angle' to 
elicit the subjects' judgements of inter-location angles was 
used to help the subjects make as an accurate judgement as 
possible. It was recognised that they may have had a 
preferred method of making such a judgement, for example, 
scanning an image of the virtual environment and then 
'reading of f the value from the image (as suggested by 
Thomdyke and Stasz, 1981) or using pen and paper to 
facilitate what ever mechanism was involved and then reading off the angle from the sketch. 
Informal observation of the subjects indicated that some stated aloud the angle then sketched it, 
others did the reverse, and for others there appeared to be an interaction between the two. 
The actual inter-room angles were determined by making a scale drawing of the layout of the 
rooms on squared paper and then using trigonometry to calculate the angles. A map of the 
layout of the rooms was available on pressing the TAB key within the game, a feature which 
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was concealed fi-om the subjects'3. 
The data collected from the subjects consisted of two pairs of measurements (the raw data may 
be found in appendix A): 
- the stated value; and, 
- the angle drawn on the compass axes which was measured using a protractor. 
First of all, a cross-product correlation was applied to these stated and drawn line values which 
were found to be very highly positively correlated, r(l 15) = 0.995, p < 0.01 and given this very 
high degree of correlation, the mean of each pair of judgements has been calculated and taken 
to be the estimate of inter-location angle. In calculating the mean, it was ensured that the 
difference between the estimated value and the actual value was kept to a minimum. 
Finally, as this is a pilot experiment a null condition has been included. Condition 2d requires 
subjects to the angle from the exit to the exit, and angle of 0°. The inclusion of this condition 
verifies that subjects do recognise at least one of the source rooms and are capable of judging a 
simple angle. 
'•'The close and proportionate correspondence between the map and the virtual rooms of the first level of the game is 
central to this experiment. While this cannot be established beyond doubt, two arguments can be offered in 
mitigation. Firstly, the rooms in the game are constructed from graphic blocks, and the number of blocks per wall 
appears to be directly proportionate to the length of the walls in the map view. Secondly, a configuration tool for 
modifying the layout of the game called AutoDoom, came to light after the experiment, and from this it is clear that 
the layout of rooms is composed on a Cartesian co-ordinate basis. Given this evidence there is no reason to suppose 
that the virtual space in Doom does not follow Cartesian geometry in its construction. 
Page 67 
The test materials 
Table 2-1 contains a list of the 8 judgements asked of the subjects together with the actual 
angle from source to destination. Condition 2d, as can be seen, is the null condition. 
Judgement From To Actual angle 
l a the starting point the balcony -35° 
lb the starting point the computer room 37° 
I c the starting point the poison lake 80° 
I d the starting point the exit 112° 
2a the exit the starting point -58° 
2b the exit the computer room -18° 
2c the exit the poison lake 180° 
2d the exit the exit 0° 
Table 2-1 
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2.1.4 Results 
Comparing the signed and unsigned errors for the two learning conditions 
Table 2-2 holds the mean signed and unsigned errors for the two learning conditions. The data 
from the null condition 2d and errors greater than 90° have been excluded '^'. 
Incidental learning condition Intentional learning condition 
Signed mean errors -14.6° -14.5° 
Unsigned mean errors 37.2° 35.4° 
Table 2-2 
Comparing the signed errors: a value of t(18) = 0.00 (one-tailed) fails to reveal a reliable 
difference between the two learning conditions. Given this evidence, the hypothesis 
component which suggested that intentional learning would yield more accurate judgements 
than incidental learning cannot be supported. However the mean errors of-14.5° and -14.6° do 
suggest the presence an anti-clockwise bias in the direction of the judgements. Comparing 
these data sets with the no-bias condition (i.e. 0°): for the mean signed intentional errors, t(9) = 
-2.26, p < 0.06 (two-tailed) indicating a reliable anti-clockwise bias; for the mean signed 
incidental errors, t(9) = -2.26, p < 0.06 (two-tailed) which again indicates a reliable anti-
clockwise bias. 
Comparing the unsigned errors: a value of t(18) = 0.06 (two-tailed) fails to reveal a reliable 
difference in the absolute magnitude of the errors between the two learning conditions. This 
fmding also constitutes fiirther evidence that the hypothesis component which suggested that 
intentional learning would yield more accurate judgements than incidental learning cannot be 
supported. 
Errors of 90° or more have been discarded on the grounds that errors of this magnitude are indicative of the 
subjects having become disoriented. 
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Comparing the signed and unsigned errors for the two locations 
Table 2-3 holds the mean signed and unsigned errors for the two learning conditions by 
location. The data fi-om the null condition 2d and errors greater than 90° have again been 
excluded. 
Signed mean errors Intentional learning condition Incidental learning condition 
First location -34.8° -3.3° 
Second location -12.1° -10.2° 
Unsigned mean errors 
First location 46.6° 35.3° 
Second location 14.4° 38.6° 
Table 2-3 
Analysing the signed errors with a two-way ANOVA: F(l,9) = 4.42, p < 0.07 which indicates 
that the magnitude of the errors differed with the learning conditions, but location did not have 
a reliable effect, F(l,9) = 0.19. Nor was there any suggestion of an interaction between 
learning and location, F(l,9) = 1.90, p < 0.2. 
Analysing the unsigned errors with a two-way ANOVA: F(l,9) = 2.35 which indicates that the 
magnitude of the errors do not differ with the learning conditions, but location did have some 
effect, F(l,9) = 3.55, p < 0.1. There is no suggestion of an interaction between learning and 
location, F(l,9) = 0.67. 
Comparing the variability of the judgements 
Analysing the magnitude of the 95% confidence intervals for the signed errors in the two 
learning conditions (excluding estimates fi-om condition 2d), a value of t(6) = 1.36 (two-tailed) 
indicates that there are no reliable differences in the variability of the judgements between 
learning conditions. The same holds true for the 95% confidence intervals of the unsigned 
errors: t(6) = 1.03 (two-tailed). (NB, the reduced level of degrees of fi-eedom are due to missing 
data - please see Appendix A for details.) 
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2.1.5 Discussion of results 
This experiment has revealed the following about the accuracy of judgements made from 
spatial knowledge acquired from exploring virtual environments. 
- There is evidence of a reliable difference in the magnitude of the signed errors between the 
intentional and incidental learning conditions (p < 0.07). There is no such evidence in the 
unsigned errors. 
- There is an overall reliable tendency (p < 0.06) to bias the judgement of the inter-room 
angles in an anti-clockwise direction. 
- There is no reliable difference in the variability of the judgements across conditions. 
- There is no difference in the magnitude of the signed errors between the judgements made 
from two different locations. This result lends support the hypothesis component that 
judgements made from different locations would be equally accurate. The unsigned errors, 
however did show some evidence (p < 0.1) that location did have some effect. 
- Finally, most judgements proved to be quite inaccurate with less than 15% of judgements 
in each conditions being within 10° of the actual value. Further 30.5% of the judgements 
in the intentional and 30.2% of the judgements in the incidental condition were found to be 
in error by more than 90°. 
Informal observation of the subjects 
The finding that there is no evidence for reliable differences in the accuracy of judgements 
between the intentional and incidental judgements is something of a surprise. This is 
particularly so given the following observations: 
- All of the subjects in the incidental learning condition expressed great surprise (and horror 
usually coupled with expletives) at being asked to judge angles, yet their performance is 
not reliably poorer to the intentional condition. 
- As already noted, it was informally observed that subjects in the incidental condition spent 
more of their time in the rooms immediately adjacent to the starting room, namely the 
balcony and the computer rooms, than those in the intentional condition (this observation 
was confirmed by those subjects who were unable to make judgements about those rooms 
most distant from the starting room, because they had not visited them). Yet for all this 
additional exposure to fewer rooms there is no trade-off in improved performance (i.e. 
angle judging) for those rooms. In all 69 (out of 80) judgements were made in the 
intentional learning condition and only 46 (out of 80) judgements in the incidental learning 
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condition. 
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2.2 Introduction to experiment II 
Experiment I , employing a virtual reality game, found evidence for an overall tendency to 
produce judgements, fi-om memory, of inter-room angles which were biased in an anti-
clockwise direction. Experiment 11 further investigates this evidence for the observed anti-
clockwise bias in the judgements of angles in virtual environments. However, in contrast to the 
first experiment, this experiment employs a virtual reality construction kit - ACK3D - enabling 
especially designed '3D' virtual environments to be created. The virtual environments which 
can be created using ACK3D differ fi-om that of the first experiment in two principal ways: 
- the virtual space of DOOM used in experiment I is a tribute to the game designer's art 
consisting of a highly detailed series of rooms and corridors, whereas ACK3D is very 
simple and regular; 
- the virtual space was highly asymmetric. Using ACK3D the variables of complexity and 
symmetry can be closely controlled. This application is described more fially in section 
2.2.3. 
2.2.1 Experiment II 
Two 'L-shaped' virtual environments were created consisting of monochrome green walls with 
four different coloured panels forming the landmarks between which subjects were asked to 
judge the angle - see figures 2-2 and 2-3. The virtual environments differed only in their 
orientation being mirror images of each other, one being 'right-oriented', the other ieft-
oriented'. Subjects were assigned to either the right- or left-oriented virtual environment 
condition and then given two minutes in which to explore them and learn their spatial 
arrangements. After the period of exploration, subjects were asked to judge the angles between 
the landmarks. The judgements were of the form, fi-om the A panel, assuming you are 
facing 0°, what is the angle to the B, C and D panels' - where B, C and D are the other distinct 
panels. In all, twelve judgements were asked of each subject. 
2.2.2 Hypothesis 
On the evidence of experiment I , it is anticipated that an anti-clockwise bias in the judgements 
of inter-feature angles will be observed. 
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2.2.3 Method 
Materials 
Two 'L-shaped' virtual environments were created using the PC application ACK3D (fiill 
detail of which may be found in appendix B). At start up ACK3D reads a file (ACKMAP.LOl) 
and executes the spatial description of the '3D' configuration therein contained. This spatial 
configuration file is created fi-om another program called mapedit which provides a 64x64 grid 
which may be populated with a variety of graphical objects. ACK3D which was run on a PC 
(at 33MHz with 8Mb of memory and a SVGA graphics card; the card has 1Mb of video 
memory and a resolution of 800x600 with 256 colours) had been previously installed on the 
PC's hard disc. 
The walls of these virtual rooms measured 16x16 panels (units) and the corridor was 3 panels 
wide and were coloured a monochromatic green. Two of the panels in the walls were coloured 
differently being purple and red respectively and a fiirther two gave the appearance of being 
either a window or a wall clock'^. Movement within the virtual environments is achieved by 
means of the PC's cursor keys. Figure 2-2 a plan view of the right-oriented virtual room. 
Red panel 
Purple panel 
• Clock panel 
Window panel 
Figure 2-2 
'^The choice of objects is limited by the ACK3D application. 
Page 74 
Figure 2-3 is a plan view of the left-oriented virtual room. 
Red panel 
Purple panel 
Clock 
panel 
Window panel 
Figure 2-3 
Colour Illustrations 
The screen-shots overleaf are taken from the two virtual room. 
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Taken from the left-oriented environment, looking 
towards the window panel. 
Taken from the left-oriented environment, looking 
towards the red and purple panels. 
Taken from the right-oriented environment, looking 
towards the window and clock panels. 
Taken from the right-oriented environment, looking 
towards the purple panel with the red panel in the 
distance. 
Subjects 
16 subjects (10 men and 6 women) drawn fi-om staff at MARI Computer Systems Ltd, agreed 
to participate in this experiment. All of the subjects used computers on a daily basis, and as 
such were wholly familiar with the operation of PCs. None was paid. 
Design 
An independent groups design was employed with a half of the subjects being randomly 
assigned to each condition. The two conditions were the left-oriented virtual environment or 
right-oriented virtual environment. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually. The experimenter informed each subject that the purpose of 
the study was to investigate the accuracy of people's spatial knowledge acquired from exploring 
a virtual room. 
The following instructions were then read aloud. 
"This is a virtual room which I would like you to explore for 2 minutes. Use the cursor keys 
to move. When you have done so I will ask you a number of questions like this:' 
'Imagine you are standing with your back to the XXXpanel facing due North (i.e. 0°). 
Estimate (i.e. say aloud the straight-line angle from the XXX panel to the YYY panel. 
(Where XXX and YYY will be one of the four panels.) There will be 12 such questions.' 
After the instructions were read to the subjects they were asked i f they understood what was 
required of them, and i f not the instructions were re-read and then they were asked again. 
These instructions were supplemented by producing an ad hoc sketch to fiirther clarify what 
was required of them. 
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Test materials 
Table 2-4 contains a list of the 12 judgements required of the subjects together with the actual 
angle from source to destination for the right-oriented and left-oriented virtual environments. 
Source Destination Left-oriented environment Right-oriented environment 
Window panel Clock panel -30.0° -30.0° 
Window panel Purple panel -15.0° 16.5° 
Window panel Red panel -35.0° 35.0° 
Clock panel Window panel 60.0° 60.0° 
Clock panel Purple panel -15.0° -60.0° 
Clock panel Red panel -36.0° 45.0° 
Piuple panel Window panel 155.0° -163.5° 
Purple panel Clock panel 165.0° -150.0° 
Purple panel Red panel -65.0° 65.0° 
Red panel Window panel -35.0° 55.0° 
Red panel Clock panel -36.0° 45.0° 
Red panel Purple panel -65.0° 65.0° 
Table 2-4 
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2.2.4 Results 
The evidence for an anti-clockwise bias 
Table 2-5 holds the mean signed and unsigned errors for the two conditions. Errors greater 
than 90° have been omitted. 
Right-oriented environment Left-oriented environment 
Signed mean errors 1.3° -27.2° 
Unsigned mean errors 27.9° 43.5° 
Table 2-5 
The left-oriented signed errors reveal a reliable anti-clockwise bias, t(7) = 5.16, p < 0.001 (one-
tailed) when compared with no-bias condition (i.e. 0°) but there is no such evidence in the 
right-oriented signed errors do not reveal an anti-clockwise bias, t(7) = 0.31 (one-tailed). 
However both the mean unsigned and signed judgements are reliable different from the actual 
values, t(7) = 12.30, p < 0.001 (two-tailed) and t(7) = 5.03, p < 0.002 (two-tailed) respectively. 
Comparing the signed errors, t(14) = 4.46, p < 0.0003 (two-tailed) which indicates that the 
errors incurred in the left-oriented environment are very significantly larger than those incurred 
in the right-oriented environment. For the unsigned errors, t(I4) = 2.76, p < 0.02 which 
indicates that the errors incurred in the left-oriented environment are again very significantly 
larger than those incurred in the right-oriented environment. 
The signed and unsigned errors: by judgement 
Comparing the errors from the two conditions: for the signed errors, t(22) = 2.68, p < 0.02 
(two-tailed) the errors in the left-oriented environment being reliably larger than those in the 
right-oriented environment. The unsigned errors, t(22) = 1.41 (two-tailed) do not differ. 
Comparing the variability of the judgements 
Analysing the magnitude of the 95% confidence intervals for the signed errors in the two 
conditions, a value of t(I3) = -1.39 (two-tailed) indicates that there are no reliable differences 
in the variability of the judgements between conditions. The same holds true for the 95% 
confidence intervals of the unsigned errors: t(13) = 1.05 (two-tailed). 
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2.2.5 Discussion of results 
This experiment has revealed the following about the accuracy of judgements made from 
spatial knowledge acquired from exploring virtual environments. 
- There is a reliable (p < 0.0007) anti-clockwise bias in the judgements of inter-feature angles 
in the left-oriented but not in the right-oriented virtual environment. 
- Both the signed and unsigned errors made in judging angles from a left-oriented 
environment are reliably larger than those made in the left-oriented environment. 
- The precision of the judgements made by the subjects did not reliably differ. 
- The judgements varied in accuracy with almost a third of judgements in right-oriented 
condition (31%) but only 14% in left-oriented conditions being within 10° of the actual 
value. While nearly one fifth of the judgements in the right-oriented condition (18.5%) and 
nearly a quarter of the judgements in the left-oriented (24.2%) were in error by 90° or more. 
A confounding error 
Post-experimentally it was noticed that the two virtual envirormients are not exact mirror 
images of each other. It can be seen from figures 2-2 and 2-3 that the clock panel is to the left 
of the window panel in each virtual environment. 
What then is the consequence of this error? The answer is slight. I f the statistical analyses in 
the results section are repeated excluding those judgements involving the clock panel, no 
differences in the results are found. 
This error could have been avoided had the design of the virtual environments been properly 
reviewed before the experiment was conducted. 
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2.3 Introduction to experiment III 
Experiments I and I I have examined the accuracy of judgements of inter-feature angles made 
from immediate memory. In contrast, experiment I I I aims to establish a baseline measure of 
accuracy against which these judgements from memory may be compared. Specifically this 
experiment addresses the following issues: 
- how accurate are judgements of angles while actively exploring a virtual environment? 
- is there a directional bias in the judgements of angles while actively exploring a virtual 
environment? 
- how is the accuracy of judgements made of inter-feature angles affected by the features 
being in the line of sight and out of the line of sight of each other. 
2.3.1 Experiment III 
To address these questions, two virtual environments were created which were designed so as 
to have a number of features which were either in the line of sight of each other or out of the 
line of sight of each other. These virtual environments were made up of monochrome green 
walls with four different coloured panels forming the landmarks between which subjects were 
asked to judge the angle. The two conditions differed from each other in the following ways: 
- most significantly, in the in the line of sight condition each landmark was in plain view of 
each other while in the out of the line of sight condition this was not the case - this is most 
easily seen by examining figure 2-4 and figure 2-5; 
- with the in the line of sight condition subjects could adopt a variety of view points from 
which to make their judgements, this, again, was not so in the latter condition. Judgements 
made in the out of the line of sight were, to some extent, made from memory in that only 
one landmark was in view at any one time. 
Subjects were assigned to either the in the line of sight or the out of the line of sight condition 
and then given one minute in which to familiarise themselves with the virtual environment. 
After the period of familiarisation, subjects were asked to judge the angles between the 
landmarks while still in the virtual environment and able to freely move within it. The 
judgements were of the form, from the A panel, assuming you are facing 0°, what is the 
angle to the B, C and D panels' - where B, C and D are the other distinct panels. In all, twelve 
judgements were asked of each subject. 
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2.3.2 Hypothesis 
It is anticipated that; 
- Judgements of angles made while actively exploring a virtual environment will tend to be 
more accurate than those made from immediate memory. However, judgements made of 
inter-feature angles which are in the line of sight of each other wi l l be more accurate than 
those made out of the line of sight of each other. 
- An anti-clockwise directional bias in the judgements of angles is anticipated in the 
judgements made of inter-feature angles out of the line of sight of each other. No such bias 
is expected for judgements made of inter-feature angles in the line of sight of each other. 
2.3.3 Method 
Materials 
Two virtual environments were again created using the PC application ACK3D, full detail of 
which may be found in appendix B. The two virtual rooms were constructed as follows: the 
walls of the first virtual room measured 11x11 panels (units) and were coloured a 
monochromatic green. Two of the panels in the walls were coloured differently being purple 
and red respectively and a further two gave the appearance of being either a window and a wall 
clock - the choice of objects is limited by the ACK3D application. The walls of the second 
virtual room measured 16x16 panels (units) and were again coloured a monochromatic green. 
A purple and red panel together with a window and a clock were also included. ACK3D which 
was run on a PC (at 33MHz with 8Mb of memory and a SVGA graphics card; the card has 1Mb 
of video memory and a resolution of 800x600 with 256 colours) had been previously installed 
on the PC's hard disc. 
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Figure 2-4 is a representation of the virtual room employed in the 'in the line of sight 
condition'. 
Red 
panel 
Window panel 
Clock 
panel 
Purple panel 
Figure 2-4 
Figure 2-5 is a representation of the virtual room employed in the out of the line of sight 
condition. 
Red 
panel 
Clock I 
panel 
Window panel 
Figure 2-5 
Colour Illustrations 
The two figures overleaf are screen-shots taken from the out of the line of sight virtual room 
and from the in the line of sight virtual room. 
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This image has been taken from the in the line of sight 
condition. The red panel and clock panel can be clearly 
seen. 
This image has been taken from the out of the line of 
sight condition. Only the red panel and the obscuring 
walls can be seen. 
Subjects 
16 subjects (14 men and 2 women) drawn from staff at MARI Computer Systems Ltd, agreed 
to participate in this experiment. A l l of the subjects used computers on a daily basis, and as 
such are wholly familiar with the operation of PCs. None was paid. 
Design 
An independent groups design was employed with a half of the subjects being randomly 
assigned to either condition. The two conditions were the out of the line of sight and in the line 
of sight conditions. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually. The experimenter informed each subject that the purpose of 
the study was to investigate the accuracy of people's spatial judgements of angles in a virtual 
room. 
The following instructions were then read aloud. 
'This is a virtual room with which I would like you to familiarise yourself for 1 minute. Use 
the cursor keys to move. When you have done so I will ask you a number of questions like 
this: • 
'While still in the room, estimate (i.e. say aloud) the angle from the XXX panel to the YYY 
panel. (Where XXX and YYY will be one of the four panels.) There will be 12 such 
questions.' 
After the instructions were read to the subjects they were asked i f they understood what was 
required of them, and i f not the instructions were re-read and then they were asked again. 
These instructions were supplemented by producing an ad hoc sketch to frirther clarify what 
was required of them. 
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Table 2-6 contains a list of the two pairs of 12 judgements asked of the subjects together with 
the actual angle from source to destination. 
Source Destination in the line of sight out of the line of sight 
purple panel red panel -7.5° 52.0° 
purple panel window panel -63.0° 20.0° 
red panel window panel 59.0° 55.0° 
clock panel purple panel -85.0° 51.0° 
window panel purple panel 27.0° 20.0° 
window panel clock panel -7.0° 49.0° 
purple panel clock panel 5.0° -39.0° 
red panel purple panel -7.5° 38.0° 
red panel clock panel 23.0° -8.0° 
clock panel red panel 67.0° -8.0° 
clock panel window panel 7.0° -41.0° 
window panel red panel -31.0° -35.0° 
Table 2-6 
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2.3.4 Results 
Table 2-7 holds the mean signed and unsigned errors for the two learning conditions. Errors 
greater than 90° have been excluded. 
in the line of sight out of the line of sight 
Signed mean errors -6.0° 9.1° 
Unsigned mean errors 43.3° 41.7° 
Table 2-7 
Comparing the signed errors: a value of t(14) = 3.01, p < 0.005 (one-tailed) confirms that the 
out of the line of sight errors are reliably larger than the in the line of sight errors. In contrast, 
the unsigned errors do not differ in magnitude, t(14) = 0.65 (one-tailed). This result tend to 
support the first hypothesis component, namely that judgements made of inter-feature angles 
which are in the line of sight of each other wil l be more accurate than those made out of the line 
of sight of each other. 
The out of the line of sight signed errors reveal a reliable anti-clockwise bias, t(7) = 1.9, p < 
0.05 (one-tailed) when compared with no-bias condition (i.e. 0°), as do the in the line of sight 
signed errors, t(7) = -4.0, p < 0.005 (one-tailed). This result offers only partial support to the 
second hypothesis component namely that an anti-clockwise directional bias in the judgements 
of angles was anticipated in the judgements made of inter-feature angles out of the line of sight 
of each other. No such bias was expected for judgements made of inter-feature angles in the 
line of sight of each other. 
The out of the line of sight and in the line of sight unsigned error are also reliable different from 
the actual values, t(7) = 21.8, p < 1.08E-07 (two-tailed), and t(7) = 12.30, p < 5.4E-06 (two-
tailed) respectively. 
Comparing the variability of the judgements 
Analysing the magnitude of the 95% confidence intervals for the signed errors in the two 
conditions, a value of t(13) = -0.66 (two-tailed) indicates that there are no reliable differences 
in the variability of the judgements between conditions. The same holds true for the 95% 
confidence intervals of the unsigned errors: t(13) = 0.53 (two-tailed). 
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2.3.5 Discussion of results 
This experiment has revealed the following about the accuracy of judgements made from 
spatial knowledge acquired from exploring virtual environments. 
- The signed errors in the out of the line of sight condition proved to be reliably larger (p < 
0.005) than the in the line of sight errors, agreeing with the first hypothesis component but 
this effect was not statistically reliable. However the unsigned errors did not differ in 
magnitude. 
- However the unsigned out of the line of sight errors proved to be reliably larger than the in 
the line of sight errors p < 0.05, again agreeing with the first hypothesis component. 
- There is a reliable (p < 0.05) anti-clockwise bias in the judgements of inter-feature angles in 
the out of the line of sight condition and in the in the line of sight condition. 
- The variability of the errors did not differ. 
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A confounding error 
Post-experimentally it was noticed that a number of errors in the construction of the two virtual 
environments had been introduced during their construction. As can be seen from the figures 
2-4 and 2-5 the location of the panels used as landmarks from which the judgements of angles 
have inadvertently been moved with respect to each other between conditions.. 
Despite this error the essential hypothesis testing remains valid. Judgements made out of the 
line of sight and in the line of sight can still be compared and the results are meaningful. 
This error could have been avoided had the design of the virtual environments been properly 
reviewed before the experiment was conducted. 
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construct a maps of their campus, the students were most likely to put those landmarks that 
were in reality in front of them at the top of the page. This finding clearly echoes the work of 
Shepard and Hurwitz (1983) who it may be recalled have noted the extended use of the upward 
direction to refer to (i) any uphill direction; (ii) to mean north; and (iii) to the direction one is 
facing based on the egocentric frame of reference (see section 1.3.5 for a fully discussion of 
their work). 
Whether orientation-specificity wil l be observed in the spatial knowledge acquired from 
exploring the virtual mazes is the first of the two major themes of this experiment. I f 
orientation-specificity is found then it would tend to support the position that exploring virtual 
environments gives rise to secondary or indirect spatial knowledge, unlike primary spatial 
knowledge which is acquired directly from the environment. 
Building cognitive maps 
The second issue addressed by this experiment concerns the process of building a coherent 
cognitive model or map of the virtual enviroimients being explored. Ittelson (1973) has noted 
that in order to acquire spatial knowledge of the large-scale spaces which surround the 
individual, active cognitive integration of multiple views from multiple vantage points is 
required. To understand this process in a virtual environment, the virtual mazes have been 
constructed so that from a range of locations within the first maze (condition 2a, figure 3-2) all 
four landmarks are visible; in the second maze (condition 2b, figure 3-3) this changes so that 
any three landmarks are visible from specific view points, then two (condition 2c, figure 3-4) 
and finally only one (condition 2d, figure 3-5). So, i f the cognitive mapping of these virtual 
mazes is similar to, or analogous with, the process in the real world, then the integration of 
multiple view points should require proportionately more cognitive time and effort as the 
number of view points increase. Evidence for some of this has already been noted in section 
1.3.3. For example, Evans and Pezdek (1980) found evidence for the role of mental rotation in 
the recognition of the (US) states presented by 35 mm slides but not for a set of buildings. 
They found that RTs for recognition increased as a linear function of the degree of rotation of 
the picture of the states but not of the buildings. These results may be due to the fact that the 
subjects had experienced the college building from multiple perspectives, whereas they had 
only ever seen the states from maps - and probably canonically presented (i.e. 'North' at the 
top). Evans and Pezdek have presented further evidence of this kind by noting that subjects 
asked to study maps of a different campus, and then presented with slides of buildings on this 
campus, showed a similar linear relationship of RT to recognition to that found in experiments 
with involving mental rotation. 
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In the current experiment, it is suggested that the nature of this cognitive effort will be in the 
form of a series of mental rotations. It is fiirther envisaged that subjects wil l successively 
acquire spatial knowledge relating to the orientation and location of the landmarks. Those 
landmarks, initially out of sight, wi l l be integrated sequentially with the contents of the scene 
either immediately visible or in memory. As the number of landmarks which have to be 
integrated increases, it is expected that the relationship between the number of landmarks and 
the time to integrate them wil l be monotonic in a way which is analogous to the processes 
studied in experiments on mental rotation (e.g. Shepard and Metzler, 1971). 
3.1.1 Experiment IV 
Firstiy, to determine whether there is evidence of orientation-specificity in spatial knowledge 
acquired from exploring a virtual environment, four virtual mazes of varying complexity, each 
containing a number of landmarks wil l be explored by the subjects until they are sufficientiy 
familiar with the spatial organisation of the mazes that they are able to make a number of 
judgements about the angle from one landmark to another (i.e. the inter-landmark angle). This 
maze condition wi l l be confrasted with a map condition wherein subjects wil l study paper-
based plan views of the virtual mazes, again until they are sufficiently familiar with them, such 
that they are able to make a similar set of inter-landmark angle judgements. 
Four virtual envirormients (hereafter, mazes) were created consisting of monochrome green 
walls with four different coloured panels forming the landmarks between which subjects were 
asked to judge the angle - see figures 3-2, 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5. Four monochrome (black and 
white) maps of the virtual environment were also prepared and printed on sheets of white A3 
paper. The different coloured, panels being clearly labelled. Secondly, the time it takes to 
create a cognitive model or map as measured by the free exploration times of the virtual mazes 
wil l be recorded. 
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3.1.2 Hypothesis 
It is anticipated that the judgements made of inter-landmark angles made in the maze condition 
wil l not show any particular orientational bias as measured by the magnitude and direction of 
the error in judgement, whereas those made in the map condition should (see the table below). 
Furthermore it is anticipated that the time to learn the mazes wil l increase monotonically as a 
fimction of their increasing complexity, whereas no. differences should be observed in the map 
conditions. Table 3-1 summarises the hypothesis components for this experiment: 
Hypothesis component Maze conditions Map conditions 
The accuracy of 
judgements from different 
orientations 
No differences in 
accuracy are expected 
Judgement aligned with the way in which the 
map was leamed will be the most accmate. 
Judgements counter-aligned with the learning 
condition will be least accurate. 
Judgements which are non-aligned with the 
learning condition will show a level of 
accuracy between the aligned and counter-
ahgned. 
The free study / 
exploration times. 
Free exploration of the 
mazes will increase as the 
number of landinarks 
visible at any time 
decreases. 
The configuration of the maps should not affect 
study time. 
Table 3-1 
As noted at the begiiming of this experiment it is not possible to defme a canonical 'aligned', 
'counter-aligned' and so forth in a virtual environment because although a subject initially does 
find him or herself a such an environment in a particular orientation this is lost the instant he or 
she begins to explore. So the following operational definition wil l be adopted: 
- the most accurate judgement should lie at 180° to the least accurate judgement; 
- the intermediately accurate judgements should lie at 90° to the most and least accurate 
judgements. 
I f such a pattern is foimd it wi l l then be taken as evidence for the presence of orientation-
specificity in spatial knowledge acquired from exploring virtual environments. 
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3.1.3 Method 
Materials 
Four maps for the configuration of figures 3-2, 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 were printed on sheets of A3 
paper (black on white) and the various panels labelled, but not coloured. The actual maps were 
approximately four times largely than the figures below. 
The mazes were again created using ACK3D - a full description of which may be found in 
appendix B. The walls of the mazes were a uniform monochrome green with four panels 
which were different from the walls and these were a clock panel, a window panel, a red panel 
and a purple panel. ACK3D which was run on a PC (at 33MHz with 8Mb of memory and a 
SVGA graphics card; the card has 1Mb of video memory and a resolution of 800x600 with 256 
colours) had been previously installed on the PC's hard disc. Figure 3-2 illustrates conditions 
la and 2a (all four landmarks visible): 
Window panel 
Purple 
panel 
Clock 
panel Red 
panel 
Figure 3-2 
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Figure 3-3 illustrates conditions lb and 2b (any three landmarks visible from a range of 
viewing points): 
Window panel 
Red 
panel 
Clock 
panel 
Purple 
panel 
Figure 3-3 
Colour Illustrations 
The two figures overleaf are screen-shots taken condition 2a looking from the purple panel 
towards the clock and red panel, and from condition 2b, looking towards the window panel (to 
the left) and red panel respectively. 
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This image has been taken from the four landmarks 
visible condition. Here the red panel and the clock 
panel can be seen. 
This image has also been taken from the four 
landmarks visible condition. Here the remaining 
landmarks are visible, namely, the window and purple 
panels. 
This image has been taken from the three landmarks 
visible condition. Here the red panel and the window 
panel can be seen. 
This image has also been taken from the three 
landmarks visible condition. Here the clock panel and 
an obscuring are visible. 
Figure 3-4 illustrates conditions Ic and 2c (any two landmarks visible from a range of viewing 
points): 
Purple 
panel 
Red 
panel 
Clock panel 
Window 
panel 
Figure 3-5 illustrates conditions Id and 2d (only one landmark visible): 
Clock 
panel 
Red 
panel 
Purple 
panel 
Window 
panel 
Figure 3-4 
Figure 3-5 
Colour Illustrations 
The two figures overleaf are respectively screen-shots taken from conditions 2c and 2d 
respectively. 
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This image has also been taken from the two landmarks 
visible condition. Here the clock panel and an 
obscuring are visible. 
This further image from the two landmarks visible 
condition. Here the clock panel and an obscuring are 
visible. 
This knage is from the one landmark visible condition. 
The window panel and an obscuring wall can be seen. 
This final image is also from the one landmark visible 
condition. The clock panel and an obscuring wall can 
be seen. 
Subjects 
56 subjects (48 men and 8 women) drawn from the technical and administrative staff at MARI 
Computer Systems Ltd, agreed to participate in this experiment. All of the subjects use 
computers on a daily basis, and as such are wholly familiar with the operation of PCs. None 
was paid. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four maze or four map conditions and given as 
much time as they required to familiarise themselves with it (for the map conditions) or explore 
it (for the maze conditions) and learn its spatial arrangements. Study and exploration time were 
recorded. After the period of exploration, subjects were asked to judge the angles between the 
landmarks. The judgements were of the form, from the A panel, assuming you are facing 
0°, what is the angle to the B, C and D panels' - where B, C and D are the other distinct panels. 
Design 
An independent measures design was employed with subjects being randomly assigned to the 
maze and map conditions. 
Procedure 
In the map conditions, the following instructions were read to each subject: 
7 am about to show you a map which I would like you to study until you are completely 
familiar with its features, their location and orientation. There are 4 panels which are different 
from the walls and these are a clock, a window, a red panel and a purple panel. All panels are 
labelled. There is no set time limit although I will time you. When you satisfied that you are 
completely familiar with the map I will ask you a number of questions like this:' 
'imagine you are standing with your back to the XXX panel facing due North (i.e. 0 degrees). 
Estimate (i.e. say aloud) the straight-line angle from the XXX panel to the YYY panel. (Where 
XXX and YYY will be one of the four panels.)' 
After the instructions were read to the subjects they were asked if they understood what was 
required of them, and if not the instructions were re-read and then they were asked again. 
A randomly selected map was then placed on a table so that it lay squarely before them. When 
the subject indicated that they were satisfied that he / she was sufficiently familiar with the 
map, it was removed from his / her sight and then either three or four judgements asked of them 
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depending upon condition (see table 3-2). Study times were also recorded (to the nearest 
second). 
For the maze conditions: prior to the experiment each subject was asked if they were colour 
blind and only those who were not were asked to participate. Each participant was asked to sit 
before the computer being used for the experiment, instructions were read to them and then one 
of the four mazes was selected at random and loaded into the computer's memory by typing 
'trial trialnumber' where the trialnumber was either 1, 2, 3 or 4. This command loaded and ran 
the ACK3D application and the required maze definition file'^. 
The instructions were as follows: 
'This is a maze through which I would like you to freely explore until you are completely 
familiar with its features, their location and orientation. There are 4 panels which are different 
from the green walls and these are a clock, a window, a red panel and a purple panel. Use the 
cursor keys to move through the maze. There is no set time limit although I will time you. 
When you satisfied that you are completely familiar with the maze I will ask you a number of 
questions like this:' 
'imagine you are standing with your back to the XXX panel facing due North (i.e. 0 degrees). 
Estimate (i.e. say aloud) the straight-line angle from the XXX panel to the YYY panel. (Where 
XXX and YYY will be one of the four panels.)' 
After the instructions were read to the subjects they were asked if they understood what was 
required of them, and if not the instructions were re-read and then they were asked again. 
When the subjects indicated that they were satisfied that they were sufficiently familiar with 
the maze, it was closed down by the experimenter pressing the <ESC> key, which also cleared 
the screen. Then either three or four judgements were asked of them depending upon 
condition. Exploration times were also recorded (to the nearest second). 
^^ A batch file had been created, called trial.bat, which automated this process. 
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The test materials 
These are the twelve possible combinations of features rendered as questions (different 
coloured panels) and are order specific. Yielding... 
1. With your back to the window panel and facing 0° degrees, what is the angle to the clock? 
2. With your back to the red panel and facing 0° degrees, what is the angle to the clock panel? 
and so forth. Table 3-2 details the actual angles to estimate. 
Source Destination la/2a lb/2b lc/2c ld/2d 
window panel clock panel 26.0° -15.0° -6.0° -48.0° 
red panel clock panel -60.0° 35.0° 114.0° 78.0° 
purple panel clock panel -32.0° 90.0° 11.3° -8.0° 
clock panel window panel -64.0° -15.0° -6.0° 42.0° 
red panel window panel 4.0° -38.0° -149.0° 0.0° 
purple panel window panel 16.0° 21.0° 47.3° 90.0° 
clock panel red panel 30.0° -55.0° 26.6° -12.0° 
window panel red panel 4.0° 52.0° -43.0° 0.0° 
purple panel red panel -50.0° -18.0° 57.5° 38.0° 
clock panel purple panel -32.0° -90.0° 105.3° 82.0° 
window panel purple panel -16.0° 22.0° -41.0° -90.0° 
red panel purple panel 40.0° 72.0° 57.5° 38.0° 
Table 3-2 
The orientation of the angles in both the map and maze conditions have been categorised 
according to the orientation of the angles from the map conditions. Thus the angles have been 
labelled as being aligned, counter-aligned and non-aligned and aligned, counter-aligned non-
aligned-right and non-aligned-left by decomposing the non-aligned data into its constituents. 
It should be noted that not all of these conditions have the frill range of aligned, counter-
aligned non-aligned-right and non-aligned-left judgements. This is due to the difficulty in 
creating the appropriately configured mazes. 
Note: all errors greater than 90° have been excluded on the grounds that such errors are 
indicative of disorientation. 
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3.1.4 Results 
Analysis of map data 
The map data may be analysed to reveal whether the maps differed from condition to condition. 
Both the signed and unsigned errors have been analysed by means of pairs two-way analyses of 
variance (aligned, coimter-aligned and non-aligned) and (aligned, counter-aligned and the non-
aligned judgements being decomposed into non-aligned-right and non-aligned-left). Table 3-3 
holds these errors. 
Signed errors Dividing the non-aligned errors into 
their constituents 
Aligned Counter-aligned Non-aligned non-aligned-right non-aligned-left 
Condition la -0.5° -29.8° 16.8° 12.5° 21.2° 
Condition lb 12.7° n/a 16.2° . 24.2° 8.2° 
Condition Ic 3.2° -17.8° -12.2° -18.9° -6.9° 
Condition Id 7.7° 20.5° 8.5° 8.5° n/a 
Unsigned errors 
Condition la 9.5° 30.5° 25.2° 25.5° 24.8° 
Condition lb 30.0° n/a 32.0° 37.1° 26.8° 
Condition Ic 21.6° 17.8° 15.1° 18.9° 11.3° 
Condition Id ' 35.3° 20.5° 29.2° 29.2° n/a 
Table 3-3 
Analysis of the signed errors 
Comparing the signed aligned, counter-aligned and non-aligned errors with a two-way 
ANOVA: the magnitude of the errors do not differ with the number of landmarks visible at any 
time F(3,6) = 1.75; or by the orientation of the judgements to be made, F(2,6) =1.29. Further 
analysis of the non-aligned-right and the non-aligned-left errors reveals that the magnitude of 
the errors do not vary reliably: t(5) = 0.07. 
Analysis of the unsigned errors 
Comparing the unsigned aligned, counter-aligned and non-aligned errors with a two-way 
ANOVA: the magnitude of the errors do not differ with the number of landmarks visible at any 
time F(3,6) = 0.39; or by the orientation of the judgements to be made, F(2,6) = 0.54. Further 
analysis of the non-aligned-right and the non-aligned-left errors reveals that the magnitude of 
the errors do not vary reliably: t(5) =1.11. 
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Analysis of maze data 
The maze error data may be analysed to reveal whether the mazes differed from condition to 
condition. Both the signed and unsigned errors have been analysed by means of pairs two-way 
analyses of variance (aligned, counter-aligned and non-aligned) and (aligned, counter-aligned 
and the non-aligned judgements being decomposed into non-aligned-right and non-aligned-
left). Table 3-4 holds these data. 
Signed errors Dividing the non-aligned errors into 
their constituents 
Aligned Counter-aligned Non-aligned non-aligned-right non-aligned-left 
Condition 2a 18.2° 0.0° 16.9° 11.8° 22.0° 
Condition 2b 12.7° n/a 16.2° 24.2° 8.2° 
Condition 2c -17.0° 12.0° 3.0° 11.0° -4.9° 
Condition 2d -10.1° 8.8° -16.1° -16.1° n/a 
Unsigned errors 
Condition2a 20.5° 48.0° 35.6° 48.2° 23.0° 
Condition 2b 30.0° n/a 22.0° 37.1° 6.8° 
Condition 2c 23.6° 25.2° 21.7° 23.4° 20.0° 
Condition 2d 21.5° 31.0° 22.5° 22.5° n/a 
Table 3-4 
Analysis of the signed errors 
Comparing the signed aligned, counter-aligned and non-aligned errors with a two-way 
ANOVA: the magnitude of the errors do not differ with the number of landmarks visible at any 
time F(3,6) = 1.15; or by the orientation of the judgements to be made, F(2,6) = 0.13. Further 
analysis of the non-aligned-right and the non-aligned-left errors reveals that the magnitude of 
the errors do not vary reliably: t(5) = 0.06. 
Analysis of the unsigned errors 
Comparing the signed aligned, counter-aligned and non-aligned errors with a two-way 
ANOVA: the magnitude of the errors do not differ with the number of landmarks visible at any 
time F(3,6) = 1.02; or by the orientation of the judgements to be made, F(2,6) = 0.03. Further 
analysis of the non-aligned-right and the non-aligned-left errors reveals that the magnitude of 
the errors do vary reliably: t(5) = 1.94, p < 0.06. 
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The integration of multiple viewpoints 
Study Times 
Table 3-5 holds the mean free study / exploration times for all four map and maze conditions. 
Condition la/2a lb/2b 7c/2c ld/2d 
Map (study times in seconds) 47.0 62.7 75.4 27.7 
Maze (exploration times in seconds) 126.7 76.8 153.1 252.0 
Figure 3-6 illustrates the above data. 
300 
250 
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i 150 J 
100 J 
50 
2 3. 
Number of landmarks visible 
- - Map - - O - -Maze 
Table 3-5 
Free study times 
It is clear that the mean free 
study times for all four map 
conditions do not vary 
reliably. Rank correlating the 
number of landmarks with the 
free study times, a value of 
= -0.2 is found. This indicates 
that the study times do not 
increase monotonically with 
the number of landmarks. 
This finding is unsurprising as 
all of the landmarks are 
necessarily equi-available. 
Free exploration times 
Figure 3-6 
Clearly the mean free study 
times for all four virtual mazes 
conditions do vary reliably. 
While the free study times for conditions 2a, 2b and 2c do not differ, the free study time for 
condition 2d is reliably longer than 2c (p < 0.05) and 2b (p < 0.05) and 2a (p < 0.06). Rank 
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correlating the number of landmarks with the free study times, a value of rg = 0.8 is found. 
While this level of correlation is not statistically reliably it does suggest that free study times 
tend increase monotonically with the number of landmarks. 
3.1.5 Discussion of results 
The map conditions 
The results of the four map conditions may be summarised and compared with the relevant 
hypothesis components as follows: 
1. Judgement aligned with the way in which the map was learned will be the most accurate. 
Judgements counter-aligned with the learning condition will be least accurate. Judgement 
which are non-aligned with the learning condition will show a level of accuracy between the 
aligned and coimter-aligned. 
Evidence was found for a broad confirmation of the presence of orientation specificity in 
judgements made after studying maps. However these effects were not statistically reliable 
which may be due to the small number of subjects in each condition. 
2. The configuration of the maps should not affect study time. 
Free study times did not vary between conditions as expected. 
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The maze conditions 
The results of the four maze conditions may be summarised and compared with the relevant 
hypothesis components as follows: 
1. The accuracy of judgements from different orientations will not vary. 
Evidence for orientation-specificity was found according to the operation definition given at 
the very beginning of this chapter, namely, that orientation-specificity is typified by the 
pattern of: (i) the smallest error in making a judgement being at 180° to the largest error 
and (ii) the intermediate errors being at right angles to the smallest and largest errors. 
Furthermore, while the accuracy of the judgements did not vary between conditions 2a, 2d 
and 2c, the mean signed errors incurred in making judgements after exploring the virtual 
maze in condition 2d were very significantly different (they were strongly biased in an anti-
clockwise direction) from those in the other three conditions. 
2. Free exploration of the mazes will increase as the number of landmarks visible at any time 
decreases. 
Analysis of the free exploration times suggests a monotonic increase with the number of 
landmarks. 
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4. Experiment V 
Experiment V explores the differences in the nature of the spatial knowledge acquired from 
maps (which Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982, describe as 'survey knowledge') and such 
knowledge acquired from the exploration of non-immersive virtual environments. Experiment 
V is thus an attempt to parallel some of the central themes of the study by Thomdyke and 
Hayes-Roth (1982) but substituting a virtual building for a real one. 
4.1 Introduction to Experiment V 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth aimed to investigate the differences in spatial knowledge acquired 
from maps and spatial knowledge acquired from free exploration of a particular environment. 
They selected as their environment the fust floor of the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, 
USA. The first floor consisted of two buildings separated by an enclosed hall with a 50° dog 
leg. The building contained a number of distinct and prominent public areas which, with the 
exception of the hall, were all set at right-angles to each other. 
Figure 4-1, after Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth 
(1982) p.566, is a representation of the first 
floor of the Rand Corporation although it is 
not to scale or in precise proportion. 
Their subjects were divided into two groups, 
those who had previously acquired 
knowledge of the buildmg by either actually 
working there (the navigation condition) and 
those who were requested to acquire such 
knowledge by studying floor plans of the 
building (the map knowledge condition). 
Within each condition, a ftuther subdivision 
was made. For the map condition, (i) 
subjects were required to leam a map of the 
building so that they could reproduce it without error; (ii) as group (i) but with a further 30 
minutes of over-leaming; and (iii) as (i) but with a further 60 minutes of over-learning. 
For the navigation condition, (i) subjects were identified who had worked at the Rand for 1 to 2 
months; (ii) for 6 to 12 months; and (iii) for 12 to 24 months. 
Figure 4-1 
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Both groups were asked to estimate: 
- Euclidean (i.e. 'straight line') distances from the centre of one room to another; 
- route distances, again from the centre of one room to another; 
- orientation, that is, subjects were asked to point to a given location from their current 
location, and; 
- location, that is, to locate a designated location from an incomplete map. 
Results from the map-learning condition 
Thomdyke & Hayes-Roth found that the performance of the map learning subjects with regard 
to distance estimates was characterised as follows: 
- the correlation between the Euclidean and route distance estimates was very high (r = 0.82); 
- the relative accuracy of the estimates was equally divided between Euclidean and route 
distance estimates (i.e. for 50% of the sample the correlation between actual and route 
distance was higher than the correlation between the actual and Euclidean distances). 
- more and larger errors were made in estimating route distance than Euclidean distance and 
these error were not reduced with over-learning. 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth have argued that subjects who have acquired spatial knowledge 
from a map generate an image of the map to estimate distances. Subjects are able to estimate 
distances by scanning from point to point in a manner which is analogous to visually scanning 
the actual map. When estimating a Euclidean distance, subjects scan the image and estimate 
the distance by comparing it to the provided scale. However as Euclidean distance estimates do 
not depend on the route information, the error in subjects' estimates of Euclidean distance will 
be independent of the number of the legs on the connecting route. Therefore when subjects 
estimate route distances, they must estimate and sum the lengths of the component legs on the 
route. This additional processing is thus a potential source of error in the estimation process. 
The more component legs to be estimated and combined, the greater the opportunity for error. 
As a consequence, the error in map-learning subjects' estimate of route distances should exceed 
the error in their estimates of Euclidean distance which indeed it does. This model of 
generating distance estimates from images created from studying maps is also supported by the 
image scanning work of Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser, (1978); Denis and Cocudes (1989); and, 
Kulhavy, Schwartz and Shaha (1983) which has been reviewed in chapter 1. 
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Results from the navigation condition 
In contrast, the distance estimates made by the navigation subjects were found to be less 
uniform. 
- the judgements of route distances were more accurate than judgements of Euclidean 
distances, but as the amount of navigation experience increased, the differences in accuracy 
of judgement between route and Euclidean distances diminished. 
- Euclidean judgements were found to become more accurate with extended navigational 
experience though the accuracy of route distances judgements was unchanged. 
Therefore, unlike distance estimation from spatial knowledge acquired from maps there 
appears to be a clear dependency between the Euclidean and route judgements. Euclidean 
judgements are derived from route estimates. 
4.1.1 Experiment V 
This experiment necessarily differs from the Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth study in a number of 
ways. Firstiy, as already mentioned, a virtual building will be used in place of a real one. The 
virtual building differs from a real building in that it is very regular, all angles are right-angles, 
all surfaces are either horizontal or vertical. There is no outside world to place it in context; 
and the lighting is uniform. It is, of course, also devoid of people, fiimiture and a ceiling! The 
virtual building consists of five empty rooms coimected by a corridor. The rooms are 
distinguished by either their monochromatic colour scheme (i.e. purple, red or green coloured 
walls) or by means of features 'embedded' in the walls (i.e. clocks or opaque 'windows'). 
Secondly, this experiment will only address the Euclidean and route distance estimates. The 
reasons for this are three-fold, 
- experiments I, II, III and IV have already provided a body of evidence on the issue of angle 
estimation in virtual environments; 
- there are practical difficulties with the availability of subjects who would be willing to 
spend a substantial amount of time making additional orientation judgements, and; 
- while Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth physically escorted their subjects to specific rooms in the 
Rand building from which to make judgements this,, of course, carmot be reproduced in this 
experiment. Instead this will be paralleled by making a number of different copies of the 
virtual building with different starting points specified. Thus subjects can be effectively 
'spirited' to specific rooms from which to make the distance estimates. 
While the differences between this experiment and Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's are 
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pronounced, there is no reason to suppose that they affect the validity of the comparison 
between spatial knowledge acquired from a map of the virtual building and spatial knowledge 
acquired from exploring the virtual environment itself. 
4.1.2 Hypothesis 
The statement of hypothesis for this experiment is as Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's: 
1. Spatial knowledge acquired from exploring the virtual building will facilitate more accurate 
route judgements of distance than equivalent Euclidean judgements of distance. 
2. Spatial knowledge acquired from a map of a virtual building will facilitate more accurate 
Euclidean judgements than route judgements of distance. 
3. The difference in accuracy between the route and Euclidean judgement will diminish with 
extended navigational experience. 
4.1.3 Method 
Materials: the navigation conditions 
A virtual building was again created using the PC application ACK3D. ACK3D which was run 
on a 486SX PC (at 33MHz with 8Mb of memory and a SVGA graphics card with 1Mb of video 
memory with a resolution of 800x600 with 16 colours) had been previously installed on the 
PC's hard disc. 
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Materials: the map condition 
Figure 4-2 is a representation of the map of the virtual building used in this experiment. The 
map used in this experiment, was printed on a sheet of A4 paper oriented 'landscape' (black on 
white) and the various rooms labelled as below. As with Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, a scale 
was included on the map but the subjects were not explicitly instmcted to use it. 
Wtodowrocm 
aockroom 
Purple roam 
• ircin'-iim 
Red room 
Figure 4-2 
Colour Illustrations 
The two screen-shots overleaf are taken from the virtual building used in this experiment. 
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This image has been taken looking towards the window 
room from the corridor leading to it. 
This unage has been taken looking towards the red 
room from the green room. 
Subjects 
24 subjects (20 men and 4 women), drawn from the technical and administrative staff at MARI, 
agreed to participate in this experiment. All of the subjects use computers on a daily basis, and 
as such are wholly familiar with the operation of PCs. None was paid. 
Design 
An independent measures design was employed with a third of the subjects being assigned to 
each condition (i.e. the map condition and the tw;o navigation conditions). 
Unlike the design employed by Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, the map condition was not further 
subdivided. In their original experiment Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth had divided the map 
condition into three sub-groups, two of which involved over-learning the map. However they 
subsequently found that the map leamers' spatial knowledge did not improve with extended 
exposure to the map as measured in terms of the accuracy of judgements made of inter-room, 
Euclidean and route distances. Consequently Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth conflated the map 
condition's data, using it as a single control condition. Given this finding, this experiment will 
employ a unitary map condition. 
In confrast, the navigation condition has been divided into two sections; a one period of 
exploration condition consisting of free exploration for two minutes starting in a randomly 
chosen room, and a three periods of exploration condition consisting of three periods of free 
explorations for two minutes, punctuated by rest periods of 30 seconds, starting afresh from a 
randomly selected room. The duration of the periods of exploration were determined by means 
of two pilot trials where subjects explored a similar virtual building until they were confident 
they had leamed its organisation and dimensions. Subjects typically took 2 to 3 minutes to 
explore this virtual building, and when pressed to spend more time doing so, complained of 
boredom. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually. The experimenter informed each subject that the purpose of 
the study was to assess the accuracy of people's spatial knowledge given different amounts and 
kinds of learning experience. The distinction between Euclidean (described as the 'the straight 
line' distance) and route distances was also explained after they had completed the exploration 
or study phase. 
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The map condition instructions 
The following instructions were read to each subject: 
7 am about to show you a map of an imaginary building which I would like you to study for 
two minutes. After that time I will ask you to draw the building on a blank sheet of paper. 
Any mistakes in your drawing will be pointed out to you, and the process of study followed by 
drawing will continue until you have been able to draw a full and correctly labelled map of 
the building on two consecutive occasions. Afterwards there will be a number of questions 
about the spatial organisation of the virtual building.' 
After the instructions were read to the subjects they were asked i f they understood what was 
required of them, and i f not the instructions were re-read and then they were asked again. The 
map was then placed on a table so that it lay squarely before them, and the study-recall cycle 
repeated until the subject had drawn a correctly labelled map (a drawing was judged to be 
veridical i f the rooms were correctly proportioned with no gross metric distortion) on two 
consecutive trials. 
Instructions for the exploration conditions 
Prior to the experiment each subject was asked i f they were colour blind and only those who 
were not were asked to participate. Each participant was asked to sit before the computer being 
used for the experiment, the instructions read to them and then the file containing the definition 
of the virtual building loaded. The instructions were as follows: 
"This is a virtual building which I would like you to explore for 2 minutes (or, for 2 minutes on 
three occasions with a brief rest period between sessions). The building has a number of 
different rooms characterised either by the colour of their walls (i.e. red, green and purple) or 
by the objects embedded in them (i.e. clocks and windows). Use the cursor keys to move 
through the virtual building. Afterwards there will be a number of questions about the spatial 
organisation of the virtual building.' 
After the instructions were read to the subjects they were .asked i f they understood what was 
required of them, and i f not the instructions were re-read and then they were asked again. 
Those subjects participating in the single exploration phase were also told that, 'two minutes is 
quite a short time for this task, so I wi l l let you know when one minute has passed'. 
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The distance judgements 
After the subjects in both the map and navigation conditions had carried out the first phase of 
the instructions they were invited to estimate both the EucHdean and route distance between the 
centres of 5 rooms of the virtual building. This was effected by loading five different 
configurations of the virtual building in which the starting position was moved from room to 
room. The experimenter then rotated the view of the each room in turn so as both to aid the 
subjects' sense of orientation and to mimic the likely behaviour of the subjects in Thomdyke 
and Hayes-Roth's experiment. Then 'standing' at the centre of each of the five rooms the 
subject were asked to estimate the Euclidean and route distances to the other four rooms. The 
subjects were provided with a proforma, as an extract (below) illustrates: 
3 red room clock room window room purple room 
Estimate the straight-line 
distance from the centre of the 
Green room to the... 
• 
Each set of questions were administrated randomly (i.e. a list of 10 non-repeating, random 
numbers was generated, and those numbers used to reference the questions). As each set of 
estimates were completed they were covered so as to prevent the subject comparing one set 
with another. 
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Test materials 
The distances between the rooms are in standard units of distance where a unit corresponds to 
the width of a graphical block used in the construction of the virtual environment. The scale on 
the map was also divided into units corresponding to the graphical blocks. 
From To Route distance Euclidean distance 
Red room Green room 11 8.06 
Clock room Green room 18 11.66 
Window room Green room 43 20.62 
Purple room Green room 24 12.73 
Clock room Red room 20 8.06 
Window room Red room 45 18.11 
Purple room Red room 25 7.07 
Window room Clock room 38 13.04 
Purple room Clock room 20 11.05 
Purple room Window room 37 10.44 
4.1.4 Results 
The raw data for this experiment may be found in appendix A. The data fi-om the three 
experimental conditions consists of two sets of judgements namely the route and Euclidean 
inter-room estimates. Furthermore each inter-room estimate is judged twice, that is, room A •=> 
room B and room B "=> room A. The overall mean of these estimates has been used throughout 
the analyses which follow. 
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4.1.5 One period of exploration results 
4.1.5.1 Comparison o f signed and unsigned errors 
Table 4-6 holds the signed and unsigned mean errors incurred by subjects in making both route 
and Euclidean judgements. 
Mean signed error Mean unsigned error 
Route judgements -11.8 11.9 
Euclidean judgements ^ 0.4 4.8 
Table 4-6 
Analysing the signed errors with a one-tailed /-test: t(7) = -9.93, p < 0.001, which indicates that 
the route errors are very reliably larger than the Euclidean errors. Repeating this procedure for 
the unsigned errors: t(7) = 4.09, p < 0.0025, which indicates that the unsigned route errors are 
again very reliably larger than the unsigned Euclidean errors. 
These two results fail to support the first hypothesis component, namely, spatial knowledge 
acquired from exploring the virtual building will facilitate more accurate route judgements of 
distance than equivalent Euclidean judgements of distance. 
4.1.5.2 Comparison o f errors: by judgement 
Analysing the signed errors with a two-tailed /-test: t(9) = 5.47 p < 0.001, which indicates that 
the mean errors associated with the route judgements are significantly larger than the 
corresponding Euclidean errors. Again with the unsigned errors, t(9) = 4.47 p < 0.001, which 
indicates that the mean errors associated with the route judgements are significantly larger than 
the corresponding Euclidean errors. 
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4.1.5.3 Correlating the actual distances and the corresponding errors 
There is a reliable negative correlation between actual distance and the mean signed route 
errors, r(9) = -0.83, p < 0.01. Figure 4-3 illustrates the line of best fit for the above route errors 
plotted against the actual distance. 
One period of Navigation line of best fit 
45 
-25 -20 -15 -5 0 5 
EnDr(units of distance) 
10 15 20 25 
Figure 4-3 
From this figure it is clear that there is a linear relationship between the magnitude of the errors 
and the actual distance, and that there are two major groups of errors (and a singleton). 
In contrast the mean unsigned errors do not appear to vary in a systematic way, an observation 
which is substantiated by the absence of a reliable correlation between actual distance and the 
size of the error, r(9) = 0.55. Given the low level of correlation, the line of best fit for the 
unsigned errors has not been calculated. 
Euclidean errors 
The mean signed Euclidean errors do not appear to vary with the magnitude of the actual 
Euclidean distance, r(9) = -0.41, likewise the mean unsigned Euclidean errors, r(9) = -0.02. 
Given these low levels of correlation, the lines of best fit have not been calculated. 
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4.1.5.4 One period o f exploration: in summary 
Subjects made significantly larger signed errors in estimating route distances than the 
corresponding Euclidean distances, t(7) = 9.93 p < 1.2E-05, similarly for the unsigned errors, 
t(7) = 4.09, p < 0.0025. These findings fail to support following hypothesis component, 
namely, spatial knowledge acquired from exploring the virtual building will facilitate more 
accurate route judgements of distance than equivalent Euclidean judgements of distance. 
Furthermore the magnitude of the signed route errors was found to increase as a fimction of the 
magnitude of the actual distance, r(9) = -0.834, p < 0.015, this did not hold for the unsigned 
route errors or either of the Euclidean judgements. 
In conclusion 
These results have failed to replicate the findings of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth. The 
Euclidean judgements have proved to be significantly more accurate than the route judgements 
which is the complete reverse of what was expected. Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's model of 
distance estimation predicts that the Euclidean estimates are dependent upon the route 
estimates. Inaccurate route estimates as observed in this condition should have produced 
inaccurate Euclidean estimates but this has not been observed. It would appear that the two 
sets of judgements are independent. 
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4.1.6 Three periods of exploration results 
4.1.6.1 Comparison of signed and unsigned errors 
Table 4-7 holds the signed and unsigned mean errors incurred by subjects in making both the 
route and Euclidean judgements. 
Mean signed error Mean unsigned error 
Route error -10.1 10.3 
Euclidean error 3.5 6.2 
Table 4-7 
Analysing the signed errors with a one-tailed Ntest: t(7) = -4.59, p < 0.002, which indicates that 
the route errors are very reliably larger than the Euclidean errors. Repeating this procedure for 
the unsigned errors: t(7) = 1.81, p < 0.06, which indicates that the unsigned route errors are 
again reliably larger than the unsigned Euclidean errors. 
These two results fail to support the first hypothesis component, namely, spatial knowledge 
acquired from exploring the virtual building will facilitate more accurate route judgements of 
distance than equivalent Euclidean judgements of distance. 
4.1.6.2 Comparison of errors: by judgement 
Analysing the signed errors with a two-tailed f-test: t(9) = 5.13, p < 0.001 which indicates that 
the mean errors associated with the route judgements are significantly larger than the 
corresponding Euclidean errors. Analysing the unsigned errors with a one-tailed correlated t-
test: t(9) = 7.24, p < 0.001 which again indicates that the mean unsigned errors associated with 
the route judgements are significantly larger than the corresponding Euclidean errors. 
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4.1.6.3 Correlating the actual distances and the corresponding errors 
There is a reliable negative correlation between actual distance and the mean signed route 
errors, r(9) = -0.951, p < 0.01. Figure 4-4 illustrates the line of best fit for the above route 
errors plotted against the actual distance. 
Three periods of Navigation line of best fit 
• 45 -
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Figure 4-4 
From this figure it is clear that there is a linear relationship between the magnitude of the errors 
and the actual distance, and that there are two major groups of errors (and a singleton). 
In contras the mean unsigned errors does not appear to vary in a systematic way, an observation 
which is substantiated by the absence of a reliable correlation between actual distance and the 
size of the error, r(9) = 0.43. Given the low level of correlation, the line of best fit for the 
unsigned errors has not been calculated. 
Euclidean errors 
The mean signed Euclidean errors do not appear to vary with the magnitude of the actual 
Euclidean distance, r(9) = -0.41, likewise the mean unsigned Euclidean errors, r(9) = -0.30. 
Given these low levels of correlation, the lines of best fit have not been calculated. 
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4.1.6.4 Three periods o f exploration: in summary 
The relative accuracy of judgements. Subjects made significantly larger signed errors in 
estimating route distances than the corresponding Euclidean distances, /-test: t(7) = -4.59, p < 
0.002, similarly for the unsigned errors: t(7) = 1.81, p < 0.06. These findings fail to support 
following hypothesis component, namely, spatial knowledge acquired from exploring the 
virtual building will facilitate more accurate route judgements of distance than equivalent 
Euclidean judgements of distance. 
Furthermore the magnitude of the signed route errors was found to increase as a function of the 
magnitude of the actual distance, r(9) = -0.951, p < 0.001, this did not hold for the unsigned 
route errors or the Euclidean judgements. 
In conclusion 
These results have failed to replicate the findings of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth. The 
Euclidean judgements have proved to be significantly more accurate than the route judgements 
which is the complete reverse of what was expected. Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's model of 
distance estimation predicts that the Euclidean estimates are dependent upon the route 
estimates. Inaccurate route estimates as observed in this condition should have produced 
inaccurate Euclidean estimates but this has not been observed. It would appear that the two 
sets of judgements are independent. 
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4.1.7 Map condition results 
4.1.7.1 Comparison o f signed and imsigned errors 
Table 4-8 holds the signed and unsigned mean errors incurred by subjects in making both the 
route and Euclidean judgements. 
Mean signed error Mean unsigned error 
Route error -0.20 11.46 
Euclidean error 6.60 8.04 
Table 4-8 
Analysing the signed errors with a one-tailed /-test: t(7) = -3.04, p < 0.01, which indicates that, 
the route errors are very reliably larger than the Euclidean errors. Repeating this procedure for 
the unsigned errors: t(7) = 1.64 p < 0.08, which indicates that the unsigned route errors are 
again larger than the unsigned Euclidean errors. 
The difference in accuracy between the route and Euclidean errors fails to support the second 
hypothesis component, namely, spatial knowledge acquired from a map of a virtual building 
will facilitate more accurate Euclidean judgements than route judgements of distance. 
4.1.7.2 Comparison o f errors: by judgements 
Analysing the signed errors with a two-tailed /-test (i.e. Euclidean errors should be smaller than 
route errors): t(9) = 4.41, p < 0.001 which indicates that the Euclidean errors are significantly 
larger than the route errors. Analysing the unsigned errors with a two-tailed /-test (i.e. 
Euclidean errors should be smaller than route errors): t(9) = 3.76, p < 0.005 which indicates 
that the Euclidean errors are significantly smaller than the route errors. 
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4.1.7.3 Correlating the actual distances and the corresponding errors 
There is a reliable negative correlation between actual distance and the size of the mean signed 
route errors, r(9) = -0.78, p < 0.01. Figure 4-5 illustrates the line of best fit for the above route 
errors plotted against the actual distance. 
Map learning line of best fit 
45-
10 
-10 -2 0 2 
Em>r (units of distance) 
Figure 4-5 
No such correlation is found between the actual distance and the size of the mean unsigned 
errors: r(9) = 0.21, and given the low level of correlation, the line of best fit for the unsigned 
errors has not been calculated. 
Euclidean errors 
The magnitude of the signed Euclidean errors do not appear to vary with the magnitude of the 
actual Euclidean distance, r(9) = -0.20. Correlating the unsigned errors with the actual 
Euclidean distance, r(9) = 0.29, given this low level of agreement the line of best fit has not 
been calculated. 
4.1.7.4 Map condition: in summary 
The relative accuracy of judgements. Subjects made larger errors in estimating Euclidean 
distances than route distances, t(I4) = -1.25, p < 0.12. However analysis of the unsigned errors 
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revealed that the route errors were significantly larger than the Euclidean errors, t(9) = 3.76, p 
< 0.005 which indicates that the Euclidean errors are significantly smaller than the route errors. 
These findings therefore offer only equivocal support to the hypothesis component spatial 
knowledge acquired from a map of a virtual building will facilitate more accurate Euclidean 
judgements than route judgements of distance. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the signed route errors was found to increase as a fiinction of the 
magnitude of the actual distance, r(9) = -0.78, p < 0.01, this did not hold for the unsigned route 
errors or the Euclidean judgements. 
In conclusion 
These results have failed to replicate the findings of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth. The route 
judgements have proved to be more accurate than the Euclidean judgements which is the 
reverse of what was expected. However, Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth did report very 
significant positive correlations between both sets of judgements and the actual distances, 
which have also been observed here. The high levels of correlation between the pairs of 
distance estimates in both the route and Euclidean suggests that the cognitive representations 
fi-om which the subjects were making their judgements were intemally consistent. This 
consistency suggests a map-like cognitive representation of the spatial relations within the 
virtual environment. 
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4.1.8 Comparing conditions: the signed errors 
Table 4-9 holds the mean signed errors for the route and Euclidean estimates. 
Mean signed route mean Mean signed Euclidean mean 
one period of exploration -11.75 0.43 
three periods of exploration -10.14 3.51 
map learning -0.21 6.60 
Table 4-9 
Analysing the signed route and Euclidean data with a two-way analysis of variance: for type of 
judgement (i.e. route or Euclidean), F(l,14) = 41.37, p < 0.001 indicating that the route errors 
are very significantly larger than the Euclidean errors. Analysing for the effect of the learning 
condition (i.e. map versus navigation), F(2,28) = 6.15, p < 0.007, indicating a significant 
learning effect. There is no evidence for an interaction between type of judgement and learning 
condition, F(2,28) = 0.56, p < 0.58. 
Analysis of the signed route data 
Analysing the signed route data with an ANOVA: F(2,21) = 5.56, p < 0.01 indicating that there 
are reliable differences among learning conditions. 
The one period of navigation errors are reliably larger than the map errors, t(14) = 2.61, p < 
0.02 (two-tailed); the three periods of navigation errors are reliably larger than the map errors, 
t(14)=2.14, p < 0.05 (two-tailed); while the signed navigation errors do not differ in magnitude. 
Analysis of the signed Euclidean data 
Analysing the signed Euclidean data with an ANOVA: F(2,21) = 1.55 which indicates that 
there are no reliable differences among leaming conditions. 
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4.1.9 Comparing conditions: the unsigned errors 
Table 4-10 holds the mean unsigned errors for the route and Euclidean estimates. 
Mean unsigned route mean Mean unsigned Euclidean mean 
one period of exploration 11.86 4.78 
three periods of exploration 10.28 6.20 
map leaming 11.46 8.04 
Table 4-10 
Analysing the signed route and Euclidean data with a two-way analysis of variance: for type of 
judgement (i.e. route or Euclidean), F(l,14) = 13.66, p < 0.002 indicating that the route errors 
are significantly larger than the Euclidean errors. Analysing for the effect of the leaming 
condition (i.e. map versus navigation), F(2,28) = 0.50 suggesting no differences among 
leaming conditions. There is also no evidence for an interaction between type of judgement 
and leaming condition. 
Taking these analyses fiuther: analysing the unsigned route data with an ANOVA: F(2,21) = 
0.62 indicating that there are no reliable differences among leaming conditions, similarly for 
the unsigned Euclidean data: F(2,21) = 1.00 again indicating that there are no reliable 
differences among leaming conditions. 
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4.1.10 Discussion of results 
The results fi-om this experiment are unequivocal: Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's findings have 
not been reproduced. 
1. Map leaming: this experiment employed a more realistic paradigm to that of Thomdyke and 
Hayes-Roth in that subjects studied a map until they could accurately reproduce it. There 
was no deliberate or prolonged over-leaming. Unlike Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth who 
found that more and larger errors were made in estimating route distance than Euclidean, 
this experiment found the reverse. 
2. Free exploration: Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth found that free exploration of a building gave 
rise to more accurate route distance estimates than Euclidean estimates but with extended 
exposure both improved and tended to become equally accurate. In contrast, this 
experiment found the Euclidean estimates were more accurate than route estimates and 
while extended exposure made no difference to the accuracy of the route estimates, the 
Euclidean estimates declined in accuracy. 
3. However the correlations between the route judgements errors and the actual route distances 
for all conditions proved to be statistically reliable but negative. This indicates that the size 
of the error incurred in judging route distances increases with distance to judge. In contrast, 
no reliable correlations were found between the Euclidean judgements errors and the actual 
Euclidean distances. 
4. The independence of the Euclidean estimates fi-om route estimates is another striking feature 
of these results. Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth argue that route judgements plus 'mental 
algebra' are used to produce estimates of Euclidean distances. Yet as the route judgements 
have proved to be so systematically inaccurate and the Euclidean judgements so relatively 
accurate this relationship cannot hold. As accurate Euclidean judgements cannot be made 
from inaccurate route judgements they must have been arrived at independently. 
5. No improvement in accuracy was found in the route judgements with increased exploration, 
and evidence was found for increased exploration producing poorer Euclidean distance 
estimates. Given these findings this component of the hypothesis cannot be supported. 
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5. Experiments VI, VII and VIII 
Experiment V I is an investigation into whether the clutter phenomenon is a feature of virtual 
space. Clutter has been suggested as the cause of the frequently observed phenomenon of 
people over-estimating distances when the intervening route is filled with objects, landmarks or 
turns (e.g. Cohen, Baldwin and Sherman, 1978; Byme, 1979; Sadella and Staplin, 1980, 
Thomdyke 1981; Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982). 
Experiment V I I fiorther examines the role of clutter in distance estimation and Moar and 
Bower's (1983) observation that judgements of angles tend to systematicity, that is, angles tend 
to be judged closer to a multiple of 90° than their trae value. Finally, having both estimates of 
distance and angles the resultant vectors can be compared with the actual vector. 
Experiment V I I I is an examination of the role of imagery in making distance estimates from 
memory of recently explored virtual environments. 
This chapter ends with a general discussion of the findings of these final three experiments. 
5.1 Introduction to experiment V I 
This experiment has two principle objectives: firstly, to obtain a baseline measure of the 
accuracy of subjects judgements of Euclidean distance from within virtual environments in the 
presence and absence of obstacles, the presence of which should give rise to the clutter 
phenomenon. Secondly, to compare direct exploration with indirect exploration of such 
environments. Exploration of virtual environments in the experiments reported in this volume 
has required subjects to use the keyboard to manipulate the perspective or view of the virtual 
environment (i.e. facilitate the appearance of moving through virtual space) which may termed 
direct exploration. In confrast, indirect exploration for the purposes of this experiment consists 
of the subject instmcting the experimenter to move for him or her. The subject wil l be able to 
instmct the experimenter to, for example, move to the left then stop, turn right and stop and so 
forth. In this way the subject experiences exploration at a remove. 
Distance estimation 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's (1982) model of distance estimation which has been discussed at 
length in the literature review (chapter 1 section 3), suggests that people employ 'mental 
algebra' using estimates of the length of component legs of the route, together with the angles 
turned through, to produce an estimate of total distance. They fiirther suggest that increasing 
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the number of computations required for an estimate increases the hkehhood of error, noting 
that the absolute error is probably greater than evidence suggests as some of the subject's 
computational errors will cancel each other out, reducing the overall error. Thomdyke and 
Hayes-Roth believe that people estimate the distance between two points by mentally 
simulating a trip from the start point to the destination. When estimating route distances, they 
estimate and sum the lengths of the component legs on the route. When estimating Euclidean 
distances, they must estimate the angles at which they turn between different legs on the route. 
They must then perform some mental algebra using the legs and the angle estimates to estimate 
the Euclidean distance between the points. However, this model largely ignores the following 
factors which are thought to affect the accuracy of distance estimates: 
- evidence suggests that remembered routes and angles tend to be 'normalised'; that is, for 
example, streets that in reality deviate from being straight tend to be remembered as being 
straight (e.g. Norman and Rumelhart, 1975; Chase and Chi, 19801'') and that estimated 
angles tend to be recalled as being closer to right-angles than their true value Moar and 
Bower (1983); and, 
- the effect of clutter which is discussed below. 
Evidence for the effect of clutter 
Byrne (1979) found that subjects' distance estimates for routes with many turns are reliably 
greater than for equally long routes with fewer turns. He suggested that distance along a route 
is estimated using the processing heuristic based on a function of the number of intervening 
obstacles or features - the more features / locations to remember between two points, the 
greater the apparent distance between those points. Byrne has further proposed that the 
cognitive representation of distance information is in terms of a network of topological 
information which is encoded, in the case of route information, as ordered strings of locations 
with information relating to the angle turned through. Similar evidence for the clutter illusion 
has been found by Cohen, Baldwin and Sherman (1978); while Sadella and Staplin (1980) 
found that people in a shopping mall over-estimated distances between two equi-distant 
locations as a function of intervening intersections, time to travel there, and how crowded the 
route was. Sadella and Staplin went on to identify the main contributory factor in over-
estimating distances as being the number of intersections encoimtered. Kosslyn, Pick and 
Fariello (1974) have also found that both children's and adults' memory judgements of the 
'^ Cited in Levine, Jankovic and Palij, 1982 
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distance between two objects in a room increased when barriers were interposed between the 
objects. Studies of subjects' use of visual imagery have demonstrated that the time to scan 
across a visual image increases linearly with scan distance and with the number of objects on 
the scanned path (Kosslyn, 1973, 1978; Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser, 1978). Sadella, Staplin and 
Burroughs (1980) also describe a variant of the distance distortion: the distance from a well-
known landmark (which they call a spatial reference point) to a less well-known landmark is 
estimated 7% shorter than the reverse distance (from the less well-known landmark to the well-
known landmark). 
Other forms of clutter 
Numerous studies from environmental psychology have demonstrated that people's experiences 
in their locale influence their perception of point-to-point distance. These environmental 
influences include the relative attractiveness of locations as destinations, their centrality (i.e. 
their proximity to frequently visited areas), the familiarity of the paths coimecting the locations, 
the direction of paths (towards or away from central locations), and the length of time the 
subject has resided in the locale. Finally, Sadella, Staplin and Burroughs (1979) have reported 
that a route containing high frequency names was estimated as being longer than one 
containing low frequency names. 
Evidence to the contrary 
Cohen, Weatherford, Lomenick and Koeller (1979) assessed distance estimation ability of 
second and sixth graders and adults in a novel environment consisting of seven identical 
stimulus locations and three barriers. The space encountered and the paths walked by the 
subjects were designed such that each subject experienced the factorial combination of barriers 
(present versus absent) and route (travelled versus not travelled) across each of the three inter-
location distances (4, 6 and 8 feet). For all ages, estimates of travelled routes containing 
barriers were more accurate than barrier-present routes that had not been travelled. Thus, 
though the studies described above have shown that barriers to direct travel lead to distortions 
in spatial representations, it would appear that walking can help subjects compensate for these 
potentially distorting effects. 
5.1.1 Experiment VI 
Two virtual rooms were created for this experiment. The first virtual room had walls which 
measured 12x12 panels (units) externally and 10x10 internally and were coloured 
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monochromatic green, except for a red, window and clock panel. The walls of the second 
virtual room measure 16x16 panels (units) externally and are coloured a monochromatic green. 
This room also had a distinguishing red, window and clock panel. The second room also had a 
number of internal walls which were intended to add an element of clutter. 
The two rooms were complemented by two modes of exploration, namely, the free exploration 
condition (hereafter the hands-on condition) in which subjects were asked to make judgements 
of Euclidean distances while actively exploring the virtual rooms and to the indirect 
exploration condition (hereafter the hands-off condition). The hdnds-ojf mode of exploration 
had the subjects ask the experimenter to move for them within the virtual rooms, that is, the 
subjects were not required to use the keyboard directly. Instead they instructed the 
experimenter to move in the following way, e.g. go left - stop - forward - stop. Neither 
condition was time limited. 
5.1.2 Hypothesis 
Firstly, active exploration of virtual environments {hands-on condition) will produce the more 
accurate estimates of Euclidean distance estimation than by subject-directed exploration. 
Secondly, the presence of obstacles will tend to produce (i.e. clutter) less accurate judgements 
in that subjects will tend to over-estimate the actual distances. 
5.1.3 Method 
Materials 
Two virtual rooms were again created using the PC application ACK3D full detail of which 
may be found in appendix B. ACK3D which was run on a 486SX PC (at 33MHz with 8Mb of 
memory and a SVGA graphics card with 1Mb of video memory with a resolution of 800x600 
with 256 colours) had been previously installed on the PC's hard disc. 
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Figure 5-1 is a plan view of the smaller, uncluttered virtual room. 
Figure 5-2 is a plan view of the larger, cluttered virtual room. 
Figure 5-1 
Red Panel 
Figure 5-2 
Colour Illustrations 
The two screen-shots overleaf are taken from the two virtual rooms used in this experiment. 
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Subjects 
16 subjects drawn from staff at MARI Computer Systems Ltd. agreed to participate in this 
experiment. All of the subjects used computers on a daily basis, and as such were wholly 
familiar with the operation of PCs. None was paid. 
Design 
A 2x2 factorial design was employed with a half of the subjects being randomly assigned to 
either the free exploration condition (the hands-on condition) or indirect exploration condition 
(the hands-off condition). Within each of these conditions, subjects made judgements about 
both the cluttered and uncluttered virtual environments. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually. The experimenter informed each subject that the purpose of 
the study was to investigate the accuracy of people's spatial knowledge in a virtual room. 
The following instructions were then read aloud. 
7 would like you the estimate the Euclidean, that is, the straight line distance between a 
number of panels in the two virtual rooms I am about to show you. The rooms are 
essentially green in colour but have one red panel, one window panel and one clock panel 
and it is these panels I will ask you to estimate the straight line distance between in units, 
where a unit is the width of one panel Finally, I would like you to make these judgements of 
distance while you are within the virtual room.' 
After the instructions were read to the subjects they were asked i f they understood what was 
required of them, and i f not the instructions were re-read and then they were asked again. 
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The test materials 
Table 5-1 holds the inter-feature distances to be judged and their distances. 
Judgement Feature Feature Actual Euclidean distance 
Condition 1 Jl Clock panel Window panel 9.92 
(uncluttered) J2 Window panel Red panel 12.21 
J3 Clock panel Red panel 12.65 
Condition 2 J4 Clock panel Window panel 9.43 
(cluttered) J5 Window panel Red panel 15.81 
J6 Clock panel Red panel 18.36 
Table 5-1 
5.1.4 Results 
The raw data for this experiment may be found in appendix A. The data from this experiment 
have been analysed in terms of the errors incurred in making the judgements of Euclidean 
distance allowing the errors to be easily compared across conditions. Table 5-2 holds the mean 
signed and imsigned errors incurred in making estimates of both cluttered and uncluttered 
distances from both modes of explorations. 
Signed errors Clutter No-clutter 
Direct exploration -0.8 -0.9 
Indirect exploration -3.5 -2.3 
Unsigned errors 
Direct exploration 3.0 2.7 
Indirect exploration 4.0 2.4 
Table 5-2 
Analysing the signed errors with a two-way analysis of variance: F(l,14) = 0.63 indicates that 
the presence or absence of clutter has no significant effect on the accuracy of the judgements; 
however, a value of F(l,14) =5.42, p < 0.04 indicates that the mode of exploration has a 
significant effect on the accuracy of the judgements, direct exploration being the more accurate. 
There is no evidence of an interaction between clutter and mode of exploration. 
Analysing the unsigned errors with a two-way analysis of variance: F(l,14) = 4.79 indicates 
that the presence or absence of clutter has a significant effect on the accuracy of the 
judgements; whereas, a value of F(l,14) = 0.40, indicates that the mode of exploration has no 
significant effect on the accuracy of the judgements. Again there is no evidence of an 
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interaction between clutter and mode of exploration. 
5.1.5 Discussion 
The effects of clutter 
There are two key findings with respect to the effect of clutter on distance estimation in virtual 
environments. Firstly, the presence of obstacles (intervening walls) does not induce the over-
estimation of Euclidean distance which is characteristic of clutter. Instead it appears to induce 
slight under-estimation. Secondly, the presence of clutter tends to produce less accurate 
Euclidean distance estimates compared with estimates made from uncluttered virtual 
environments. 
Modes of exploration 
The results of this experiment are very much in line with the brief review of active versus 
passive acquisition of spatial knowledge outlined in section 1.2.2. Introducing a level of 
indirection into the experience of a virtual environment tends to result in less accurate estimates 
of inter-feature distances. This finding is congruent with the reports of a number of researchers 
have reported more error prone or less accurate spatial judgements when spatial knowledge has 
been acquired passively (e.g. Appleyard, 1970; Beck and Wood, 1976; Feldman and Acredolo, 
1979; Golledge and Spector, 1978). 
A confounding error 
Post-experimentally it was noticed that a design error had occurred in this experiment. The 
panels used as landmarks in the cluttered condition had been inadvertently moved with respect 
to the no-clutter condition. Despite this error it is not anticipated that this will have had a 
significant effect on the results as the landmarks had only been moved by a panel or two's 
width. This error could have been avoided had the design of the virtual environments been 
properly reviewed before the experiment was conducted. 
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5.2 Introduction to experiment VII 
The unexpected findings of experiment VI that Euclidean distances in cluttered environments 
tend to be under-estimated is here further explored. Furthermore the claims by Lee (1970) and 
Sadalla and Magel (1980) that right-angle turns (in lieu of the 'walls' of experiment VI) can 
induce the clutter illusion are also examined. 
In addition to the examination of the effects of clutter in virtual environments Moar and 
Bower's (1983) observation that judgements of angles tend to systematicity, that is, angles tend 
to be judged closer to a multiple of 90° than their true value is also tested. 
Finally, as subjects are for the first time being asked to estimate both angle and distance it is 
possible to calculate the resultant vectors from the estimates of Euclidean and route distances 
and inter-feature angles and compare them with the actual vector. 
5.2.1 Experiment VII 
In this experiment, the effect of clutter has been isolated by creating three red monochrome 
virtual corridors. All three corridors have a fixed unit length of 60 units (i.e. graphic panels) 
but have either: 
- no turns (the control condition); 
- five right-angle turns with cormecting corridors of varying lengths; or, 
- eight right-angle turns again with connecting corridors of varying lengths. 
The choice of five and eight turns for the experimental conditions reflect, in part, the limitation 
of the application used to generate the corridors. Specifically, the maximum length of a 
sfraight corridor was 60 units and the choice of five or eight turns is a balance between 
ensuring that a reasonable number of turns and that the connecting corridors are, again, of a 
reasonable length. Clutter in this experiment will be instantiated in the form of an increasing 
number of right-angle turns (either no turns, or five, or eight turns) along the virtual corridors 
being used. 
5.2.2 Hypothesis 
Judgements of distance fraversed will tend to be over-estimated with the increasing amounts of 
clutter there is en route. Clutter should produce similar effects for both route and Euclidean 
judgements. Finally, after Moar and Bower (1983) it is expected that there will be a tendency 
to systematicity in that judgements of inter-feature angles will tend to be estimated to be closer 
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to the nearest multiple of 90° than they actually are. The inter-feature angles to be judged are 
the angles from one end of the virtual corridor to the other - the 'start-to-end' angle. 
5.2.3 Method 
Materials 
The virtual corridors were again created using the PC-based applications ACK3D (details of 
which may be found in appendix B). ACK3D which was run on a PC (at 33MHz with 8Mb of 
memory and a SVGA graphics card; the card has 1Mb of video memory and a resolution of 
800x600 with 256 colours) had been previously installed on the PC's hard disc. 
Subjects 
16 subjects (all men), drawn from the technical staff at MARI Computer Systems Ltd., agreed 
to participate in this experiment. All of the subjects use computers on a daily basis, and as such 
were wholly familiar with the operation of PCs. None was paid. 
Design 
A repeated measures design was employed. Subjects were assigned to each of the five 
conditions in a random order. Although there were five conditions, strictly, only three 
corridors were used. This fact was concealed from the subjects. 
- The control condition consisted on a straight corridor 60 units long. Each subject traversed 
this only once. 
- Figure 5-3 illusfrates conditions la and lb which used the same corridor. As can be seen 
this virtual corridor is not symmetrical, and by reversing the starting point with the end 
point, the subjects moved through the corridor either in a clockwise or anti-clockwise 
manner. Each subject traversed the virtual corridor once in each direction. 
- Figure 5-4 illustrates conditions 2a and 2b. As (ii), each subject traversed the virtual 
corridor once in each direction. 
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Start^la^ 
End (lb) 
Start (lb) 
End (la) 
Figure 5-3 
Start (2a) 
End (2b) Start (2b) 
End (2a) 
Figure 5-4 
As can be seen the two corridors have two major differences: firstly, figure 5-7 has only 5 
right-angle turns whereas figure 5-8 has eight; and secondly, figure 5-7 turns back on itself, in 
contrast figure 5-8 follows an overall East-West progression. All corridors were 60 units long 
and three units wide. The central line was taken to be the route distance. 
Colour Illustrations 
The two screen-shots overleaf are taken from the two virtual corridors used in this experiment. 
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This image and the one below have been taken from the 
featureless monochrome virtual corridors used in this 
experiment. 
Procedure 
The subjects were told that the experiment was concerned with understanding how accurate 
their judgements of distance and angles were in virtual space. Each subject was then asked to 
sit before the computer being used for the experiment and then one of the 5 corridors was 
selected at random and loaded. The following instructions were then read aloud. 
"This is a corridor along which I would like you to move until you reach the end. Each panel 
of the corridor equals 1 unit of distance. Use the cursor keys to move. When you have done 
so I will ask you the following questions: 
- estimate the distance you actually travelled in units allowing for the twists and turns you 
make, that is. the route distance; 
- estimate the straight line distance from the starting point to the end of the corridor, that 
is, the 'as crow flies distance'; and, 
- imagine you are standing with your back to the starting panel of the corridor facing due 
North (i.e. 0°). Estimate (i.e. say aloud) the angle from this point to the end of the 
corridor 
There are a total of 5 corridors.' 
In addition to the corridors being presented in random order, the order in which the above 
questions were to be asked was also randomised. 
5.2.4 Results 
The raw data for this experiment may be found in appendix A. 
Treatment of results 
The overall means of the two pairs of 5-tums and 8-tums judgements have been taken, and 
used in the analysis, which in turn have been translated into mean errors. Errors rather than 
judgements have been used for two reasons: firstly, to permit the different Euclidean 
judgements to be compared with each other, and secondly, to allow the route and Euclidean 
estimates to be compared directly. 
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Signed distance judgements 
Table 5-3 holds the mean signed route and Euclidean errors for the three conditions - one data 
set has been excluded due to the subject's inability to complete all of the required judgements. 
Only the signed errors have been analysed as the clutter effect is a signed error. 
Mean signed route errors Mean signed Euclidean errors 
no clutter 5.87 4.9 
5-tums -7.83 11.05 
8-tums -5.67 -0.13 
Table 5-3 
Comparing the route errors with the no-bias condition (i.e. zero error) reveals that two of these 
data sets do not differ from zero (i.e. the no clutter condition, t(14) = -0.84 and the 8-tums 
condition, t(14) = 1.03). While the errors in the 5-tums condition do reliably differ from zero, 
t(14) = 1.93, p < 0.05. However further analysing these errors by means of a series of (paired) 
t-tests failed to reveal any reliable differences between the pairs of judgements. 
Comparing the Euclidean errors with the no-bias condition (i.e. zero error) indicates that two 
of these data do not differ from zero (i.e. the no clutter condition, t(14) = -0.84 and the 8-tums 
condition, t(14) = 1.03). While the errors in the 5-tums condition do reliably differ from zero, 
t(14) = 1.93, p < 0.05. Further analysing these errors by means of a series of (paired) t-tests: 
- 5-tums errors compared with 8-tums errors, t(14) = 5.88 p < 0.001, indicating that the 5-
tums errors are reliably larger than the 8-tums errors; 
- confrol condition errors compared with 8-tums errors, t(14) = 0.51 indicating no reliable 
difference between conditions; 
- control condition errors compared with 5-tums errors, t(14) = -1.98 p < 0.05 indicating that 
the 5-tums errors are reliably larger than the confrol condition errors. 
Although there is some evidence for reliable over-estimation in both the route and Euclidean 
estimates in 5-tum condition, the hypothesis component that a cluttered virtual environment 
would tend to produce over-estimates of distance cannot be unequivocally supported. 
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5.2.5 Evidence for systematicity in the judgements of angles 
The final component of the hypothesis relates to evidence for systematicity in the judgements 
of angles. Moar and Bower's (1983) evidence for systematicity is based upon the use of a 
series of f-tests, comparing the differences between the error in judgement and 90° with the 
difference between the actual angle and 90°. Their evidence for systematicity is then based on 
the finding that the judged angles were significantly closer to a multiple of 90° than the actual 
angle. This procedure has been used on the angle judgements from this experiment. For each 
condition the judged angles and the actual angle, the absolute difference from the nearest 
multiple of 90° (including 0°) has been derived. This gives two sets of differences which have 
been compared by way of independent /-tests, in which pair-wise comparisons of the difference 
between the error in judgement and the difference between the actual angle and 90°. 
Condition Actual angle Actual 'error' Mean signed errors 
la 70° 20° -5.1 
lb 160° 20° -38.1 
2a 7° 7° 18.0 
2b 7° 7° 0.5 
Comparing the signed errors: t(4) = -1.59, p < 0.09 suggesting the presence of some evidence 
for systematicity. (The unsigned errors have not been analysed as systematicity refers to a 
directional bias only). 
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5.2.6 Vectors 
Control condition: route estimates 
100 -80 -GO -40 -20 BO 80 
-lOO-L 
Figure 5-5 illustrates the 
vectors for the control 
condition route distance and 
angle estimates. The dotted 
line (obscured by the y-axis) 
indicates the actual vector 
running from the origin to 
0,60. Both axes are in units of 
distance. This figure is a little 
unrevealing in that all but three 
of the vectors are obscured by 
the y-axis, however, it does 
show that the angle was 
correctly estimated. 
Figure 5-5 
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Condition la: route estimates 
80 A-
100 -80 -GO -40 -20 20 40 
1GG-'-
60 80 100 
Figure 5-6 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
la. Both axes are in units of 
distance. The dotted line 
indicates the actual vector 
running from the origin to 
38,47. All but three of the 
vectors are in the correct 
quadrant and from inspection 
the remaining vectors appear to 
be fairly equally distributed 
either side of the actual vector. 
Condition lb: route estimates 
Figure 5-6 
100 -80 -60 -40 
Figure 5-7 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
lb. The dotted line indicates 
the actual vector miming from 
the origin to -45,39. Both axes 
are in units of distance. The 
'star-burst' appearance of this 
figure suggests that many of the 
subjects were disoriented with 
most vectors lying in different 
quadrants to that of the actual 
vector, 
-1G0-1-
Figure 5-7 
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Condition 2a: route estimates 
100 -80 -60 -40 -20 20 40 60 
Figure 5-8 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
2a. The dotted line indicates 
the actual vector running from 
the origin to 59,10. Both axes 
are in units o f distance. A l l of 
the vectors are in the same 
quadrant as that o f the actual 
vector but most demonstrate an 
anti-clockwise bias. 
Condition 2b: route estimates 
Figure 5-8 
I 1 \ \ h 
•100 -80 -60 -40 -20 
Figure 5-9 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
2b. The dotted line indicates 
the actual vector running from 
the origin to 59,9. Both axes 
are in units o f distance. From 
this figure i t is clear that most 
vectors are clustered about the 
actual vector. 
Figure 5-9 
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Control Condition: Euclidean estimates 
100-,-
60 
40 
20 
-100 -80 -GO -40 -20 
-20 
-40 • 
-GO . 
-80 • 
-100-
0 GO 
Figure 5-10 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for the control 
condition. The dotted line 
(obscured by the y-axis) 
indicates the actual vector 
running from the origin to 60,0 
Both axes are in units of 
distance. From this figure it is 
clear that most vectors are 
clustered about the actual 
vector wi th only three vectors 
being noticeably different. 
Figure 5-10 
Condition la: Euclidean estimates 
I 1 1 1-
-100 -80 -BO -40 
00-,-
•80 4-
20 40 
Figure 5-11 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
la . The dotted line (obscured) 
indicates the actual vector 
running from the origin to 4,4 
Both axes are in units of 
- I \ 1 
60 80 100 distance. A l l but three o f the 
vectors are in the correct 
quadrant and from inspection 
appear to be fairly equally 
distributed either side o f the 
actual vector. 
Figure 5-11 
Page 141 
Condition lb: Euclidean estimates 
I 1- 1-
•100 -80 -60 -40 -20 
-lOO-L 
- 1 1 1 1 
40 60 80 100 
Figure 5-12 illusfrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
l b . The dotted line (obscured) 
indicates the actual vector 
running from the origin to -4,4. 
Both axes are in units of 
distance. This figure shows 
evidence o f the 'star-burst' 
pattern o f vectors noted in 
condition route judgements l b 
which suggests that many o f 
the subjects were disoriented. 
Condition 2a: Euclidean estimates 
Figure 5-12 
100. 
80 • 
60 • 
40 • 
20 • 
I \ 1 \ h -
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 
-20 
•40 
-60 
-80 - -
-100--
\ h 
20 40 60 80 100 
Figure 5-13 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
2a. The dotted line (obscured) 
indicates the actual vector 
running from the origin to 30,5. 
Both axes are in units of 
distance. Clearly all o f vectors 
lie in the same quadrant as the 
actual vector. 
Figure 5-13 
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Condition 2b: Euclidean estimates 
100-
80 • 
60 • 
40 -
20 • 
I \ \ \ h -
-100 -80 -GO -40 -20 
-20 
-40 
-GO . 
-80 • 
-100-
i 1 \ 1 
20 40 GO 80 1C 
Figure 5-14 illustrates the 
vectors for route distance and 
angle estimates for condition 
2b. The dotted line indicates 
the actual vector running from 
the origin to 30,4. Both axes 
are in units o f distance. From 
this figure i t is clear that most 
vectors are clustered about the 
actual vector. 
Figure 5-14 
5.2.7 Discussion 
Firstly, w i th only one exception, the participants in this experiment were able to make the 
judgements requested o f them, although from informal observation their confidence in the 
accuracy o f the judgements was low. 
The distance estimates 
While the mean route judgements for the 8-tum condition proved to be accurate, a statistically 
reliable under-estimate was found in the 5-tum condition. In all , this clearly does not provide 
evidence for the presence o f the clutter illusion. The position wi th the Euclidean estimates is 
less clear. The estimates in the 5-tum condition produced evidence o f reliable over-estimations 
o f the actual distances (p < 0.05), while the 8-tum condition did not. This finding runs contrary 
to expectations, given that the clutter effect is taken to be related to the number o f turns (or 
obstacles) i n a route. Overall, these findings do not suggest that clutter is a contributory factor 
in the errors made in estimating distances in virtual envirormients. 
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Evidence for systematicity 
Some evidence systematicity was found in the judgements o f angles in the four conditions. 
However further work is required to determine whether this finding holds across a range o f 
configurations. 
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5.3 Introduction to experiment VIII 
The genesis o f this experiment lies wi th , firstly, elements o f Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth model 
o f distance estimation discussed at the beginning o f this chapter. I t w i l l be recalled that they 
argued that people who have acquired spatial knowledge from a map generate an image o f the 
map which they can subsequently scan to produce distance estimates. 
The second stimulus for this experiment comes from the informal observation of, and post-
experimental reports from, subjects who participated in experiments I , n, I V and V indicated 
that the preferred means by which judgements o f distance and angle are made from memory is 
by way o f imagery. A number o f the subjects'^ described creating an image o f the virtual 
environment they had recently explored and then performing some cognitive manipulation of 
that image be i t 'mental rotation' or 'image scanning'. 
Experiment V I I I , then, is an explicit test o f the role o f imagery in making distance estimates 
from memory o f recently explored virtual environments. 
Image scanning 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth (1982) have sought to show that when learning maps intentionally, 
the individual acquires an image o f the depicted space, and that the mental representation of a 
map and the physical map are isomorphic. Image scaiming then permits the individual to 
identify the exact and relative location o f particular objects. Evidence o f image scanning 
processes in cognition are extensive and include Kosslyn, Bal l and Reiser's (1978) seminal 
study where they presented subjects wi th a map o f an imaginary island on which seven 
different locations were identified. These locations, a beach, a lake, a hut and so forth were so 
placed as to ensure that the distances between them were all different. The subjects were asked 
to study the map unti l they could accurately reproduce i t on a blank proforma. They were then 
asked to f o r m an image o f the island focusing on a particular feature. A second feature was 
then named and subjects were asked to scan their image and depress a button when they had 
located the second named object. The results showed a linear relationship between latency and 
the distance o f the second named object from the first. However, i t should be noted that 
Kosslyn et al found that the absence o f explicit instructions to generate and consult an image 
(o f the map previously studied by subjects) resulted in the disappearance o f the linear 
It must be stressed that no formal records were taken of these reports. 
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relationship between time to scan the image from feature to feature (the verification latency) 
and the distance separating those features. 
5.3.1 Experiment V I I I 
A simple regular virtual environment was created consisting o f monochrome green walls with 
two different coloured panels, and three free standing objects forming the objects between 
which subjects were asked to estimate the distance. Subjects were assigned to either the 
explicit imagery condition or the implici t imagery condition and then given three minutes in 
which to explore the virtual environment and leam its spatial arrangement. After the period o f 
exploration, subjects were either asked to visualise the virtual environment and then to fix their 
attention on the first o f two named objects or to simply fix their attention on the first o f two 
named objects. When a second object was named the subjects were either asked to explicit 
scan across the visualised image or to 'locate' the second object. Scanning and locating times 
were recorded, as was the time to estimate the distance and finally the distance estimate itself 
As can be seen from this brief outline o f the experiment, there are a number of critical 
differences between this and Kosslyn et aFs original experiment. These are: 
- Kosslyn et al employed a verification paradigm as the raison d'etre for the image scanning. 
More specifically, they asked their subjects to locate a first object, and then to scan for a 
second which may or may not have been present. Furthermore, the range o f objects 
suggested by Kosslyn et al were all plausible, in that i t was not unreasonable to expect them 
to be found on an island or a map o f an island, and as such subjects were required to scan 
the image o f the island they had generated to verify the existence or otherwise of those 
objects. I n confrast as no such set o f objects could reasonably exist for the rather minimalist 
virtual environment employed in this experiment (please see figure 4-13). Therefore 
replacing the verification paradigm, subjects were instead explicitly requested to estimate 
inter-object distances. 
- In a pi lot study which was conducted prior to the experiment proper in order to determine a 
reasonable estimate for the exploration time, i t became clear from observation o f the 
participants that they were capable o f generating and then scanning an image o f the virtual 
environment that had just explored but estimating the inter-obiect distances was very clearly 
a separate process. This finding was also wholly consistent wi th the earlier experiments in 
this series where subjects were seen to be engaged in the actual process o f performing a 
range o f computations, and were observed to vocalise their calculations, and so forth. Given 
this evidence a distinct measurement o f the time the subjects took to estimate inter-object 
distances was also recorded. 
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- This experiment has an implici t imagery condition. This condition has adopted what is 
judged to be a imagery-neufral term namely 'locate' as the alternative to 'scan'. Although 
the image-neufrality o f the term 'locate' was not established i t did prove to be meaningful to 
all o f the subjects in the imagery implici t condition. 
- The number o f inter-object distances has been reduced from 84 to 20 (namely, 1 0 x 2 , that 
is, ten judgements from A '=>B, where ' A ' and ' B ' stand for objects in the virtual 
environment, and then another 10 judgements from B |=>A. The order o f presentation was 
random. 
The differences between this experiment and Kosslyn et al 
In their original experiment, Kosslyn, Bal l and Reiser used a tape recorder to name the starting 
location, fol lowed a delay o f 4 seconds, and then named a second location. Presentation o f the 
second location started a clock, which was used to measure the RT for verification. As 
Kosslyn, Bal l and Reiser did not provide precise instruction on how the tape recorder and timer 
were interfaced, the current experiment has adopted a variation on this, which is as follows. A 
program written in a mixture o f C and C++ was created to replace Kosslyn et aPs apparatus. 
The program worked by: 
i . reading a text file containing the randomised pairs o f locations to be identified; 
i i . displaying those words; and 
i i i . managing the delays between words. 
The displayed words were read from the screen by the experimenter ( in lieu o f the tape 
recorder) to the subject. In addition to managing the timed display o f the stimulus material, the 
program also recorded the scan times (or time to locate, i f image scanning was not involved), 
the ' t ime to estimate', that is, the time to estimate the inter-object distance, and then wrote all 
o f this data to file. A sample o f the contents o f the output files is as follows: 
source destination scan time time to estimate 
purple panel ceiling light 3.24 6.20 
ceiling light purple panel 1.50 4.23 
red panel treasure chest 4.61 5.82 
ceiling light treasure chest 5.93 7.76 
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5.3.2 Hypothesis 
As discussed above, Kosslyn, Bal l and Reiser found a linear relation between the inter-object 
distance and time to scan from a named location to another, but only when the subjects were 
explicit ly instmcted to employ imagery. When subjects were left to their own devices no such 
relationship was found. I t is, therefore, hj^jothesised that i f the preferred medium o f making 
judgements o f distance is an image (rather than any other cognitive representation) then a linear 
relationship between the inter-object distance and time to scan from a named location to 
another w i l l be observed in both the presence and absence o f explicit instmctions to form such 
an image. 
5.3.3 Method 
Materials 
A virtual environment was again created using the PC application A C K 3 D fiill details o f which 
may be found in appendix B. A C K 3 D , which was run on 486SX PC (at 33MHz with 8Mb of 
memory and a SVGA graphics card wi th 1Mb o f video memory wi th a resolution o f 800x600 
wi th 256 colours), had been previously installed on the PC's hard disc. Figure 5-15 is a plan 
view o f the virtual room. 
1 Chest 
TV • 
RedPanel 
Purple Panel 
• Light 
Figure 5-15 
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The walls o f this virtual room measured 14x14 panels (units) and were coloured a 
monochromatic green. Two o f the panels in the walls were coloured purple and red 
respectively. I n addition to these two panels, three free standing objects were included, these 
were a freasure chest, a ceiling light and a television - the choice o f objects, as before, is 
l imited by the A C K 3 D application. 
Colour Illustrations 
The screen-shots overleaf are from the virtual room used in this experiment. 
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The fol lowing four images have been taken from the 
virtual envirormient employed in this experiment. In 
this image are visible, the ceiling light, the T V and the 
red panel. 
In this image the treasure chest may be seen. 
The treasure chest and the T V can be seen in this image. 
The T V and the red panel are visible in this image. 
Subjects 
10 subjects (all men) drawn from the technical staff at M A R I Computer Systems Ltd. agreed to 
participate i n this experiment. A l l o f the subjects used computers on a daily basis, and as such 
were whol ly familiar w i th the operation o f PCs. None was paid. 
Design 
A n independent measures design was employed wi th a half o f the subjects being randomly 
assigned to each condition. The two conditions are: 
- the condition wherein explicit instmctions to use imagery are made, hereafter 'the explicit 
imagery' condition and 
- the condition wherein no explicit instmctions to use imagery are made, hereafter 'the 
implic i t imagery' condition. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually. The experimenter informed each subject that the purpose o f 
the study was to investigate the accuracy o f people's knowledge o f distances in a virtual 
environment. 
Initial instruction 
The subjects in both the explicit imagery and the no-imagery conditions were asked i f they 
were for colour bl ind and only those who were not were asked to participate. Each participant 
was asked to sit before the computer being used for the experiment, the instmctions were read 
to them and then the file containing the definition o f the virtual building loaded. Both groups 
were either one o f read the fol lowing: 
Instructions (explicit imagery condition) 
'This is a virtual room which I would like you to explore for 3 minutes. The room has a 
number of different objects located within it and some differently coloured panels. Please 
study the relative locations of the objects and panels. Use the cursor keys to move around the 
virtual room. Afterwards there will be a number of questions about the spatial organisation 
of the objects.' 
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- When I say 'ready' please close your eyes and visualise the virtual room you have just 
explored. I w i l l give you a few seconds to fix the image. 
- Then I w i l l say name a starting location, for example the television set. I would like you to 
fix your attention on the named starting location and then when I name a second location I 
would like you to imagine a black speck moving as quickly as possible from the starting 
location to the second location. 
- As soon as you get there press the spacebar. 
- Then as soon as you have estimated the distance (in units, where one panel = one unit) 
between the two locations please press the spacebar again, and state the distance. 
- Af te r as short delay, the whole process w i l l begin again from point 2. 
Instructions (implicit imagery condition) 
'This is a virtual room which I would like you to explore for 3 minutes. The room has a 
number of different objects located within it and some differently coloured panels. Please 
study the relative locations of the objects and panels. Use the cursor keys to move around the 
virtual room. Afterwards there will be a number of questions about the spatial organisation 
of the objects.' 
- When I say 'ready' please close your eyes. 
- Then I w i l l say name a starting location, for example the television set. I would like you to 
fix your attention on the named starting location and then when I name a second location. 
- As soon as you have located the second location press the spacebar. 
- Then as soon as you have estimated the distance (in units, where one panel = one unit) 
between the two locations please press the spacebar again, and state the distance. 
- Af te r as short delay, the whole process w i l l begin again from point 2. 
Af te r the instmctions were read to the subjects they were asked i f they understood what was 
required o f them, and i f not the instmctions were re-read and then they were asked again. The 
subjects were then invited to explore the virtual room for 3 minutes - a figure which had been 
arrived at being t iming two subjects, not included in the experiment proper, to explore the 
virtual room unti l they felt confident they knew the spatial organisation o f the objects contained 
therein. Af te r this period o f exploration the subjects were then asked to locate a second object 
in the virtual room according to the above instmctions starting their search from a (first) named 
location wi th in the virtual room. 
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Timings 
Afte r the exploration phase o f the experiment, and using the same computer as above, but with 
the display moved out o f sight o f the subject, the t iming program was used to drive the data 
collection phase o f the experiment. 
A t the begirming o f every trial, the subjects were told, 'ready' which was followed by a delay 
o f eight seconds. Thereafter the name o f the starting location appeared on the screen of the 
computer, which was immediately read by the experimenter, then followed a delay of four 
seconds and the name o f the target location, which again was read by the experimenter. The 
names o f all the objects in the virtual room consisted o f two words were as closely matched for 
length (i.e. number o f syllables) as was practical, so, for example, ' l ight ' became 'ceiling light ' . 
As soon as the second word had been displayed, a centi-second clock was started. The subjects 
had been instructed to position their preferred hand lightly on the keyboard, wi th their thumbs 
immediately above the spacebar which was being used in lieu o f a button. Pressing the 
spacebar stopped the timer. As the instructions (above) indicate, two sets o f times were 
recorded, the first is the time to locate / scan to the second object from the first object, and the 
second is the ' t ime to estimate'. In all , the subjects were asked to locate and scan between (or 
'locate') 20 pairs o f objects, which they had observed in the virtual room. The order of 
presentation o f the pairs o f objects was random. 
5.3.4 Results 
The raw data for this experiment may be foimd in appendix A . 
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Test materials 
Table 5-4 contains the judgements asked o f the subjects and the actual inter-feature distances in 
'units ' where a unit corresponds to the width o f a graphical block used in the constmction o f 
the virtual environment. A l l distances referenced hereafter are also in units. 
Judgements From To Distance (units) 
J l television set treasure chest 2.83 
J2 television set red panel 2.83 
J3 red panel ceiling light 5.66 
J4 television set ceiling light 6.32 
J5 treasure chest purple panel 6.71 
J6 ceiling light purple panel 9.22 
J7 treasure chest ceiling light 10.00 
J8 treasure chest red panel 10.77 
J9 television set purple panel 11.70 
JIG red panel purple panel 13.15 
Table 5-4 
I n all o f the three pairs o f measurements taken in this experiment, namely, 
- the scan time / time to locate; 
- the time to estimate; and 
- the distance estimates themselves, two sets o f judgements were required o f the subjects, that 
is, for example, judging from the red panel to the purple panel (i.e. from A '=i> B - hereafter 
the ' s e t l ' ) , and then from the purple panel to the red panel (i.e. from B '=>A - hereafter the 
'set 2 ' ) . 
For each type o f measurement these pairs o f values are reported together wi th their mean, 
referred to as the 'overall ' mean. 
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Scan times for the explicit imagery condition 
Table 5-5 holds the mean o f the two pairs o f image scanning times (in seconds) together with 
the actual inter-object distance in imits (as above). 
Jl J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 JIG 
mean scan time 2.88 2.57 3.78 3.18 3.49 3.53 4.13 3.62 4.51 3.11 
distance 2.83 2.83 5.66 6.32 6.71 9.22 10.00 10.77 11.70 13.15 
Table 5-5 
A Spearman's rank correlation on the mean image scanning times and the actual distance, 
produces a value o f rg = 0.512, which is a little short o f the critical value (rg = 0.56, N = 10) 
and as such indicates a fairly reliable correlation. However, i f the last pair of data are 
excluded, the correlation is more pronounced, r = 0.80, p < 0.05. A possible justification for 
excluding the final set o f data is that these times and distances refer to a pair o f boundary 
features. That is, they f o r m part o f the walls o f the virtual environment being the red panel and 
purple panel and as such subjects may have been moving from wal l to wall in a ballistic 
manner without scanning the intervening distance. Baum and Jonides (1977) have also 
observed that the time required to compare two distances decreased wi th the magnitude o f the 
difference between the distances on both perceptual and memorial tasks, and this may be the 
case here. 
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Regression analysis (i) 
Figure 5-25 illustrates the line of best-fit for the above data. 
line of best-fit for the explicit imagery scan tines 
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Figure 5-16 
These findings compared with Kosslvn et al (1978). The first observation to be made is that 
there is a clear linear relationship between distance to scan and time to scan when subjects are 
explicitly instructed to form and image. However, the above figure stands in contrast to 
Kosslyn et al's findings in that it appears to take a relatively longer time to scan the image of 
the virtual room. Kosslyn found (judging from his graph) that subjects could scan a distance of 
18 cm in under 2 seconds. In contrast, these subjects are unable to scan the shortest virtual 
distance in anything less than 2 seconds'^ . This may mean that the apparent depth of the 
virtual environment employed in this experiment suggests minimum apparent distances of 18+ 
centimetres. 
The equation of the line is y = 2.72 + 0.1 *x, that is, scan time = 2.72 + 0.1 *units_of_distance. 
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Regression analysis (ii) 
Figure 5-17 illustrates the line of best fit for the explicit imagery condition excluding the final 
data point. 
Line of best fit for the explicit imagery condition excluding the final data point 
5.00 _ 
4.00 I 
2.50 4-
1.50 4-
6.0 
Actual distance 
Figure 5-17 
Again there is a clear linear relationship between the distance to scan and time to scan although 
the line of best fit is steeper when the final data point is omitted^o. 
20 The equation of the line being y = 2.38 + 0.16*x, that is, scan_time = 2.38 + 0.16*units_of_distance, 
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Time to locate for the implicit imagery condition 
Table 5-6 holds the mean times to 'locate' (in seconds) together with the actual object to object 
distance in units. 
Jl J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 JIO 
mean time 3.4 2.8 4.0 3.0 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.7 2.8 2.6 
distance 2.83 2.83 5.66 6.32 6.71 9.22 10.00 10.77 11.70 13.15 
Table 5-6 
A Spearman's rank correlation on the overall mean time to locate and the actual distance, 
produces a value of r = -0.17 which indicates the absence of a correlational between the time to 
locate and inter-object distance. This finding does not support the hypothesis that imagery is 
the preferred medium for making judgements of distance within virtual environments. 
Hiese finding compared with Kosslyn et al. It is clear from these data, that the overall time to 
locate the second named object from the first does not monotonically increase with the 
increased distance between objects. Furthermore, this is also consistent with Kosslyn et al's 
findings that in the absence of explicit instructions to use imagery, that a faster, non-imagery 
based cognitive manipulation is employed by subjects. 
2' For the sake of completeness, if like the imagery condition, the last data pair is omitted and the correlation 
recalculated a value of r = -0.034 is found, which again indicates an absence of a correlation between the distance to 
estimate and the time to locate the second object from the first. 
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Verbal reports 
After each experiment in the no-imagery condition, subjects were asked to describe how they 
had carried out that their tasks. A summary of their replies are as follows: 
Subject Protocol 
Si Subject 1 employed image scanning using the purple panel as focus and frame 
of reference Distance estimates were just that, not being informed by a 
conscious calculation. 
S2 Subject 2 did not form an image. Instead the subject knew the relative location 
of each objects.in the form, 'A is to the right of B'. 
S3 Subject 3 employed image scanning as (Subject 1). 
S4 Subject 4 described using a picture formed in his head, facing the red panel and 
then moving fi-om the red panel to the first, named object. Distance estimates 
involved Pythagorus' theorem and then estimating square roots. 
S5 Subject 5 knew the relative position of each object with respect to the 
immediately adjacent wall. Subject 5 also formed an image. 
Interestingly in four of the five post-experiment debriefings, subjects claim to have used 
imagery. Either, their reports are in error, or are post-experiment rationalisation or the images 
formed of virtual environment are non-veridical. 
Scan times for the explicit versus implicit imagery conditions 
Comparing mean times in both conditions with an independent t-test: t(18) = 1.897, p < 0.075 
which indicates a possible (though not statistically reliable) difference between conditions. 
This results suggests that the implicit imagery group are faster at locating the second named 
object from the first than the explicit imagery group. This may also be taken as further 
evidence that the implicit imagery group, despite their post-experimental reports to the 
contrary, are probably not using imagery to locate objects 'within' their cognitive 
representation of the virtual space they have explored. These results are again consistent with 
Kosslyn et al's findings. 
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In summary 
This experiment has found evidence that when subjects are explicitly instructed to construct an 
image of the virtual environment they have just explored that they do so, and are able to scan 
across the image from feature to feature. Whether this is used to estimate distances within that 
virtual environment remains equivocal. However, i f subjects are not so instructed, despite their 
post-experimental claims to the contrary, they employ some other means of locating one object 
from another. These results broadly agree with reported experimental evidence, namely, that 
e.g. Kosslyn et al, and other have been able to show a simple linear relation between image 
scanning times and distance to scan. However it is not clear whether this linear relationship 
holds for all distances scanned across such an image especially at extremes or boundary 
conditions. 
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Distance estimates for the explicit and implicit imagery condition 
Table 5-7 holds the mean signed and unsigned errors incurred in judging the inter-object 
distances. 
Mean explicit 
signed error 
Mean implicit 
signed error 
Mean explicit 
tinsigned error 
Mean implicit 
unsigned error 
Subjects 1.47 1.79 1.38 1.56 
Table 5-7 
Comparing the explicit with the implicit signed errors: t(8) = -0.45, for the signed errors, t(8) 
= 0.30. These results clearly indicate the absence of reliable differences between the 
magnitude of the errors. 
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The 'time to estimate' for the explicit imagery condition 
Table 5-8 holds the mean time to estimate inter-object distances. All times are in seconds, and 
distances are in 'units of distance'. 
Jl J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 JIO 
mean time 2.90 3.68 3.56 3.26 4.38 4.39 4.55 4.25 4.52 3.17 
distance 2.83 2.83 5.66 6.32 6.71 9.22 10.00 10.77 11.70 13.15 
Table 5-8 
A Spearman's rank correlation on the mean image scanning times and the actual distance, 
produces a value of rg = 0.391, which indicates a low level of correlation and as such does not 
merit regression analysis. Table 5-9 holds the sum of the mean scan times and the time to 
estimate and the actual distance: 
Jl J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 JIO 
combined time 2.9 3.7 3.6 3.3 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.5 3.2 
distance 2.83 2.83 5.66 6.32 6.71 9.22 10.00 10.77 11.70 13.15 
Table 5-9 
A Spearman's rank correlation on the combined times and the actual distance, produces a value 
of rg = 0.561, which is very nearly statistically reliable (critical value = 0.564), and if the final 
data point is omitted, a value of rg = 0.81 which is statistically reliable, p < 0.05. Such a high 
level of correlation does merit regression analysis. 
Page 161 
Figure 5-18 illustrates the line of best-fit omitting the final data point. 
Combined times - explicit imagery - line of best fit 
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Figure 5-18 
From this figure it is quite clear that there is evidence of a linear relationship between the 
combined scan time and time to locate and the actual distance^ .^ 
The 'time to estimate' for the implicit imagery condition 
Table 5-10 holds the mean time to estimate inter-object distances. All times are in seconds, 
and distances are in 'units'. 
Jl J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 JIO 
mean time 4.4 4.0 3.4 3.6 4.3 4.9 5.0 5.7 4.6 3.8 
distance 2.83 2.83 5.66 6.32 6.71 9.22 10.00 10.77 11.70 13.15 
Table 5-10 
A Spearman's rank correlation on the mean image scanning times and the actual distance, 
produces a value of r = 0.40, which again indicates a low level of correlation and as such does 
not merit regression analysis. 
22 The equation of the line of best fit is: overall_time = -9.97 + 4.39* distance_scanned. 
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Comparing the 'time to estimate' for the two imagery conditions 
Comparing these times with an ANOVA, a value of F( 1,18) = 4.41 is found. This result 
indicates that the mean times to estimate distance are not reliably different between conditions. 
5.3.5 Discussion of results 
In all, despite subjects' post-experimental protocols to the contrary, and the informal 
observation of prior experiments, these results agree with Kosslyn et aFs findings sufficiently 
well to suggest that when subjects are instructed to use imagery in these circumstances, they do 
so, but left to their own devices they do not. Not only is there a linear relationship between 
time to scan and distance to estimate, but the use of imagery is more time consuming than 
employing a non-imagery based strategy. However, the separation of scanning time from 
distance estimation time appears to have been meaningful, and there is no reliable difference 
between the groups, further suggesting a cognitive dislocation between image scanning and the 
process of distance estimation. Finally, irrespective of how individuals estimate distances, both 
groups are equally accurate. 
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5.4 General discussion of experiments V I , V I I and V I I I 
Direct and indirect exploration 
Introducing a level of indirection into the experience of an environment produces less accurate 
distance estimation of inter-feature distances. It is not clear why this should be necessarily so 
as the exploration of non-immersive virtual environments consists of manipulating the viewing 
point rather than moving the explorer / observer. The two differences between the direct and 
indirect conditions were firstly, in the latter condition the subjects were required to vocalise 
their instruction to move the point of view on the virtual environment. However this, if 
anything, may have assisted the subjects (possibly as verbal labels, e.g. Maki and Braine, 1985) 
in remembering spatial locations. Secondly, it seems very unlikely that the kinaesthetic 
feedback fi-om pressing the cursor keys on the PC's keyboard in the direction exploration 
condition would have contributed very much information to, say, the subjects' sense of inertial 
navigation. 
Whither clutter? 
Both experiments VII and VIII failed to find evidence for the role of clutter either in the form 
of obstructing walls (experiment VI) or a series of right-angle turns (experiment VII) in 
producing reliable over-estimations of distances. To the contrary, evidence was found for 
distinct but not statistically reliable under-estimation of distance. This finding is consistent 
with the pattern of distance estimation presented in chapter 4, experiment 5. However some 
evidence was found for over-estimation of distance when routes had not have a general linear 
East-West progression and instead turned back on themselves (experiment VU). 
Image scanning 
Analysis of the data from experiment VEI lends support to the following: 
- People can form images of explored virtual environment i f explicitly told to do so and are 
able to scan them. This adds virtual environments to the list of media which can give rise to 
images - Kosslyn et al (1978) - pictures and maps, Denis and Cocude (1989) - textual 
descriptions. 
- I f people are explicitly instructed to form and then scan an image generated from exploring 
a virtual environment, there is a linear relationship between distance to scan and time taken 
to scan, again replicating the findings of, for example, Kosslyn et al (1978). 
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Distance estimation and image scanning are not necessarily synonyms. The pre-experiment 
pilot suggested that distance estimation and image scanning, at least for virtual 
environments, were separate operations, and this suggestion was confirmed in the 
experiment proper. 
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6. Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
The eight experiments reported in the preceding chapters were conducted with the aim of 
answering the question, 'Is spatial knowledge acquired from exploring virtual environments 
more like spatial knowledge acquired directly from the environment (i.e. primary spatial 
knowledge) or rather does it have the characteristics of spatial knowledge acquired from maps 
and figures (i.e. secondary spatial knowledge)?'. The methodology adopted was one of 
distance and angle estimation. 
6.2 The estimation of angles in virtual environments 
Angle estimation in experiments I, II, III, IV and VII 
The first four experiments^^ investigated the nature of the spatial representation acquired from 
exploring a virtual environment by requiring of subjects a series of judgements of angles 
between features in that environment. Throughout these four experiments the subjects had 
been required to adopt an imagined ego-centric frame of reference when making judgements of 
inter-feature angles. An ego-centric frame of reference is usually defined as one which is based 
about the representing individual. This is a three-dimensional co-ordinate system wherein 
objects are located in terms of in front of, to the right or left, or above or below the individual 
(e.g. Bryant and Tversky, 1992). An imagined ego-centric frame of reference is at a remove in 
that the subject is required to generate an image of the virtual environment and then adopt a 
view point from within that image which resembles a true ego-centric frame of reference. 
To ensure the adoption of this frame of reference by the subjects the following instructions 
were common to these four experiments (minor variants permitting): 
'imagine you are standing with your back to the XXX panel facing due North (i.e. 0°). 
Estimate (i.e. say aloud) the angle from the XXXpanel to the YYYpanel. (Where XXX and 
YYYwill be one of the n panels.) 
The one exception to this was experiment III , which involved subjects making judgements of 
angles while actively exploring virtual environments, so that the instruction to imagine was 
2^  Together with a part of experiment VII. 
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omitted. Therefore in addition to the ego-centric firame of reference, the use of imagery in 
these experiments has been quite explicit. 
Experiment I 
Experiment I was a pilot in that it attempted to establish the feasibility of a series of 
experiments based around the theme of investigating spatial cognition derived fi-om exploring 
virtual environments. To this end it employed a virtual reality game - Doom. Subjects were 
asked to explore the first level of Doom. Subsequent to this exploration they were asked to 
make a number of judgements of inter-feature angles from this first level of Doom. The 
judgements were from two different starting points to four other locations. The accuracy of the 
judgements of angles were compared and not found to be reliably different. In addition to this 
finding there was clear, though not statistically reliable, evidence for an anti-clockwise bias in 
the judgements of angles which was unexpected. Experiment I also compared the incidental 
and intentional learning of the spatial configuration of the virtual environment. Again no 
differences were found in the accuracy of the judgements which is consistent with other 
comparisons of incidental and intentional spatial learning (e.g. Kozlowski and Bryant, 1977; 
Mandler, Seegmiller and Day, 1977; Brewer and Treyens, 1981). 
The two key findings from, this pilot experiment, namely the viability of this approach to the 
estimation of inter-feature angles and the anti-clockwise bias, then formed the basis of the 
remaining three experiments of this first half of the investigation. 
Experiment II 
Experiment I I further investigated the finding that the judgements of angles in a virtual 
environment appear to have an anti-clockwise bias. In contrast to the first experiment, 
experiment I I and all subsequent experiments employed a virtual reality construction kit -
ACK3D - which enabled especially designed 'three dimensional' non-immersive virtual 
enviromnents to be created. 
Experiment I I did find evidence for a reliable (p < 0.06) anti-clockwise bias in the judgements 
of inter-feature angles for one of the two virtual environments explored, namely the 'left-
oriented' but not in the 'right-oriented' virtual environment. However this effect was greatly 
reduced when errors greater than 90° were excluded. 
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Experiment III 
Experiment II I was designed to investigate the accuracy of judgements of inter-feature angles 
while actively exploring virtual environments and thus establish a baseline against which the 
judgements of angles made from memory could be compared. The experiment had two 
conditions. The first of which was so designed that one set of judgements were made of 
features which were in the line of sight of each other. The second condition was designed so 
that the features were out of the line of sight of each other being obscured by an intervening 
'wall', thus the judgements made of features which were out of the line of sight of each other 
required the subject to remember the location of at least one of the obscured features. In 
contrast judgements which were made of features which were in the line of sight of each other 
did not require the use of memory to make the estimate. 
The results of this experiment indicated that the signed errors in the out of the line of sight 
condition proved to be slightly larger than those errors made in the in the line of sight 
condition, as expected, but this effect was not statistically reliable. However this effect was 
also observed in the unsigned errors which did prove to be statistically reliably, p < 0.05. 
Experiment IV 
Experiment FV addressed the question of whether spatial knowledge acquired from exploring a 
virtual environment shows the same orientation specificity as knowledge acquired from 
studying maps or figures. Orientation-specificity has been usually defined thus: judgements of 
angle made in the same orientation as the orientation in which the spatial knowledge was 
acquired are made more accurately (e.g. Levine, Jankovic and Palij, 1982; Presson and 
Hazelrigg, 1984) and more quickly (e.g. Loftus, 1978; Evans and Pezdek, 1980) than those 
which are counter-aligned or non-aligned with the learning orientation. However for this 
experiment the orientation-specificity was operationally defined in terms of a distinctive 
pattern of errors.- (i) the smallest error in making a judgement being at 180° to the largest error 
and (ii) the intermediate errors being at right angles to the smallest and largest errors. 
Upon analysis, evidence for this pattern of errors and thus orientation-specificity in the 
cognitive representation of the spatial configuration of the virtual environments was found in a 
number of the conditions. 
Experiment IV also considered the integration of multiple view points in virtual space to form a 
perceptual / conceptual whole. It was suggested that subjects would construct an overall model 
or map of a virtual environment by integrating the orientation and location of the landmarks in 
turn by a series of mental rotations. Those landmarks, initially out of sight, would be integrated 
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sequentially with the contents of the scene either immediately visible or in memory. This 
component of the experiment recorded the free exploration time and compared it with the 
number of landmarks visible at any one time. It was found that rank correlating the number of 
landmarks with the free study times obtained a value of rg = 0.8, which while not being 
statistically reliable^ "* does suggest that free study times tend to increase monotonically with the 
number of landmarks to integrate. 
Experiment VII (second hypothesis component) 
Although experiment VII's principal focus was an examination of the role of clutter in distance 
estimation, it also tested Moar and Bower's (1983) observation that judgements of angles tend 
to systematicity, that is, angles tend to be judged closer to a multiple of 90° than their true 
value. In this experiment subjects were asked to traverse a number of virtual corridors and then 
judge the 'start-to-end' angle. 
Evidence was found for systematicity in those corridors which turned in on themselves but no 
such evidence was found in those corridors which had an East-West linear progression. 
2'' The number of data pairs was only 4. 
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6.3 The findings: angle estimation 
6.3,1 Angle estimation: an anti-clockwise bias 
Experiments I , I I , and II I reported evidence for an anti-clockwise bias in the direction of the 
judgements of inter-feature angles out of sight, although when errors greater than 90° were 
excluded the magnitude of this bias greatly diminished. In contrast it was found in experiment 
II I that when subjects were asked to judge the angle between two features which were in plain 
view of each other, they tended to bias their judgements in a clockwise direction by 
approximately 20°. 
These results point to two key questions. Firstiy, 'How big is the anti-clockwise bias?' and 
secondly, 'What is the role of memory in this anti-clockwise bias?'. As to the first question, 
the range of the mean signed errors in experiment I - HI was -7.6° to -22.1° - see table 6-1 
below. (It should be noted that the data from experiment HI condition in the line of sight have 
not been included as these judgements were not made from memory.) Yet this range may be an 
imder-estimate of the strength of the effect given that there appears to be an inherent clockwise 
bias in making judgements of angles when the features are in plain view. If this is so, the effect 
may then be as strong as 25° - 45°. This clearly needs fiirther investigation. As to the second 
question and the role of memory in this apparent anti-clockwise bias: 
Symmetry 
Tversky (1981) has reported that remembering one spatial location with respect to another can 
lead to distortions of direction. Tversky has found alignment errors, that is, features were both 
recalled and recognised as being more closely aligned than they actually were in a range of 
spatial tasks including judgements of directions between cities; judgements in subjects' local 
environment; in memory for Tversky attributes these errors to two' heuristics found in models 
of perceptual organisation. The first is alignment whereby figures are lined up relative to one 
another due to their mutual proximity. The second is rotation where the natural axes induced 
by a figure converge with frame axes (North-South, East-West, or horizontal-vertical), a 
phenomenon which Tversky believes is related to the Gestalt 'law' of perceptual organisation 
by common fate, artificial countries and maps, and in memory for blobs not interpreted as 
maps. However despite this evidence it does not seem to offer an account of the systematic 
directional distortion reported here. 
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Systematicity 
Systematicity (e.g. Moar and Bower, 1983) which is the reported tendency to recall angles as 
being nearer a multiple of 90° and appears to be essentially a variant on the above observations 
and may be ruled unlikely for the same reasons. However it should be noted that some 
evidence for systematicity was foimd in experiment VII but in slightly unusual circumstances. 
In experiment VII subjects were asked to judge the 'start-to-end' angle after traversing a 
number of virtual corridors. In the conditions where there was some evidence of systematicity 
those corridors turned in on themselves like a half-uncurled spiral, and it is perhaps this 
unusual feature which differentiates these results from a more typical linear judgement. 
Availability 
There is some evidence to suggest that some judgements of orientation and angle are more 
available than other, and this differential availability of spatial information may be account for 
the anti-clockwise bias. For example, right-left, East-West has been shown in many 
experiments to be more difficult to discriminate than up-down, front-back (e.g. Farell, 1979; 
Just and Carpenter, 1975; Maki, Maki and Marsh, 1977; Maki and Braine, 1985). Loftus 
(1978) found that i f directions were presented as a simple number (e.g. 310°), then a monotonic 
increase in reaction time to draw the direction was observed as the value increased; however, if 
the directions were presented visually, angles close to North and South (±10°) were 
significantly more quickly responded to / processed than angles close to East and West. 
Similarly Maki et al (1977) have demonstrated the effects on reaction time for both memorised 
familiar (e.g. maps of the US states), abstract locational (e.g. 'left of, 'above', etc.) and 
orientational (vertically versus horizontally oriented) stimuli. Furthermore Franklin and 
Tversky (1990) have found that reaction times for reporting the location of objects which had 
been described in a body of text which the subjects had read depended upon the orientation of 
their bodies. When subjects were standing, reaction times were fastest for reporting objects 
which were located beyond the subject's head / feet, yet when the subjects were reclining front / 
back were fastest. 
While there is no doubt that right-left. East-West judgements do take longer than front-back, 
North-South and do appear to be less available to subjects, this does not offer a fiill account of 
why there should be a difference between clockwise and anti-clockwise. 
Finally, returning briefly to point to Maki (1979) who has argued that whatever causes right 
and left to be difficuh to discriminate also causes East - West to be difficult (and perhaps by 
extension clockwise and anti-clockwise directions). Maki goes on to assume that the difficulty 
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of discriminating right-left is related to the right-left symmetry of the body, citing Corballis and 
Beale, 1976; Nicoletti et al, 1988 as evidence. 
Handedness 
Of the pool of approximately 50 people who participated in these experiments only two were 
foimd to be left-handed, and none were ambidextrous (this information was sought informally 
some time after the experiments had been conducted). It is not unreasonable to suppose that 
this predominance of right-handed subjects may have been a factor in the observed anti-
clockwise bias and is certainly worthy of fiirther research. 
Mental rotation 
It will be recalled that subjects were explicitly instructed to make use of imagery in making 
their judgements of angles and while it is recognised that it cannot be stated with absolute 
confidence that this was the sole means by which subjects made judgements and that if imagery 
was employed it was not supplemented by some other form of representation or mechanism, 
subjects did informally report that they had formed images. Given that imagery was being used 
then mental rotation is the prime suspect for the source of this directional bias (e.g. Shepard 
and Metzler, 1971; Shepard and Hurwitz, 1983). For example, Denis (1991, p.57) has observed 
that in the standard Cooper and Shepard mental rotation experiments that the natural direction 
of mental rotation appears to be anti-clockwise. This feature of mental rotation may then 
account for, or contribute to, the above observation in that there may be something inherent in 
the mechanism of mental rotation itself which produces an anti-clockwise bias. Furthermore 
the presence of an anti-clockwise bias is consistent with Kozlowski and Bryant's (1977) 
findings that when subjects are asked to point at familiar building which is out of sight they 
tend to point to the left of (that is, anti-clockwise of) the actual locations of the buildings. They 
also found that the magnitude of these anti-clockwise errors tend to increase if made by 
individuals who, by self-report, had a poor sense-of-direction. 
In conclusion 
On the balance of evidence the mechanism of mental rotation is the most likely cause of the 
anti-clockwise biases reported in experiments 1,11 and HI. 
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6.3.2 Angle estimation: orientation-specificity 
Experiment IV presented some evidence for the pattern of errors associated with orientation-
specificity in judgements made after exploring virtual environments. It will be recalled that 
orientation-specificity has been operationally defined by the pattern of: (i) the smallest error in 
making a judgement being at 180° to the largest error and (ii) the intermediate errors being at 
right angles to the smallest and largest errors. As the presence of orientation-specificity is 
taken to be characteristic of secondary spatial knowledge, that is, spatial knowledge acquired 
from representations of space (for example, Evans and Pezdek, 1980; Levine, 1982; Levine, 
Jankovic, and Palij, 1982; Presson and Hazelrigg, 1984; Presson, McAdams and DeLange, 
1987^ ;^ Rossano and Warren, 1989), a conclusion might be that spatial knowledge acquired 
from virtual enviroimients indeed has the characteristics of secondary spatial knowledge. 
Orientation-specificity and preferred direction 
In practice, however, it has proved to be very difficult to distinguish between orientation-
specificity and what Shepard and Hurwitz (1983) and ShoU (1987) describe as the preferred 
direction which is a characteristic of (primary) spatial knowledge which has been acquired 
from exploring the real world. It therefore may then be concluded that although the issue of 
orientation-specificity initially appeared to be a usefiil way of determining whether spatial 
knowledge acquired from exploring virtual environments is more like that which is acquired 
from the environment or from representations of the environment in practice it is very difficult 
to say whether the pattern of errors observed in experiment IV are more properly associated 
with orientation-specificity or preferred direction. 
6.3.3 Angle estimation: comparing errors 
The errors incurred in these experiments may be compared in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
percentage of errors falling within 10° of the actual value which have been operationally 
defined as 'accurate' could be compared with other empirical evidence; secondly, the 
percentage of errors greater than 90° of the actual value which have been operationally defined 
as 'inaccurate' could again be compared with other reported evidence; and finally, the mean 
signed and unsigned errors could be similarly compared. However as discussed in chapter 1, 
section 1.3.6 there are only a very small number of studies of the accuracy of judgements of 
25 Cited in Presson et al, 1989, p. 896. 
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angles26. Of such studies those that there are tend to report directly or indirectly mean errors 
incurred in making judgements of angles and these will be compared with the findings from 
experiments I , I I , III, IV and VII. 
Table 6-1 holds a summary of the signed and unsigned mean errors from experiments I, II, III , 
rV and VII. Table 6-2, in contrast, holds data from experiments conducted by Kozlowski and 
Bryant (1977); Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth (1982); and Moar and Bower (1983). 
Source Mean signed errors Mean unsigned errors 
Experiment I 
- Intentional leaming condition -14.5° 35.4° 
- Incidental leaming condition -14.6° 37.2° 
Experiment II 
- Right-oriented environment condition 1.3° 27.9° 
- Left-oriented environment condition -27.2° 43.5° 
Experiment III 
- In the line of sight condition -6.0° 43.3° 
- Out of the line of sight condition 9.1° 41.7° 
Experiment IV 
- 4 landmarks visible (condition 2a) 11.7° 34.7° 
- 3 landmarks visible (condition 2b) 14.5° 26.0° 
- 2 landmarks visible (condition 2c) -0.7° 23.5° 
- 1 landmark visible (condition 2d) -5.8° 25.0° 
Experiment VII 
- condition la -5.1° n/a 
- condition lb -38.1° n/a 
- condition 2a 18.0° n/a 
- condition 2a 0.5° n/a 
Table 6-1 
The following data has been gleaned from the very few published studies which tabulate their 
results. However it should be noted that only the data from Moar and Bower can reliably taken 
as being signed, and as to the other data it is impossible to say whether it is signed or unsigned. 
^^Levine (1980) reports that vihtn you-are-here maps are inverted people go off in directions that were incorrect by 
in excess of 90° more than 25% of the time, and Goldin and Thomdyke (1982) have found that subjects in simulated 
navigation condition (subjects were shown a film) made significantly more errors in excess of 90° than those subjects 
in the real navigation condition. 
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Source mean errors 
Kozlowski and Bryant, 1977 
- good sense of direction 10.79° 
- poor sense of direction 25.71° 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982 map learning 
- judging orientation 39.3° 
- judging location 16.9° 
- judging orientation for simple routes 41.5° 
- judging orientation for complex routes 38.5° 
navigation (free exploration) 
- judging orientation 22.1° 
- judging location 24.9° 
- judging orientation for simple routes 17.4° 
- judging orientation for complex routes 30.9° 
Moar and Bower, 1983 -11.4°-37.5° 
Table 6-2 
As statistical tests would be inappropriate on the above data, inspection alone must be relied 
upon. From inspection it is apparent that the magnitude of the signed errors incurred in making 
judgements from memory of inter-feature angles from virtual environments do not appear to 
differ from angle estimation in the real world. The only apparent difference is in the 
preponderance of anti-clockwise biased errors from experiments I - HI, however this may be an 
artefact of the reporting practice in that only signed errors rather than both signed and unsigned 
errors appear to be more generally reported. 
Turning to the unsigned errors, it was found that the mean errors varied between 25° and 45°. 
However a more interesting observation is that range of the mean signed errors in experiment I 
(both conditions), experiment I I (left-oriented envirormient condition), experiment HI {put of 
the line of sight condition), experiment IV (all conditions) and experiment VII (conditions la 
and lb) is 31.6°- 45.1°, a window of only 13.5°. Such a narrow window of judgements '^' 31.6°-
45.1° indicates that these results are very similar to those reported by Thomdyke and Hayes-
"^^  The reasons for the exclusion are that: 
- experiment III {in the line of sight condition) the judgements are not made from memory; 
- experiment II (right-oriented environment condition), the F2 analysis of the judgements themselves revealed that 
they are not generalisable, and 
- experiment VII (conditions 2a and 2b) the virtual corridors involved in these conditions turned back on 
themselves which is not a feature of the other experimental conditions. 
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Roth (1982) in their simulated orientation task. Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth found that when 
subjects were asked to imagine a pair of locations and to judge the angle between them, the 
mean errors were approximately 50° falling to approximately 25° with increasing experience. 
These errors were also found to be larger by 5° - 10° than when the subjects made the 
judgements while they were actually physically located in one of the pairs of rooms. Both sets 
of judgements were again foimd to improve in accuracy with increasing experience. 
However, in conclusion, it must be noted that as the variety of different judgements from both 
the real and virtual environments is so great, further work is required in this area is required 
before any degree of confidence can be attached to the above observations. 
6.3.4 Angle estimation: study and free exploration times 
The free exploration times for the virtual maze conditions in this experiment were significantly 
larger than the free study times for the map conditions, a finding paralleling Taylor and 
Tversky (1992a). Taylor and Tversky found that found that it took subjects significantly longer 
to study and comprehend a route description of an environment than a survey description. The 
spatial information from the maps is immediately available: in contrast the virtual maze 
required exploration which necessarily takes longer but it may be that the route information 
acquired from this free exploration takes longer to learn that the corresponding survey 
knowledge. Indeed, exploration times rose with the increasing number of discrete landmarks to 
assimilate. Further work is again required to resolve this issue. 
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Purple Panel ][ Purple Panel 
A plan view of the right-oriented virtual room. A plan view of the left-oriented virtual room. 
Figure 6-1 
However (anticipating the next section of this chapter) no such differences were found in 
experiments V, VI, VII or VIII where subjects were faced with distance estimation tasks. 
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6.3.5 The estimation of angles: in conclusion 
These first four experiments have demonstrated that: 
- asking subjects to judge inter-feature angles while adopting an imagined ego-centric frame 
of reference proved to be meaningfiil. 
- subjects are at times prone to disorientation in that errors of 90° or more, which are taken 
to be indicative of disorientation, occur with a frequency of approximately 30% of all 
judgements. This is consistent with Goldin and Thomdyke's (1982) finding that subjects 
making judgements of angle in a simulated navigation condition (i.e. watching a film of a 
tour through an environment) tend to make more errors of 90° or more than subjects who 
had actually taken the tour. 
- in excluding those errors in excess of 90°, the pattern and magnitude of the remaining 
errors are indistinguishable from the size of the errors reported elsewhere, excepted that 
(next point): 
- there is a pronounced, and unexpected, anti-clockwise bias in the direction of the 
judgements for which mental rotation is an unproven but implicated mechanism. 
- in trying to determine whether spatial knowledge acquired from exploring virtual 
environments showed evidence of orientation-specificity revealed that the boundaries 
between orientation-specificity and preferred direction are blurred. This test for 
orientation-specificity has failed to determine whether spatial knowledge acquired from 
exploring virtual environment is more like that which is acquired from maps or the real 
environment. 
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6.4 The estimation of distance in virtual environments 
A brief reprise of the findings 
Complementing the four experiments which addressed the issue of the accuracy of angle 
estimation in a variety of different virtual environments, the final four experiments investigated 
distance estimation. Experiment V was a detailed investigation into inter-feature distance 
estimation; experiment VI examined the effects on distance estimation of direct and indirect 
exploration of virtual environments; experiment VII considered the effects of judging distances 
in cluttered environments, and finally experiment Vni confrasted distance estimation and 
image scaiming. 
Experiment V 
Experiment V paralleled part of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's (1978) investigation into the 
differences in spatial knowledge acquired from maps and from the environment, substituting 
virtual space for real space. Very briefly, Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth reported evidence that 
spatial knowledge acquired from exploring a building initially produced judgements of route 
distances between features (in practice these were rooms) which were more accurate than the 
equivalent Euclidean judgements but with experience both types of judgements improved and 
converged in accuracy. In confrast, spatial knowledge acquired from studying a map of the 
building produced more accurate Euclidean than route judgements, a difference which persisted 
despite over-leaming. 
Experiment V only paralleled certain aspects of Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's experiment in 
that a virtual enviroimient replaced a physical building, and that the map learning condition was 
modified. Of course, another fimdamental difference lies with the free exploration conditions. 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth's subjects in these conditions were employees working in the 
building in question. The subjects in the current experiment were, necessarily, fleeting visitors 
to a virtual building which they explored either once or three times for a short period of time. 
The results of this experiment are then in three parts, (i) estimates from the map learning 
condition; (ii) from one period of exploration and (iii) from three periods of exploration of the 
virtual environment. 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth reported that free exploration of an environment gave rise to more 
accurate route estimates than Euclidean estimates but that with extended exposure to the 
environment these difference to the accuracy tended to disappear. In contrast Thomdyke and 
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Hayes-Roth found that map leaming gave rise to accurate Euclidean distance estimates and 
relatively inaccurate route distance estimates. 
On the whole this experiment foimd evidence for the reverse of these pattems. Free exploration 
of a virtual environment gave rise to strikingly inaccurate route estimates (significant under-
estimates) and relatively accurate Euclidean distance estimates. Repeated exposure to the 
virtual environment made no difference to this. As to the map leaming condition only 
equivocal support could be found for the Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth position (their findings 
were confirmed by the analysis of the unsigned errors and contradicted by the signed errors). 
Experiment VI 
Experiment VI investigated the accuracy of inter-feature judgements of distance while actively 
and passively exploring a cluttered virtual environment. To this end two virtual environments 
were designed one of which was cluttered thus obscuring a number of distinctive features. The 
clutter was implemented in the form of 'walls' around which subjects were required to 
manoeuvre. In the uncluttered room all features were in plain view of each other. Further to 
this the subjects explored the virtual environments in one of two ways: they either moved 
themselves around the virtual environments (the active, hands-on condition) or did so indirectly 
by issuing instructions to the experimenter to either move forwards, stop, back, to the right and 
so forth (thepassive, hands-off condition). 
There were two key findings with respect to the effect of clutter on distance estimation in 
virtual environments. Firstiy, the presence of obstacles (intervening walls) does not induce the 
over-estimation of Euclidean distance which is characteristic of clutter. Instead it appears to 
induce under-estimation. Secondly, the presence of clutter tends to produce less accurate 
Euclidean distance estimates compared with estimates made from uncluttered virtual 
environments. 
As to the modes of exploration, it was foimd that introducing a level of indirection into the 
experience of a virtual environment tends to result in less accurate estimates of inter-feature 
distances. 
Experiment VIps (first hypothesis component) 
Experiment VII fiirther investigated whether the clutter phenomenon produces over-estimations 
of both route and Euclidean distance judgements in virtual environments. To this end five 
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virtual corridors were designed, two of which had five 90° turns, and a fiirther two had eight 
90°, the 90° turns were intended to produce clutter and finally a fifth completely linear control 
condition was included. The two corridors further differed in that one progressed in a East-
West direction, the other tumed in on itself Subjects fraversed all five corridors and were 
asked to estimate the route and Euclidean distances of each. 
Evidence was found that while the mean route judgement for the 8-tum condition proved to be 
accurate, a statistically reliable under-estimate was found in the 5-tum condition. This result 
does not provide evidence for the presence of the clutter illusion. The position with the 
Euclidean estimates was less clear. The estimates in the 5-tum condition produced evidence of 
reliable over-estimations of the actual distances (p < 0.05), while the 8-tum condition did not. 
This finding runs contrary to expectations, given that the clutter effect is taken to be related to 
the number of tums (or obstacles) in a route. Overall, these findings did not suggest that clutter 
is a contributory factor in the errors made in estimating distances in virtual enviroimients. 
Experiment VIII 
Experiment VIII paralleled experiment 2 of Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser's (1978) image scanning 
study. Kosslyn et aVs seminal experiment is of particular interest as distance estimation has 
been assumed by some (e.g. Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth) to be intimately related to image 
scanning. Replacing Kosslyn et aVs picture of an island, a virtual room was designed which 
had two distinctive coloured panel and three free standing objects being these a treasure chest, 
a ceiling light and a television. Subjects explored this room and then were asked to estimate 
distances between features by whatever means they so chose or by constmcting an image of the 
room and scanning from feature to feature. 
Evidence was found that people can form images of explored virtual environments if explicitiy 
told to do so and are able to scan them. This adds virtual environments to the list of media 
which can give rise to images - Kosslyn et al (1978) - pictures and maps, Denis and Cocude 
(1989) - textual descriptions. I f people are explicitly instmcted to form and then scan an image 
generated from exploring a virtual environment, then a linear relationship between distance to 
scan and time taken to scan holds, again replicating the findings of, for example, Kosslyn et al 
(1978). However i f subjects are not explicitly instructed to form an image, no such relationship 
is found between the distance to estimate and the time it takes to estimate that distance. This 
2^  It should be noted that the second part of this experiment is discussed in section 6.2. 
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again is similar to Kosslyn et al's findings. Distance estimation and image scanning are thus 
not necessarily synonyms. 
Furthermore a pre-experiment pilot strongly suggested that distance estimation and image 
scanning, at least for virtual environments, were separate operations, and this suggestion was 
subsequently confirmed in the main experiment. 
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6.5 The findings: distance estimates 
6.5.1 Distance estimation: the independence of the Euclidean estimates 
The independence of the Euclidean estimates from route estimates is the most striking feature 
of the results from experiment V. Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth had suggested that route 
judgements plus 'mental algebra' are used to produce estimates of Euclidean distances, clearly 
arguing for the dependence of Euclidean estimates on route estimates. Yet results from 
experiment V have demonsfrated that route judgements are systematically inaccurate 
(increasingly so as the distance to estimate increase) while the Euclidean judgements are 
relatively accurate and appear to be affected by the distance to judge. As accurate Euclidean 
judgements cannot be consistentiy made from inaccurate route judgements they must have been 
arrived at independently. Furthermore, as there is abundant evidence to suggest that routes are 
leamed first and are later integrated into a more map-like representation (e.g. Cohen and 
Cohen, 1985), it is difficult to understand how the Euclidean judgements are more accurate 
than the route judgements. 
Accurate Euclidean judgements and inaccurate route distance judgements are consistent with 
map leaming, and this fiirther suggests that when subjects make judgements of Euclidean 
distances they do so by generating an image of the virtual environment and scan that image to 
'read o f f the Euclidean distance. Judgements of route distances, in contrast, may be made by 
adding together the legs of virtual distance fraversed. Why different sfrategies are used is not 
clear and is worthy of fiirther investigation. 
As to the cognitive representation of distance information: i f Euclidean distance information 
can be read off an image it may then be assumed to be stored as an analogue of the actual 
distance whereas route distance information may be stored as a series of propositions. 
However, the arguments over whether imagery is one or two modes of representation (Paivio, 
1975, 1977); whether it is a mode of representation at all (Pylyshyn, 1973) or whether it is an 
integral part of representation (Kosslyn et al, 1977) must be recognised, though it will not 
pursued here. Nonetheless this is also clearly worthy of fiorther research. 
6.5.2 Distance estimation: correlations 
Statistically reliable negative correlations between the signed route judgements errors and the 
actual route distances were found for both free explorations of the virtual environment and the 
map condition. Furthermore when the lines of best fit were plotted for the signed errors against 
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the actual distances the clear linear nature of their relationship was found. These relationships 
did not hold for the unsigned errors. In contrast, no such reliable correlations or linear 
agreements were found between the signed and unsigned Euclidean judgements errors and the 
actual Euclidean distances. 
These findings are further confirms the independence of the process by which route and 
Euclidean judgements are made. However, they also pose a difficulty. Studies of subjects' use 
of visual imagery have demonstrated that the time to scan across a visual image increases 
linearly with the length of the scanned path (Kosslyn, 1973, 1978; Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser, 
1978). This finding is clearly consistent with the route errors but not the Euclidean errors, 
despite the belief that Euclidean judgements are made by this very mechanism (e.g. Thomdyke 
and Hayes-Roth, 1982). 
6.5.3 Distance estimation: No improvement in accuracy v^ ith practice 
Experiment V failed to find the improvement in the accuracy of judgements of distance 
predicted by Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth. Indeed while no evidence was found in the route 
judgements with increased exploration, the accuracy of Euclidean distance estimates actually 
decreased. Although both findings are counter-intuitive, support for the findings of this 
experiment comes from a series of experiments reported by Kozlowski and Bryant (1977)^ 9 -
experiment 3 specifically. In this experiment they led subjects through a windowless maze, 
measuring 3 mefres high by 2 mefres wide, illuminated by lights every 2 - 3 mefres. The 
subjects had been misleadingly told that this was a time-estimating exercise, but on being led 
back to the beginning of the maze were asked to make a number of estimates including draw an 
arrow leading back to the end of the maze and both the Euclidean and route distance travelled. 
The route was travelled a fiirther four times and a further three measures taken. Kozlowski and 
Bryant noted that the error in both Euclidean and route distance estimates did not significantly 
differ as a function of trials. 
6.5.4 Distance estimation: comparing errors 
Unlike the estimation of angles there is a much wider range of distance estimate data available 
for comparison with the results of experiments V, VI, VII and Vin. However the issue of 
which of these data to use for a comparison is not clear cut. Distance estimation has been 
variously studied in the laboratory using psycho-physical methodologies (e.g. Kerst and 
25 A component of this experiment, the angle estimation, has already been cited in experiment I. 
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Howard, 1978; Baum and Jonides, 1979; Nelson and Chailkin, 1980); estimates have been 
elicited from memory of environments directiy familiar to the subjects (e.g. Thomdyke, 1980; 
Thomdyke and Hayes-Roth, 1982); and from memory of maps and other sources of 
information (e.g. Kerst and Howard, 1978; Tversky, 1993). So given this diversity it is difficult 
to determine which is the most appropriate data set to use as a basis for comparison. However: 
data from the study of maps (and other sources such as TV, film, textual descriptions and so 
forth) will not be used because of the multi-modal nature of this information, that is, Tversky's 
cognitive collage observation. This leaves the psycho-physical data and estimates have been 
elicited from memory of environments directly familiar to the subjects. However even given 
these potential sources none are suitable as a basis for comparison. 
6.5.5 Distance estimation: little evidence for the effects of clutter 
Both experiments VII and VIII failed to find evidence for the role of clutter either in the form 
of obstmcting walls (experiment VI) or a series of right-angle tums (experiment VII) in 
producing reliable over-estimations of distances. To the contrary, evidence was found for 
distinct but not statistically reliable under-estimation of distance. This finding is consistent 
with the pattern of distance estimation presented in chapter 4, experiment V. However some 
evidence was found for over-estimation of distance when routes had not have a general linear 
East-West progression and instead tumed back on themselves (experiment VII). 
6.5.6 Distance estimation: image scanning 
Analysis of the data from experiment VIII lends support for the following: 
- People can form images of explored virtual environment i f explicitly told to do so and are 
able to scan them. This adds virtual environments to the list of media which can give rise 
to images - Kosslyn et al (1978) - pictures and maps, Denis and Cocude (1989) - textual 
descriptions. 
- I f people are explicitiy instructed to form and then scan an image generated from exploring 
a virtual environment, there is a linear relationship between distance to scan and time taken 
to scan, again replicating the findings of, for example, Kosslyn et al (1978). 
- Distance estimation and image scanning are not necessarily synonyms. The pre-
experiment pilot suggested that distance estimation and image scanning, at least for virtual 
environments, were separate operations, and this suggestion was confirmed in the 
experiment proper. 
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space. This point may be worthy of further research but it is outwith the scope of this 
discussion. 
6.6.2 Generalising to other non-immersive virtual reality implementations 
As interesting as these results are of most use i f they can be generalised to other non-immersive 
virtual reality implementations. While it recognised that non-immersive virtual realities are 
highly diverse phenomenon by virtue of the differences in their implementation, they may all 
be characterised in the following key ways: 
Non-immersive virtual reality as a picture 
Figure 6-3 is an image taken from 
ACK3D which has been employed in 
most the experiments reported in this 
volume, and as can be seen presents 
the potential user with an interactive, 
self-luminous picture. 
Figure 6-3 
m e>i aim ^i? 
Figure 6-4 is an image from 
Superscape (a PC-based commercial 
virtual reality system) which again 
presents the user with an interactive 
self-luminous picture. Indeed it must 
necessarily be the case that all non-
immersive virtual reality 
implementations have the same 
characteristic of an inter-active self-
luminous picture displayed on a 
monitor screen or equivalent. 
Figure 6-4 
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Depth information 
While the various instantiation of non-immersive virtual reality may monotonically preserve 
relative distances along the x and_v axes, the z axis remains hopelessly shallow. 
View points 
Non-immersive virtual reality differs from plans, maps, projected images and other 
representations of space in that the view point on the virtual environment can be manipulated 
by means of an input device (such as cursor keys or a mouse) to produce different perspectives 
of the scene. Different instantiation of non-immersive virtual reality wil l , of course, differ 
along a number of key variables such as the type and sensitivity of the input device, the amount 
of detail and realism of the virtual environment, the display resolution, its refresh rate and 
physical size and so forth. 
Interaction with non-immersive virtual reaHty 
Expanding on the last point, interaction with non-immersive virtual reality requires the person 
to be effectively motionless while the scene moves in response to the person's commands. 
This, of course, differs from Euclidean space where the person moves or is moved (in, for 
example, a vehicle) and the scene changes as a consequence. It also differs from studying a 
representation of space such as a map, when both the scene and the person are more or less 
static. And finally, interaction with non-immersive virtual reality differs from watching 
television or a motion picture where the scene does not respond to the watcher (not 
withstanding the promise of inter-active television). 
Virtual reality as a non-ecological environment 
Finally unlike the real environment, virtual reality cannot, by definition, be perceived in an 
ecological manner (Gibson, 1961, 1979). As virtual reality is artificially generated it does not 
(but perhaps necessarily, cannot) contain information-bearing structured light which is central 
to Gibson's position. Instead non-immersive virtual reality systems relies upon a limited range 
of techniques to give the impression of depth: 
- for position - texture, size and linear perspective; 
- for parallax - binocular perspective; 
- motion perspective; and so forth. 
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In conclusion 
From the above points it is clear that there is sufficient commonahties among current non-
immersive virtual reality systems to conclude that it may be expected that interaction with such 
systems must be broadly similar. 
6.6.3 Immersive virtual reality implementations 
Having discussed whether the results of the experiments reported in this volume are 
generalisable to other implementations of non-immersive virtual reality it is worth briefly 
considering whether they can be further generalised to immersive virtual reality. Immersive 
virtual reality differs from the non-immersive variety in a number of important ways which are 
too numerous to review here but two of these differences may be considered. 
- The style of interaction with immersive virtual reality is dramatically different from non-
immersive virtual reality, flying being a favoured method with the former. Indeed the 
differences are so great that some users of such systems have experienced motion sickness. 
- Immersive virtual reality requires the user to wear a HMD - a head mounted display which 
necessarily removes much of the information being received from the real world, so much 
so that a representation of the real world must be included in the virtual environment. 
Given these difference it would be unwise to assume that the results can be generalised to 
immersive virtual reality. 
In conclusion 
Therefore, from the above points it is clear that there are may not be sufficient commonalities 
among immersive virtual reality systems to conclude that these results are generalisable. 
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6.7 Further work 
There are four broad and overlapping areas of interest with respect to further work in this area. 
Firstly, there is the need to address the issues arising from the eight experiments reported here. 
Secondly, there is the very important issue as to whether these results are generalisable across 
other non-immersive virtual reality implementations. Thirdly, which is an extension of the last 
point, is the question of whether these results are generalisable across immersive virtual reality 
implementations and finally, there remains the untested proposition raised in the last section as 
to whether there is a continuum fi-om maps, relief maps, non-immersive virtual environments, 
immersive virtual reality, restricted Euclidean environments and the real world. 
6.7.1 Issues arising 
The following issues have been either arisen from the results of the experiments reported here 
or immediately suggest themselves as being relevant to this enquiry. 
The anti-clockwise bias 
There are a number of key questions with respect to this finding: 
- the role of mental rotation in estimating angles, i f any, needs to be tested and made explicit. 
Can estimates of inter-feature angles be made without recourse to mental rotation? Or is the 
bias an artefact of mental rotation coupled with an ego-centric frame of reference? Would 
instructing subjects to adopt an allo-centric frame of reference produce the same results? 
- as the size of the anti-clockwise bias diminished when errors greater than 90° were 
excluded, is the bias primarily a function of disorientation? 
Orientation-specificity or preferred direction 
Although differentiating between orientation-specificity and preferred direction has proved to 
be very difficult i f not impossible, it nonetheless remains an interesting field for further 
research. It would be useful to know whether a range of other media give rise to this 
phenomenon, particularly immersive virtual reality. 
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De-coupling route and Euclidean distance estimation 
There are perhaps three issues here, firstly, can the finding that Euclidean distance estimates 
are independent of route distance estimates be reproduced in other virtual environments and 
using other virtual reality implementations? Secondly, is route information being stored in a 
different (cognitive) format to Euclidean distance information and i f so how? Finally, i f route 
and Euclidean distance information are different and / or independent what are the 
consequences for the generally held models of the acquisition and sequence of spatial 
information? 
Relating real world spatial ability to virtual environments 
Although evidence has been presented for subjects being able to estimate route and Euclidean 
distance and the angle between features after exploring a wide variety of virtual environments 
it cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for the role of spatial cognition proper. These results 
could, instead, be taken for evidence of mental arithmetic (plus some trigonometry) given that 
the virtual environments were very regular or alternatively these data could reflect a series of 
manipulations upon images generated by subjects of the environments they had explored. For 
example, Parker and Deborah (1992) have suggested that development of the ability to perform 
mental rotation maybe important for adaptation to many immersive virtual environments. They 
have found some evidence that training people to work in immersive virtual environments to 
perform mental rotation may enhance their performance both by increasing their ability to 
locomote in (their expression) and manipulate features of the environment and by reducing 
motion sickness associated with transitions between virtual and normal environments. Thus a 
promising avenue for ftirther work would be to determine i f there is a correlation between the 
various measures of spatial ability (e.g. the Guildford-Zimmerman Spatial Orientation test) 
with subject performance in a virtual reality system. While there is no agreed definition of 
spatial ability and it does remains to some extent an ill-defined concept, what is agreed upon is 
that spatial ability consists of a number of dimensions. The major dimensions and their 
definitions are as follows (after Satalich): 
- Spatial orientation: involves the ability to move, manipulate or transform stimuli. These 
operations involve the cognitive manipulation of the representation of the stimuli centric 
frame of reference. 
- Spatial visualisation: this refers to the manipulation of the relationships within a stimulus. 
- Spatial relations: consists of the ability to form an image of an object from different 
perspectives. 
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I f a strong positive correlation was found to hold between some or all of these various 
dimension it could then be concluded that it really is spatial cognition at work in a virtual 
environment. 
6.7.2 Experimental design issues 
Unhappily a number of design error were discovered in the experiments reported in this 
volume. Without exception they were the result of moving what should have been fixed 
landmarks between conditions. The key question to be addressed is then: 'what effect has this 
had?' The answer is relatively slight. None of the landmarks were moved by more than a 
graphic unit or two the effect of which being that the angles to be judged were changed by 
perhaps as much as 20°-30° at maximum. No angles differed by as much a quadrant which may 
well have had a distinct effect on the results. 
How could this have been avoided? The simplest means would have been a careful, third-party 
review of the experimental design prior to running the experiment itself A further 
compounding issue has been the use of automation in the analysis of the data. Judgements of 
angle and distance were entered directly into spreadsheets wherein the errors were 
automatically calculated and initial analyses performed. This 'distance' from the raw data may 
well have contributed to the late detection of the design errors described in chapters 2 and 5. 
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6.8 In conclusion 
The key findings from these eight experiments are: 
- estimates of inter-feature angles made from memory after exploring virtual environments 
tend to be biased in an anti-clockwise direction, although the size of the errors do not appear 
to differ from those made in the real world. 
- the pattern of errors associated with estimates of inter-feature angles show some evidence of 
orientation-specificity or preferred direction. 
- estimates of route distance tend to be systematic under-estimates and relatively inaccurate 
when compared with corresponding estimates of Euclidean distance. Route and Euclidean 
estimates also proved to be independent of each other. 
- imagery may have an important role in the spatial cognition of virtual environments. 
These findings suggest that non-immersive virtual environments may lie on a continuum. 
Figure 6-4 is one possible continuum wherein non-immersive virtual environments form a 
bridge between static representations of the environment and the environment itself 
maps 
relief maps 
non-immersive virtual environments 
J} 
immersive virtual environments 
restricted Euclidean environments 
unrestricted Euclidean environments 
Figure 6-4 
Thus non-immersive virtual environments offer a potentially rich research environment for 
spatial cognition. 
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8.1 Experiment! 
Judgements (degrees) 
Subject Learning condition la lb Ic Id 2a 2b 2c 2d 
1 Intentional 0 0 43.5 90 -180 -90 225 0 
2 Intentional -27 56 80 130 94.5 -90 90 0 
3 Intentional -90 -90 43.5 137.5 -146 179 235 0 
4 Intentional 0 43.5 180 180 -137.5 138 0 
5 Intentional 12.5 75 76 70 -105 -90 270 0 
6 Intentional -90 0 0 45 
7 Intentional -46 122 -60 180 0 
8 Intentional 45 30 56 127 -144 -165 180 0 
9 Intentional 180 -90 0 0 -90 90 180 0 
10 Intentional -37 -142 -34 
11 Incidental -134 -108 -32 0 180 -90 -60 0 
12 Incidental 0 90 180 180 180 90 180 0 
13 Incidental -93 -18 -38 
14 Incidental -43 138 43 -142 44 0 90 0 
15 Incidental -18 32 
16 Incidental -90 -41 
17 Incidental -43 90 
18 Incidental -43 90 -39 43 
19 Incidental -63 18 127 151 -34 -42 165 0 
20 Incidental -45 45 
Signed errors (degrees) 
Subject Learning condition la lb Ic Id 2a 2b 2c 2d 
1 Intentional 35 -37 -36.5 -22.00 -122 -72 45 0 
2 Intentional 8 19 0 18.00 152.5 -72 -90 0 
3 Intentional -55 -127 -36.5 25.50 -88 163 55 0 
4 Intentional -37 -36.5 68.00 -122 -119.5 -42 0 
5 Intentional 48 38 -4 -42.00 -47 -72 90 0 
6 Intentional -55 -37 -80 -67.00 
7 Intentional -11 179.5 -42 0 0 
8 Intentional 80 -7 -24.5 14.50 -85.5 -146.5 0 0 
9 Intentional -145 -127 -80 -32 108 0 0 
10 Intentional -2 -178.5 -113.5 -112.00 
11 Incidental -99 -144.5 -111.5 -112.00 -122 -72 120 0 
12 Incidental 35 53 100 68.00 -122 108 0 0 
13 Incidental -58 -54.5 -117.5 
14 Incidental -8 100.5 -37 -73.50 101.5 18 -90 0 
15 Incidental 18 -5.5 
16 Incidental -55 -78 
17 Incidental -8 53 
18 Incidental -8 53 -119 -69.50 
19 Incidental -28 -19.5 46.5 39.00 24 -24 -15 0 
20 Incidental -82 -35 
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Signed errors excluding errors greater than 90° (degrees) 
Subjects \Learning condition la lb Ic Id 2a 2b 2c 2d 
1 Intentional 35 -37 -38 -22 -72 45 0 
2 Intentional -10 17 0 18 -72 0 
3 Intentional -55 -38 28 -86 50 0 
4 Intentional -37 -38 68 -61 0 
5 Intentional 50 33 8 -62 -42 0 
6 Intentional -55 -37 -80 -77 
7 Intentional -18 -32 0 0 
8 Intentional -15 -29 9 -79 0 0 
9 Intentional 80 -32 0 0 
10 Intentional 5 
11 Incidental -41 0 
12 Incidental 35 53 68 0 0 
13 Incidental -6 -53 
14 Incidental -6 -39 18 0 
15 Incidental 25 -19 
16 Incidental -55 -74 
17 Incidental -10 53 
18 Incidental -5 53 -80 
19 Incidental -30 -17 38 40 -30 -31 -15 0 
20 Incidental -62 -35 
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8.2 Experiment I I 
Left-oriented environment - judgements (degrees) 
S9 SIO Sll S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 
Jl 60 -10 20 45 45 30 90 20 
J2 25 30 15 -30 180 -30 180 95 
J3 50 45 45 -60 45 -60 45 100 
J4 110 80 15 -90 40 -85 45 90 
J5 30 -10 30 30 90 45 45 60 
J6 65 -10 60 30 140 40 90 20 
J7 170 250 170 150 45 170 90 30 
J8 160 25 120 110 120 135 180 45 
J9 70 60 45 -60 140 -75 90 120 
JIO 30 45 45 -60 45. -60 180 70 
J l l 55 45 60 -60 140 -60 45 60 
J12 60 60 60 -60 90 -60 45 95 
Left-oriented environment - signed errors excluding error greater than 90° 
SI S2 S3 S4 85 86 87 88 
Jl -3 2 2 -13 -63 12 -48 
J2 -15 -5 -5 -25 10 45 -15 -15 
J3 4 9 -6 14 -11 4 74 
J4 57 -18 2 -8 -18 -48 -18 
J5 -15 -5 35 -15 75 
J6 -82 -22 -57 8 3 
J7 -5 -5 75 15 -45 35 
J8 -5 80 -5 75 -5 15 5 
J9 15 15 0 15 -25 35 0 30 
JIO -34 -19 76 11 26 -4 -4 
J l l -8 -8 17 -8 7 -83 
J12 -15 -30 0 -55 5 -30 -15 
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Right-oriented environment - judgements (degrees) 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
Jl -15 90 -20 -20 -5 45 -30 30 
J2 30 20 20 40 5 -30 30 30 
J3 30 25 40 20 45 180 30 -40 
J4 15 90 70 80 90 120 90 220 
J5 45 150 -30 -40 -80 -30 -120 60 
J6 45 45 -15 20 -45 -180 120 -40 
J7 -160 20 -160 120 -180 15 -120 -200 
J8 -130 145 -130 150 -130 90 -150 -140 
J9 45 45 60 45 85 25 60 30 
JIO -60 90 75 -20 45 30 60 60 
J l l -60 45 45 20 45 30 120 160 
J12 -60 45 60 30 85 25 60 45 
Right-oriented environment - signed errors excluding error greater than 
90° 
SI 52 S3 S4 55 S6 57 55 
Jl -41.6 28.4 -1.6 -26.6 -26.6 -11.6 -71.6 -1.6 
J2 -40.3 -45.3 -30.3 14.7 14.7 
J3 -83.7 -78.7 -78.7 26.3 -78.7 26.3 -78.7 
J4 -86.6 18.4 13.4 
J5 15.0 55.0 15.0 15.0 -45.0 0.0 0.0 -15.0 
J6 -28.1 46.9 -23.1 6.9 -3.1 -53.1 16.9 
J7 -5.3 -85.3 -5.3 14.7 -5.3 74.7 
J8 -25.0 15.0 25.0 15.0 0.0 -45.0 
J9 -0.3 14.7 
JIO -86.3 3.7 3.7 
J l l -81.9 23.1 23.1 -81.9 
J12 30.3 30.3 -74.7 
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8.3 Experiment I I I 
Out of the line of sight - Judgements (degrees) 
SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 57 S8 
Jl 110 45 45 45 60 45 45 50 
J2 -65 -125 20 30 15 15 15 30 
J3 -50 135 -40 -45 -45 -45 -45 -80 
J4 -45 55 -30 -45 -60 -45 -45 -50 
J5 125 45 50 45 45 45 45 50 
J6 -10 145 -20 -30 0 -15 -15 -35 
J7 30 135 20 30 30 15 15 35 
J8 -45 -60 -40 -45 -45 -45 -45 -80 
J9 75 75 45 45 -75 45 45 45 
JIO 45 30 50 45 45 45 45 80 
111 -10 0 -20 -30 -15 -60 0 -30 
J12 -45 145 -45 -45 -30 -45 -45 -50 
Out of the line of sight - signed errors (degrees) 
SI S2 S3 S4 55 S6 57 55 
Jl 62 -3 -3 -3 12 -3 -3 2 
J2 -20 -25 -15 -30 -30 -30 -15 
J3 -20 -10 -15 -15 -15 -15 -50 
J4 -3 12 -3 -18 -3 -3 -8 
J5 80 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
J6 1 -9 -19 11 -4 -4 -24 
J7 -38 67 -48 -38 -38 -53 -53 -33 
J8 0 -15 5 0 0 0 0 -35 
J9 24 24 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 
JIO -15 -30 -10 -15 -15 -15 -15 20 
J l l 69 79 59 49 64 19 79 49 
J12 -6 4 -6 -6 9 -6 ' -6 -11 
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In the line of sight - Judgements (degrees) 
57 52 53 S4 55 S6 57 55 
Jl 0 0 -8 -5 -10 0 -20 -7 
J2 75 65 85 35 60 45 30 65 
J3 -45 -15 -25.5 -80 -30 -45 -15 -40 
J4 0 0 -15 0 -10 -10 -20 -15 
J5 -40 -30 -50 -70 -40 -30 -30 -60 
J6 85 80 80 15 70 45 60 20 
J7 -10 -45 -25 -45 -30 -45 -20 -30 
J8 30 35 50 65 45 45 60 60 
J9 20 15 32.5 30 40 5 45 27 
JIO 45 60 65 45 60 50 40 55 
J l l -20 -45 17.5 -45 -60 -40 -30 -20 
J12 20 15 32.5 35 40 5 30 30 
In the line of sight - signed errors (degrees) 
57 52 55 S4 55 55 57 55 
Jl -6 -6 2 -1 4 -6 14 1 
J2 -16 -6 -26 24 -1 14 29 -6 
J3 13 -17 -7 48 -2 13 -17 8 
J4 -6 -6 9 -6 4 4 14 9 
J5 -1 -11 9 29 -1 -11 -11 19 
J6 -22 -17 -17 48 -7 18 3 43 
J7 -21 14 -6 14 -1 14 -11 -1 
J8 19 14 -1 -16 4 4 -11 -11 
J9 7 12 -6 -3 -13 22 -18 0 
JIO 13 -2 -7 13 -2 8 18 3 
J l l -7 18 -44 18 33 13 3 -7 
J12 7 12 -6 -8 -13 22 -3 -3 
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8.4 Experiment I V 
Condition la 
Signed errors 
Aligned -7 -2.59 22.41 -20.24 -10.24 -0.24 
Counter-aligned -2.59 -67.59 -2.59 17.47 -82.53 32.47 
Non-aligned-right 78 18 13 -26 4 
Non-aligned-left 49 14 2.47 5 -10 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 7 3 22 20 10 0 
Counter-aligned 3 68 3 17 83 32 
Non-aligned-right 78 18 13 26 4 
Non-aligned-left 49 14 2 5 10 
Signed errors 
Aligned -7 -2.59 22.41 -20.24 -10.24 -0.24 
Counter-aligned -2.59 -67.59 -2.59 17.47 -82.53 32.47 
Non-aligned 78 18 13 -26 4 49 14 2.47 5 -10 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 7 2.59 22.41 20.24 10.24 0.24 
Counter-aligned 2.59 67.59 2.59 17.47 82.53 32.47 
Non-aligned 78 18 13 26 4 49 14 2.47 5 10 
Condition lb 
Signed errors 
Aligned 18.4 -11.6 -51.6 -4.7 5.3 -7.0 
Non-aligned-right 5.0 -30.0 30.0 -45.0 38.2 28.2 
Non-aligned-left 0.0 -5.0 -2.0 9.4 0.0 -15.0 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 18.4 11.6 51.6 4.7 5.3 7.0 
Non-aligned-right 5.0 30.0 30.0 45.0 38.2 28.2 
Non-aligned-left 0.0 5.0 2.0 9.4 0.0 15.0 
Signed errors 
Aligned 18.4 -11.6 -51.6 -4.7 5.3 -7.0 
Non-aligned 5.0 -30.0 30.0 -45.0 38.2 28.2 0.0 -5.0 -2.0 9.4 0.0 -15.0 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 18.4 11.6 51.6 4.7 5.3 7.0 
Non-aligned 5.0 30.0 30.0 45.0 38.20 28.20 0.0 5.0 2.0 9.44 0.0 15.0 
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Condition Ic 
Signed errors 
Aligned -9.0 21.0 -37.0 13.0 . 28.0 
Counter-aligned -11.6 -26.6 -15.3 
Non-aligned-right -21.0 -21.0 -21.0 -12.5 
Non-aligned-left 8.7 -1.3 -12.5 -22.5 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 9.0 21.0 37.0 13.0 28.0 
Counter-aligned 11.6 26.6 15.3 
Non-aligned-right 21.0 21.0 21.0 12.5 
Non-aligned-left 8.7 1.3 12.5 22.5 
Signed errors 
Aligned -9.0 21.0 -37.0 13.0 28.0 
Counter-aligned -11.6 -26.6 -15.3 
Non-aligned -21.0 -21.0 -21.0 -12.5 8.7 -1.3 -12.5 -22.5 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 9.0 21.0 37.0 13.0 28.0 
Counter-aligned 11.6 26.6 15.3 
Non-aligned 21.0 21.0 21.0 12.5 8.7 1.3 12.5 22.5 
Condition Id 
Signed errors 
Aligned 15.0 -8.8 -8.8 0.0 45.0 0.0 
Counter-aligned 80.0 -81.0 -11.0 45.0 
Non-aligned-right 75.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 -7.0 58.0 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 15.0 8.8 8.8 0.0 45.0 0.0 
Counter-aligned 80.0 81.0 11.0 45.0 
Non-aligned-right 75.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 7.0 58.0 
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Condition 2a 
Signed errors 
Aligned 8.0 -7.0 68.0 -10.6 37.4 
Counter-aligned -43.4 -0.4 -7.5 -7.5 72.4 -3.6 
Non-aligned-right 83.0 -17.0 18.0 79.0 -81.9 -16.9 
Non-aligned-left 74.0 -1.0 10.0 20.0 27.5 32.5 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 8.0 7.0 68.0 10.6 37.4 
Counter-aligned 43.4 0.4 7.5 7.5 72.4 3.6 
Non-aligned-right 83.0 17.0 18.0 79.0 81.9 16.9 
Non-aligned-left 74.0 1.0 10.0 20.0 27.5 32.5 
Signed errors 
Aligned 8.0 -7.0 68.0 -10.6 37.4 
Coimter-aligned -43.4 -0.4 -7.5 -7.5 72.4 -3.6 
Non-aligned 83.0 -17.0 18.0 79.0 -81.9 -16.9 74.0 -1.0 10.0 20.0 27.5 32.5 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 8.0 7.0 68.0 10.6 37.4 
Counter-aligned 43.4 0.4 7.5 7.5 72.4 3.6 
Non-aligned 83.0 17.0 18.0 79.0 81.9 16.9 74.0 1.0 10.0 20.0 27.5 32.5 
Condition 2b 
Signed errors 
Aligned 10.3 83.0 -52.0 8.0 8.4 18.4 
Non-aligned-right 15.0 30.0 78.0 45.0 -45.0 8.2 38.2 
Non-aligned-left -45.0 0.0 -10.6 25.0 0.0 80.0 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 10.3 83.0 52.0 8.0 8.4 18.4 
Non-aligned-right 15.0 30.0 78.0 45.0 45.0 8.2 38.2 
Non-aligned-left 45.0 0.0 10.6 25.0 0.0 80.0 
Signed errors 
Aligned 10.3 83.0 -52.0 8.0 8.4 18.4 
Non-aligned 15.0 30.0 78.0 45.0 -45.0 8.2 38.2 -45.0 0.0 -10.6 25.0 0.0 80.0 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 10.3 83.0 52.0 8.0 8.4 18.4 
Non-aligned 15.0 30.0 78.0 45.0 45.0 8.2 38.2 45.0 0.0 10.6 25.0 0.0 80.0 
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Condition 2c 
Signed errors 
Aligned -39.0 -19.0 -24.0 -9.0 -4.0 -47.0 23.0 
Counter-aligned -24.0 -4.0 29.7 18.4 -11.6 63.4 
Non-aligned-right 21.0 14.0 -31.0 14.0 69.0 -12.5 2.5 
Non-aligned-left 12.7 -2.3 -12.5 -12.5 32.5 -47.3 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 39.0 19.0 24.0 9.0 4.0 47.0 23.0 
Counter-aligned 24.0 4.0 29.7 18.4 11.6 63.4 
Non-aligned-right 21.0 14.0 31.0 14.0 69.0 12.5 2.5 
Non-aligned-left 12.7 2.3 12.5 12.5 32.5 47.3 
Signed errors 
Aligned -39.0 -19.0 -24.0 -9.0 -4.0 -47.0 23.0 
Counter-aligned -24.0 -4.0 29.7 18.4 -11.6 63.4 
Non-aligned 21.0 14.0 -31.0 14.0 69.0 -12.5 2.5 12.7 -2.3 -12.5 -12.5 32.5 -47.3 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 39.0 19.0 24.0 9.0 4.0 47.0 23.0 
Counter-aligned 24.0 4.0 29.7 18.4 11.6 63.4 
Non-aligned 21.0 14.0 31.0 14.0 69.0 12.5 2.5 12.7 2.3 12.5 12.5 32.5 47.3 
Condition 2d 
Signed errors 
Aligned 45.0 0.0 -45.0 0.0 -32.0 8.0 -45.0 0.0 0.0 
Counter-aligned 85.0 0.0 -81.0 9.0 -81.0 -36.0 -36.0 -36.0 -81.0 
Non-aligned-right -45.0 0.0 -45.0 -45.0 13.0 -45.0 
Unsigned errors 
Aligned 45.0 0.0 45.0 0.0 32.0 8.0 45.0 0.0 0.0 
Counter-aligned 85.0 0.0 81.0 9.0 81.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 81.0 
Non-aligned-right 45.0 0.0 45.0 45.0 13.0 45.0 
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8.5 Experiment V 
One period of exploration (route judgements) 
Route 
Red - green 8.0 10.0 12.0 6.0 14.0 12.0 12.0 8.0 
Clock - green 11.0 10.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 15.0 10.0 11.0 
Window-green 22.0 24.0 22.0 42.0 25.0 10.0 25.0 25.0 
Purple - green 14.0 12.0 14.0 15.0 20.0 12.0 12.0 17.0 
Clock - red 9.0 10.0 12.0 13.0 18.0 10.0 10.0 12.0 
Window - red 20.0 24.0 23.0 41.0 25.0 15.0 25.0 25.0 
Purple - red 12.0 12.0 15.0 14.0 18.0 15.0 12.0 18.0 
Window - clock 10.0 18.0 16.0 32.0 20.0 12.0 18.0 18.0 
Purple - clock 8.0 8.0 11.0 11.0 10.0 10.0 7.0 11.0 
Purple - window 10.0 18.0 15.0 25.0 25.0 8.0 16.0 23.0 
Green - red 8.0 12.0 12.0 6.0 6.0 10.0 10.0 12.0 
Green - clock 16.0 18.0 8.0 13.0 13.0 12.0 15.0 16.0 
Green - window 20.0 32.0 18.0 41.0 41.0 15.0 25.0 35.0 
Green - purple 12.0 18.0 14.0 17.0 17.0 12.0 15.0 24.0 
Red - clock 12.0 12.0 11.0 14.0 18.0 10.0 15.0 14.0 
Red - window 20.0 32.0 18.0 40.0 26.0 10.0 20.0 26.0 
Red - purple 8.0 12.0 15.0 17.0 18.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Clock - window 10.0 26.0 16.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 25.0 24.0 
Clock - purple 7.0 11.0 11.0 14.0 12.0 20.0 15.0 11.0 
Window - purple 15.0 18.0 20.0 28.0 18.0 8.0 18.0 18.0 
One period of exploration (Euclidean judgements) 
Euclidean 
Red - green 8.0 9.0 8.0 6.0 14.0 12.0 7.0 6.0 
Clock - green 10.0 7.0 8.0 12.0 8.0 12.0 . 7.0 7.0 
Window-green 14.0 15.0 15.0 42.0 20.0 12.0 12.0 15.0 
Purple - green 10.0 8.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 25.0 10.0 12.0 
Clock - red 9.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 
Window - red 6.0 8.0 17.0 41.0 14.0 15.0 15.0 13.0 
Purple - red 8.0 6.0 6.0 11.0 10.0 20.0 6.0 7.0 
Window - clock 6.0 12.0 11.0 32.0 16.0 15.0 12.0 9.0 
Purple - clock 6.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 20.0 8.0 9.0 
Purple - window 8.0 6.0 14.0 8.0 20.0 15.0 6.0 7.0 
Green - red 8.0 12.0 8.0 6.0 14.0 14.0 7.0 6.0 
Green - clock 12.0 18.0 6.0 14.0 15.0 15.0 7.0 7.0 
Green - window 12.0 11.0 12.0 40.0 18.0 18.0 10.0 13.0 
Green - purple 10.0 32.0 12.0 17.0 14.0 14.0 16.0 8.0 
Red - clock 6.0 5.0 10.0 14.0 18.0 10.0 7.0 8.0 
Red - window 4.0 18.0 15.0 42.0 26.0 20.0 18.0 6.0 
Red - purple 4.0 18.0 8.0 18.0 18.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 
Clock - window 10.0 5.0 8.0 32.0 12.0 15.0 25.0 12.0 
Clock - purple 7.0 9.0 9.0 14.0 8.0 12.0 15.0 9.0 
Window - purple 13.0 6.0 14.0 28.0 20.0 12.0 8.0 7.0 
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One period of exploration (signed route errors) 
Route 
Red - green -3.0 -1.0 1.0 -5.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 -3.0 
Clock - green -7.0 -8.0 -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 -3.0 -8.0 -7.0 
Window-green -21.0 -19.0 -21.0 -1.0 -18.0 -33.0 -18.0 -18.0 
Purple - green -10.0 -12.0 -10.0 -9.0 -4.0 -12.0 -12.0 -7.0 
Clock - red -11.0 -10.0 -8.0 -7.0 -2.0 -10.0 -10.0 -8.0 
Window - red -25.0 -21.0 -22.0 -4.0 -20.0 -30.0 -20.0 -20.0 
Purple - red -13.0 -13.0 -10.0 -11.0 -7.0 -10.0 -13.0 -7.0 
Window - clock -28.0 -20.0 -22.0 -6.0 -18.0 -26.0 -20.0 -20.0 
Purple - clock -12.0 -12.0 -9.0 -9.0 -10.0 -10.0 -13.0 -9.0 
Purple - window -27.0 -19.0 -22.0 -12.0 -12.0 -29.0 -21.0 -14.0 
Green - red -3.0 1.0 1.0 -5.0 -5.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 
Green - clock -2.0 0.0 -10.0 -5.0 -5.0 -6.0 -3.0 -2.0 
Green - window -23.0 -11.0 -25.0 -2.0 -2.0 -28.0 -18.0 -8.0 
Green - purple -12.0 -6.0 -10.0 -7.0 -7.0 -12.0 -9.0 0.0 
Red - clock -8.0 -8.0 -9.0 -6.0 -2.0 -10.0 -5.0 -6.0 
Red - window -25.0 -13.0 -27.0 -5.0 -19.0 -35.0 -25.0 -19.0 
Red - purple -17.0 -13.0 -10.0 -8.0 -7.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 
Clock - window -28.0 -12.0 -22.0 -8.0 -18.0 -28.0 -13.0 -14.0 
Clock - purple -13.0 -9.0 -9.0 -6.0 -8.0 0.0 -5.0 -9.0 
Window - purple -22.0 -19.0 -17.0 -9.0 -19.0 -29.0 -19.0 -19.0 
One period of exploration (signed Euclidean errors) 
Euclidean 
Red - green -0.1 0.9 -0.1 -2.1 5.9 3.9 -1.1 -2.1 
Clock - green -1.7 -4.7 -3.7 0.3 -3.7 0.3 -4.7 -4.7 
Window-green -6.6 -5.6 -5.6 21.4 -0.6 -8.6 -8.6 -5.6 
Purple - green -2.7 -4.7 -2.7 -4.7 -4.7 12.3 -2.7 -0.7 
Clock - red 0.9 3.9 2.9 2.9 6.9 1.9 1.9 -0.1 
Window - red -12.1 -10.1 -1.1 22.9 -4.1 -3.1 -3.1 -5.1 
Purple - red 0.9 -1.1 -1.1 3.9 2.9 12.9 -1.1 -0.1 
Window - clock -7.0 -1.0 -2.0 19.0 3.0 2.0 -1.0 -4.0 
Purple - clock -5.1 -4.1 -3.1 -3.1 0.9 9.0 -3.1 -2.1 
Purple - window -2.4 -4.4 3.6 -2.4 9.6 4.6 -4.4 -3.4 
Green - red -0.1 3.9 -0.1 -2.1 5.9 5.9 -1.1 -2.1 
Green - clock 0.3 6.3 -5.7 2.3 3.3 3.3 -4.7 -4.7 
Green - window -8.6 -9.6 -8.6 19.4 -2.6 -2.6 -10.6 -7.6 
Green - purple -2.7 19.3 -0.7 4.3 1.3 1.3 3.3 -4.7 
Red - clock -2.1 -3.1 1.9 5.9 9.9 1.9 -1.1 -0.1 
Red - window -14.1 -0.1 -3.1 23.9 7.9 1.9 -0.1 -12.1 
Red - purple -3.1 10.9 0.9 10.9 10.9 4.9 2.9 2.9 
Clock - window -3.0 -8.0 -5.0 19.0 -1.0 2.0 12.0 -1.0 
Clock - purple -4.1 -2.1 -2.1 3.0 -3.1 0.9 4.0 -2.1 
Window - purple 2.6 -4.4 3.6 17.6 9.6 1.6 -2.4 -3.4 
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One period of exploration (unsigned route errors) 
Route 
Red - green 3.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Clock - green 4.5 4.0 7.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 4.5 
Window-green 22.0 15.0 23.0 1.5 10.0 30.5 18.0 13.0 
Purple - green 11.0 9.0 10.0 8.0 5.5 12.0 10.5 3.5 
Clock - red 9.5 9.0 8.5 6.5 2.0 10.0 7.5 7.0 
Window - red 25.0 17.0 24.5 4.5 19.5 32.5 22.5 19.5 
Purple - red 15.0 13.0 10.0 9.5 7.0 10.0 11.5 8.5 
Window - clock 28.0 16.0 22.0 7.0 18.0 27.0 16.5 17.0 
Purple - clock 12.5 10.5 9.0 7.5 9.0 5.0 9.0 9.0 
Purple - window 24.5 19.0 19.5 10.5 15.5 29.0 20.0 16.5 
One period of exploration (unsigned Euclidean errors) 
Euclidean 
Red - green 0.1 2.4 0.1 2.1 5.9 4.9 1.1 2.1 
Clock - green 1.0 5.5 4.7 1.3 3.5 1.8 4.7 4.7 
Window-green 7.6 7.6 7.1 20.4 1.6 5.6 9.6 6.6 
Purple - green 2.7 12.0 1.7 4.5 3.0 6.8 3.0 2.7 
Clock - red 1.5 3.5 2.4 4.4 8.4 1.9 1.5 0.1 
Window - red 13.1 5.1 2.1 23.4 6.0 2.5 1.6 8.6 
Purple - red 2.0 6.0 1.0 7.4 6.9 8.9 2.0 1.5 
Window - clock 5.0 4.5 3.5 19.0 2.0 2.0 6.5 2.5 
Purple - clock 4.6 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.0 5.0 3.5 2.1 
Purple - window 2.5 4.4 3.6 10.0 9.6 3.1 3.4 3.4 
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Three period of exploration (signed route judgements) 
Judgements 
Red - green 15.0 8.0 11.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 6.0 9.0 
Clock - green 10.0 8.0 10.0 14.0 11.0 20.0 20.0 13.0 
Window-green 25.0 40.0 32.0 30.0 19.0 28.0 16.0 31.0 
Purple - green 12.0 8.0 14.0 18.0 14.0 16.0 11.0 16.0 
Clock - red 10.0 8.0 11.0 12.0 15.0 16.0 16.0 12.0 
Window - red 20.0 40.0 33.0 33.0 22.0 28.0 16.0 30.0 
Purple - red 10.0 8.0 15.0 17.0 16.0 20.0 11.0 16.0 
Window - clock 25.0 45.0 35.0 29.0 14.0 20.0 16.0 28.0 
Piuple - clock 12.0 6.0 17.0 13.0 11.0 16.0 7.0 14.0 
Purple - window 10.0 30.0 23.0 24.0 14.0 20.0 14.0 24.0 
Green - red 8.0 8.0 11.0 9.0 7.0 12.0 7.0 7.0 
Green - clock 10.0 8.0 9.0 4.5 13.0 16.0 10.0 14.0 
Green - window 30.0 40.0 34.0 26.0 18.0 28.0 24.0 30.0 
Green - purple 15.0 12.0 17.0 14.0 13.0 16.0 15.0 17.0 
Red - clock 15.0 16.0 18.0 12.0 14.0 14.0 11.0 14.0 
Red - window 20.0 60.0 32.0 32.0 20.0 28.0 16.0 31.0 
Red - purple 10.0 10.0 16.0 12.0 26.0 20.0 11.0 19.0 
Clock - window 15.0 30.0 32.0 32.0 23.0 24.0 24.0 28.0 
Clock - purple 12.0 4.0 17.0 17.0 7.0 12.0 12.0 15.0 
Window - purple 20.0 30.0 25.0 23.0 20.0 20.0 16.0 24.0 
Three period of exploration (signed Euclidean judgements) 
Judgements 
Red - green 10.0 8.0 10.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 10.0 5.0 
Clock - green 10.0 12.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 6.0 12.0 12.0 
Window-green 45.0 60.0 26.0 16.0 18.0 15.0 28.0 14.0 
Purple - green 20.0 12.0 13.0 8.0 10.0 5.0 8.0 8.0 
Clock - red 22.0 10.0 9.0 7.0 12.0 6.0 8.0 7.0 
Window - red 55.0 60.0 22.0 15.0 20.0 17.0 24.0 16.0 
Purple - red 20.0 12.0 8.0 10.0 14.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
Window - clock 35.0 55.0 16.0 12.0 12.0 8.0 20.0 14.0 
Purple - clock 15.0 8.0 14.0 8.0 8.0 6.0 16.0 16.0 
Purple - window 32.0 50.0 9.0 6.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 9.0 
Green - red 10.0 8.0 10.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 10.0 8.0 
Green - clock 20.0 12.0 7.0 4.0 12.0 6.0 8.0 7.0 
Green - window 40.0 60.0 24.0 14.0 15.0 15.0 20.0 16.0 
Green - purple 25.0 16.0 15.0 9.0 11.0 8.0 16.0 13.0 
Red - clock 15.0 14.0 8.0 7.0 12.0 6.0 10.0 12.0 
Red - window 55.0 40.0 18.0 12.0 18.0 12.0 26.0 14.0 
Red - purple 30.0 8.0 8.0 6.0 22.0 9.0 8.0 5.0 
Clock - window 35.0 50.0 13.0 14.0 18.0 10.0 8.0 15.0 
Clock - purple 20.0 6.0 10.0 10.0 6.0 6.0 12.0 12.0 
Window - purple 40.0 50.0 13.0 6.0 18.0 6.0 24.0 7.0 
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Three period of exploration (unsigned route errors) 
Judgements SI S2 83 84 85 86 87 88 
Red - green 4.0 -3.0 0.0 -3.0 -1.0 -1.0 -5.0 -2.0 
Clock - green -8.0 -10.0 -8.0 -4.0 -7.0 2.0 2.0 -5.0 
Window-green -18.0 -3.0 -11.0 -13.0 -24.0 -15.0 -27.0 -12.0 
Purple - green -12.0 -16.0 -10.0 -6.0 -10.0 -8.0 -13.0 -8.0 
Clock - red -10.0 -12.0 -9.0 -8.0 -5.0 -4.0 -4.0 -8.0 
Window - red -25.0 -5.0 -12.0 -12.0 -23.0 -17.0 -29.0 -15.0 
Purple - red -15.0 -17.0 -10.0 -8.0 -9.0 -5.0 -14.0 -9.0 
Window - clock -13.0 7.0 -3.0 -9.0 -24.0 -18.0 -22.0 -10.0 
Purple - clock -8.0 -14.0 -3.0 -7.0 -9.0 -4.0 -13.0 -6.0 
Purple - window -27.0 -7.0 -14.0 -13.0 -23.0 -17.0 -23.0 -13.0 
Green - red -3.0 -3.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 1.0 -4.0 -4.0 
Green - clock -8.0 -10.0 -9.0 -13.5 -5.0 -2.0 -8.0 -4.0 
Green - window -13.0 -3.0 -9.0 -17.0 -25.0 -15.0 -19.0 -13.0 
Green - purple -9.0 -12.0 -7.0 -10.0 -11.0 -8.0 -9.0 -7.0 
Red - clock -5.0 -4.0 -2.0 -8.0 -6.0 -6.0 -9.0 -6.0 
Red - window -25.0 15.0 -13.0 -13.0 -25.0 -17.0 -29.0 -14.0 
Red - purple -15.0 -15.0 -9.0 -13.0 1.0 -5.0 -14.0 -6.0 
Clock - window -23.0 -8.0 -6.0 -6.0 -15.0 -14.0 -14.0 -10.0 
Clock - purple -8.0 -16.0 -3.0 -3.0 -13.0 -8.0 -8.0 -5.0 
Window - purple -17.0 -7.0 -12.0 -14.0 -17.0 -17.0 -21.0 -13.0 
Three period of exploration (unsigned Euclidean errors) 
Judgements SI 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
Red - green 1.9 -0.1 1.9 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1 1.9 -3.1 
Clock - green -1.7 0.3 -4.7 -3.7 -3.7 -5.7 0.3 0.3 
Window-green 24.4 39.4 5.4 -4.6 -2.6 -5.6 7.4 -6.6 
Purple - green 7.3 -0.7 0.3 -4.7 -2.7 -7.7 -4.7 -4.7 
Clock - red 13.9 1.9 0.9 -1.1 3.9 -2.1 -0.1 -1.1 
Window - red 36.9 41.9 3.9 -3.1 1.9 -1.1 5.9 -2.1 
Purple - red 12.9 4.9 0.9 2.9 6.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Window - clock 22.0 42.0 3.0 -1.0 -1.0 -5.0 7.0 1.0 
Purple - clock 4.0 -3.1 3.0 -3.1 -3.1 -5.1 5.0 5.0 
Purple - window 21.6 39.6 -1.4 -4.4 1.6 -0.4 -0.4 -1.4 
Green - red 1.9 -0.1 1.9 -1.1 -2.1 -2.1 1.9 -0.1 
Green - clock 8.3 0.3 -4.7 -7.7 0.3 -5.7 -3.7 -4.7 
Green - window 19.4 39.4 3.4 -6.6 -5.6 -5.6 -0.6 -4.6 
Green - purple 12.3 3.3 2.3 -3.7 -1.7 -4.7 3.3 0.3 
Red - clock 6.9 5.9 -0.1 -1.1 3.9 -2.1 1.9 3.9 
Red - window 36.9 21.9 -0.1 -6.1 -0.1 -6.1 7.9 -4.1 
Red - purple 22.9 0.9 0.9 -1.1 14.9 1.9 0.9 -2.1 
Clock - window 22.0 37.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 -3.0 -5.0 2.0 
Clock - purple 9.0 -5.1 -1.1 -1.1 -5.1 -5.1 0.9 0.9 
Window - purple 29.6 39.6 2.6 -4.4 7.6 -4.4 13.6 -3.4 
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Three period of exploration (unsigned route errors) 
Route 81 S2 S3 84 85 86 87 88 
Red - green 0.5 3.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 4.5 3.0 
Clock - green 8.0 10.0 8.5 8.8 6.0 0.0 3.0 4.5 
Window-green 15.5 3.0 10.0 15.0 24.5 15.0 23.0 12.5 
Purple - green 10.5 14.0 8.5 8.0 10.5 8.0 11.0 7.5 
Clock - red 7.5 8.0 5.5 8.0 5.5 5.0 6.5 7.0 
Window - red 25.0 5.0 12.5 12.5 24.0 17.0 29.0 14.5 
Purple - red 15.0 16.0 9.5 10.5 4.0 5.0 14.0 7.5 
Window - clock 18.0 0.5 4.5 7.5 19.5 16.0 18.0 10.0 
Purple - clock 8.0 15.0 3.0 5.0 11.0 6.0 10.5 5.5 
Purple - window 22.0 7.0 13.0 13.5 20.0 17.0 22.0 13.0 
Three period of exploration (unsigned Euclidean errors) 
Euclidean 81 82 83 84 S5 86 87 88 
Red - green 1.9 0.1 1.9 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.6 
Clock - green 3.3 0.3 4.7 5.7 1.7 5.7 1.7 2.2 
Window-green 21.9 39.4 4.4 5.6 4.1 5.6 3.4 5.6 
Purple - green 9.8 1.3 1.3 4.2 2.2 6.2 0.7 2.2 
Clock - red 10.4 3.9 0.4 1.1 3.9 2.1 0.9 1.4 
Window - red 36.9 31.9 1.9 4.6 0.9 3.6 6.9 3.1 
Purple - red 17.9 2.9 0.9 0.9 10.9 3.4 2.9 1.4 
Window - clock 22.0 39.5 1.5 0.0 2.0 4.0 1.0 1.5 
Purple - clock 6.5 4.1 0.9 2.1 4.1 5.1 3.0 3.0 
Purple - window 25.6 39.6 0.6 4.4 4.6 2.4 6.6 2.4 
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Map learning (judgements) 
Judgement 81 82 S3 84 85 86 87 88 
Red-green 15.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 4.0 
Clock-green 10.0 12.0 10.0 12.0 10.0 16.0 40.0 6.0 
Window-green 30.0 26.0 20.0 17.0 22.0 40.0 54.0 12.0 
Purple-green 34.0 16.0 14.0 18.0 12.0 28.0 14.0 9.0 
Clock-red 12.0 16.0 16.0 14.0 15.0 24.0 30.0 4.0 
Window-red 20.0 22.0 20.0 14.0 20.0 32.0 60.0 9.0 
Purple-red 20.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 16.0 24.0 10.0 
Window-clock 25.0 14.0 16.0 12.0 18.0 24.0 45.0 10.0 
Purple-clock 40.0 14.0 16.0 12.0 10.0 16.0 20.0 7.0 
Purple-window 25.0 14.0 20.0 11.0 10.0 20.0 32.0 14.0 
Green - red 15.0 6.0 12.0 11.0 9.0 24.0 30.0 4.0 
Green - clock 20.0 8.0 10.0 15.0 5.0 20.0 36.0 8.0 
Green- window 25.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 48.0 16.0 
Green - purple 30.0 16.0 16.0 15.0 12.0 32.0 28.0 8.0 
Red - clock 25.0 20.0 16.0 14.0 13.0 24.0 16.0 5.0 
Red - window 30.0 14.0 22.0 16.0 15.0 24.0 38.0 9.0 
Red - purple 40.0 16.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 16.0 24.0 4.0 
Clock - window 30.0 20.0 20.0 12.0 20.0 28.0 45.0 7.0 
Clock - purple 40.0 16.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 38.0 5.0 
Window-purple 30.0 12.0 14.0 8.0 18.0 20.0 36.0 8.0 
Map learning (signed Euclidean errors) 
Euclidean errors 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 S8 
Red-green 6.9 3.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 11.9 11.9 -4.1 
Clock-green -1.1 0.9 -1.1 0.9 -1.1 4.9 28.9 -5.1 
Window-green 9.4 5.4 -0.6 -3.6 1.4 19.4 33.4 -8.6 
Purple-green 21.3 3.3 1.3 5.3 -0.7 15.3 1.3 -3.7 
Clock-red 3.9 7.9 7.9 5.9 6.9 15.9 21.9 -4.1 
Window-red 1.9 3.9 1.9 -4.1 1.9 13.9 41.9 -9.1 
Purple-red 12.9 4.9 2.9 2.9 0.9 8.9 16.9 2.9 
Window-clock 12.0 1.0 3.0 -1.0 5.0 11.0 32.0 -3.0 
Piuple-clock 29.0 3.0 5.0 0.9 -1.1 5.0 9.0 -4.1 
Purple-window 14.6 3.6 9.6 0.6 -0.4 9.6 21.6 3.6 
Green - red 6.9 -2.1 3.9 2.9 0.9 15.9 21.9 -4.1 
Green - clock 8.9 -3.1 -1.1 3.9 -6.1 8.9 24.9 -3.1 
Green- window 4.4 1.4 -0.6 -0.6 9.4 19.4 27.4 -4.6 
Green - purple 17.3 3.3 3.3 2.3 -0.7 19.3 15.3 -4.7 
Red - clock 16.9 11.9 7.9 5.9 4.9 15.9 7.9 -3.1 
Red - window 11.9 -4.1 3.9 -2.1 -3.1 5.9 19.9 -9.1 
Red - purple 32.9 8.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 8.9 16.9 -3.1 
Clock - window 17.0 7.0 7.0 -1.0 7.0 15.0 32.0 -6.0 
Clock - purple 29.0 5.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 9.0 27.0 -6.1 
Window-purple 19.6 1.6 3.6 -2.4 7.6 9.6 25.6 -2.4 
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Map learning (unsigned route errors) 
Route errors si s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 
Red-green 1.5 8.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 9.0 22.0 7.0 
Clock-green 24.5 4.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 14.0 24.0 8.5 
Window-green 13.0 11.0 9.0 20.0 8.0 13.0 30.5 27.0 
Purple-green 11.0 7.0 8.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 13.5 
Clock-red 5.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 7.5 10.0 23.0 11.5 
Window-red 7.5 10.0 9.5 20.5 9.5 3.0 33.0 32.0 
Purple-red 15.0 6.0 5.0 9.0 9.0 1.0 16.0 15.5 
Window-clock 8.0 11.0 14.0 20.0 8.0 10.0 22.0 27.0 
Purple-clock 2.5 9.0 8.0 7.0 10.5 8.0 18.0 13.5 
Purple-window 13.0 4.0 11.0 19.0 4.5 11.0 13.0 26.0 
Map learning (unsigned Euclidean errors) 
Euclidean errors 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
Red-green 6.9 0.9 2.9 2.4 1.4 13.9 16.9 4.1 
Clock-green 3.9 1.1 1.1 2.4 3.6 6.9 26.9 4.1 
Window-green 6.9 3.4 0.6 2.1 5.4 19.4 30.4 6.6 
Purple-green 19.3 3.3 2.3 3.8 0.7 17.3 8.3 4.2 
Clock-red 10.4 9.9 7.9 5.9 5.9 15.9 14.9 3.6 
Window-red 6.9 0.1 2.9 3.1 0.6 9.9 30.9 9.1 
Purple-red 22.9 6.9 1.9 1.9 0.9 8.9 16.9 0.1 
Window-clock 14.5 4.0 5.0 1.0 6.0 13.0 32.0 4.5 
Purple-clock 29.0 4.0 2.0 0.1 1.1 7.0 18.0 5.1 
Purple-window 17.1 2.6 6.6 0.9 3.6 9.6 23.6 0.6 
Page 230 
8.6 Experiment VI 
A l l judgements and errors for experiment V are in units of distance unless otherwise stated. 
Euclidean judgements (units of distance) 
Subject Control la lb 2a 2b 
1 60 30 10 25 30 
2 100 50 20 40 70 
3 25 15 20 15 25 
4 26 4 30 
5 58 5 10 20 20 
6 100 25 15 20 30 
7 60 10 18 40 20 
8 33 30 30 10 20 
9 100 25 10 60 50 
10 100 35 8 20 20 
11 45 30 30 30 40 
12 100 40 30 45 45 
13 42 35 38 27 45 
14 50 20 15 0 30 
15 50 28 35 25 34 
16 50 40 40 40 40 
Euclidean errors (units of distance) 
Errors Control la lb 2a 2b 
1 0.0 24.3 4.3 -5.1 -0.1 
2 40.0 44.3 14.3 9.9 39.9 
3 -35.0 9.3 14.3 -15.1 -5.1 
4 20.3 -1.7 -0.1 
5 -2.0 -0.7 4.3 -10.1 -10.1 
6 40.0 19.3 9.3 -10.1 -0.1 
7 0.0 4.3 12.3 9.9 -10.1 
8 -27.0 24.3 24.3 -20.1 -10.1 
9 40.0 19.3 4.3 29.9 19.9 
10 40.0 29.3 2.3 -10.1 -10.1 
11 -15.0 24.3 24.3 -0.1 9.9 
12 40.0 34.3 24.3 14.9 14.9 
13 -18.0 29.3 32.3 -3.1 14.9 
14 -10.0 14.3 9,3 -30.1 -0.1 
15 -10.0 22.3 29.3 -5.1 3.9 
16 -10.0 34.3 34.3 9.9 9.9 
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Route judgements (units of distance) 
Subject Control la lb 2a 2b 
1 60 50 60 50 50 
2 100 80 35 70 100 
3 24 20 30 30 40 
4 50 49 46 45 
5 58 35 50 30 40 
6 100 55 70 80 70 
7 60 50 50 50 40 
8 33 48 42 42 33 
9 100 100 60 75 80 
10 100 45 47 45 45 
11 45 60 60 55 60 
12 100 64 53 70 70 
13 42 42 42 35 53 
14 50 50 55 50 44 
15 56 34 49 32 45 
16 60 60 80 90 80 
Route errors (units of distance) 
Subject Control la lb 2a 2b 
1 0 -10 0 -10 -10 
2 40 20 -25 10 40 
3 -36 -40 -30 -30 -20 
4 -60 -10 -11 -14 -15 
5 -2 -25 -10 -30 -20 
6 40 -5 10 20 10 
7 0 -10 -10 -10 -20 
8 -27 -12 -18 -18 -27 
9 40 40 0 15 20 
10 40 -15 -13 -15 -15 
11 -15 0 0 -5 0 
12 40 4 -7 10 10 
13 -18 -18 -18 -25 -7 
14 -10 -10 -5 -10 -16 
15 -4 -26 -11 -28 -15 
16 0 0 20 30 20 
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Judgements of angles (degrees) 
Subject Control la lb - 2a 2b 
1 5 60 45 0 10 
2 0 90 90 45 0 
3 0 45 65 25 50 
4 0 70 145 10 
5 0 -90 110 10 0 
6 0 95 -10 60 5 
7 0 180 90 25 45 
8 0 10 10 90 -70 
9 p 90 180 0 0 
10 0 -45 90 0 
11 0 80 -70 25 35 
12 0 135 315 0 -45 
13 0 90 45 45 0 
14 0 4 160 0 45 
15 -15 45 30 45 45 
16 -45 30 315 20 0 
Unsigned Errors (degrees) 
Control la lb 2a 2b 
1 5 9 -94 -10 1.5 
2 0 39 -49 35 -8.5 
3 0 -6 -74 15 41.5 
4 0 19 6 0 -8.5 
5 0 -141 -29 0 -8.5 
6 0 44 -149 50 -3.5 
7 0 129 -49 15 36.5 
8 0 -41 -129 80 -78.5 
9 0 39 41 -10 -8.5 
10 0 -96 -49 -10 -8.5 
11 0 29 -29 15 26.5 
12 0 84 176 -10 -53.5 
13 0 39 -94 35 -8.5 
14 0 -47 21 -10 36.5 
15 -15 -6 -109 35 36.5 
16 -45 -21 176 10 -8.5 
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Signed Errors (degrees) 
Unsigned Control la lb 2a 2b 
1 5 9 94 10 1.5 
2 0 39 49 35 8.5 
3 0 6 74 15 41.5 
4 0 19 6 0 8.5 
5 0 141 29 0 8.5 
6 0 44 149 50 3.5 
7 0 129 49 15 36.5 
8 0 41 129 80 78.5 
9 0 39 41 10 8.5 
10 0 96 49 10 8.5 
11 0 29 29 15 26.5 
12 0 84 176 10 53.5 
13 0 39 94 35 8.5 
14 0 47 21 10 36.5 
15 15 6 109 35 36.5 
16 45 21 176 10 8.5 
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8.7 Experiment VII 
Signed errors (units of distance) 
Condition Exploration Judgement 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
no clutter Direct exploration Jl 1.4 -1.6 -2.6 -0.6 -0.6 1.4 -1.6 5.4 
J2 -1.2 -3.2 -3.2 -1.2 -2.2 8.8 -4.2 -3.2 
J3 -3.2 -2.2 -2.2 -0.2 -1.2 3.8 -6.2 -2.2 
89 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 
Indirect exploration Jl -2.6 -1.6 -2.6 -0.6 -6.6 -1.9 -2.1 -2.6 
J2 -1.7 -1.7 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 1.4 -3.2 -2.2 
J3 -2.2 -1.2 -4.2 -1.2 -2.2 -4.3 -2.2 -2.2 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
clutter Direct exploration J4 -4.4 -4.4 -6.4 1.6 -2.4 -2.4 -4.4 11.6 
J5 4.6 -1.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.6 -2.4 -0.4 
J6 -1.8 -2.8 -3.8 1.2 0.2 2.2 -8.8 -0.8 
89 sio 811 812 813 814 815 S16 
Indirect exploration J4 -4.4 -3.4 -1.4 -13.4 -3.4 -5.4 -4.4 -6.4 
J5 -3.4 1.6 0.6 -3.4 -2.4 -1.4 0.6 3.6 
J6 -7.8 -1.1 -3.8 -4.8 -7.8 -0.8 -3.8 -7.8 
Unsigned errors (units of distance) 
Condition Exploration Judgement 81 82 S3 84 85 86 87 88 
no clutter Direct exploration Jl 1.4 1.6 2.6 0.6 0.6 1.4 1.6 5.4 
J2 1.2 3.2 3.2 1.2 2.2 8.8 4.2 3.2 
J3 3.2 2.2 2.2 0.2 1.2 3.8 6,2 2.2 
89 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 
Indirect exploration Jl 2.6 1.6 2.6 0.6 6.6 1.9 2.1 2.6 
J2 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.4 3.2 2.2 
J3 2.2 1.2 4.2 1.2 2.2 4.3 2.2 •2.2 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
clutter Direct exploration J4 4.4 4.4 6.4 1.6 2.4 2.4 4.4 11.6 
J5 4.6 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.6 2.4 0.4 
J6 1.8 2.8 3.8 1.2 0.2 2.2 8.8 0.8 
89 810 811 812 813 S14 S15 816 
Indirect exploration J4 4.4 3.4 1.4 13.4 3.4 5.4 4.4 6.4 
J5 3.4 1.6 0.6 3.4 2.4 1.4 0.6 3.6 
J6 7.8 1.1 3.8 4.8 7.8 0.8 3.8 7.8 
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8.8 Experiment VIII 
Scanning time 
Jl J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 JIO 
set 1 2.90 2.47 3.51 2.81 3.24 2.74 4.34 3.05 4.35 3.34 
set 2 2.85 2.68 4.06 3.55 3.75 4.32 3.92 4.20 4.66 2.87 
mean scan time 2.88 2.57 3.78 3.18 3.49 3.53 4.13 3.62 4.51 3.11 
distance 2.83 2.83 5.66 6.32 6.71 9.22 10.00 10.77 11.70 13.15 
Time to locate 
Jl J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 JIO 
set 1 3.6 2.7 4.2 3.8 2.3 3.0 3.3 3.8 2.6 2.7 
set 2 3.1 2.8 3.7 2.2 2.0 2.7 2.4 3.6 3.1 2.5 
mean time 3.4 2.8 4.0 3.0 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.7 2.8 2.6 
distance 2.83 2.83 5.66 6.32 6.71 9.22 10.00 10.77 11.70 13.15 
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9. Appendix B 
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Introduction 
The virtual reality system used in experiments II-VIII inclusive is a publicware pair of 
applications consisting of Mapedit and ACK3D. 
Mapedit 
This application presents the user with a 
64x64 grid which may be populated with 
either graphical blocks or free standing 
objects. Figure 9-1, left, illustrates the grid, 
a green graphics block and a free standing 
ceiling light. 
Figure 9-2 illustrates a partially populated 
grid. The numbers round the edge of the grid 
represent a continuous wall of blocks, while 
an intervening wall may be seen running 
from left to right. A ceiling light has been 
placed just beyond the wall. 
This configuration may then be saved to a 
file. 
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Figure 9-3 illustrates what the end result 
when this configuration is executed using 
ACK3D. 
Figure 9-3 
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ACK3D 
ACK3D is the animation program which executes the configuration saved in the file generated 
from the mapedit utility. The virtual environment generated by ACK3D is navigated by means 
of the keyboard or a mouse. 
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